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Executive Summary 
Climate change is now a bright, blinking issue on the radar screens of companies 
worldwide. Companies have started addressing climate change for a myriad of 
reasons – reasons as diverse as their respective business models. The 
academic and business literature has done a fairly good job of exploring why 
companies are addressing climate change. This study examines how they are 
addressing climate change. It explores the risks, rewards, opportunities and 
barriers surrounding corporate action on climate change and provides insight into 
the strategies employed by companies that have led the way in taking early 
action. The lessons learned by early actors can inform the efforts of those who 
follow. 
 
Climate change presents companies with significant risks, uncertainties, and an 
increasing number of market opportunities. Companies now confront a patchwork 
of regional regulation. In addition, most companies in our survey expect federal 
regulations to limit GHG emissions within the next decade. The unknowns of 
potential regulation create uncertainty, and therefore risk, for businesses making 
strategic decisions. Volatile energy prices wreak havoc on cost structures, 
severely impairing the ability to accurately forecast profitability. Large storm 
events have caused companies to think differently about the physical risks of 
climate change. Accumulating scientific evidence, coupled with these large 
storms, has boosted public awareness, leading to changing consumer 
preferences. Companies are looking at these changing preferences and 
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identifying market opportunities, broadening the traditional risk-mitigation-
centered approach to climate change. 
 
The focus of this study is “climate-related strategies,” defined as the set of goals 
and implementation plans within a corporation that either aim to reduce GHG 
emissions, or that significantly reduce GHG emissions as a co-benefit. This 
includes strategies and measures for achieving near-term emission reductions 
from a company’s own operations; research, development, and investment in 
low-carbon production and process-related technologies; alternative products 
that have a more attractive carbon profile; energy-efficiency initiatives; reductions 
obtained through offsets and emissions trading; and activities to reduce 
“upstream” or “downstream” GHG emissions along their value chain. 
 
Methodology 
There are two primary research methods used in this study. The first method is a 
one-hundred question survey of twenty-seven members of the Business 
Environment Leadership Council (BELC) of the Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change1 and four non-BELC members.2 The second method is a set of six in-
depth case studies of companies taking action (five member companies of the 
BELC3 and one non-BELC member).4 Each of these companies has a stated 
commitment to address climate change. The demographics represent a sample 
weighted toward large, publicly-held, North American-based, multi-national 
corporations. 
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Findings 
This study examines four elements of climate-related corporate strategies – 
strategy development, organizational integration, external outreach and policy. 
This study focuses on the common aspects and recurring themes across 
strategies, but will also highlight unique and innovative practices.  
 
Strategy Development 
To develop an effective strategy, companies must understand their motivation for 
addressing climate change, identify options for GHG reductions, determine which 
options align with corporate goals and values, and find ways to fund the initiative. 
 
We found three primary drivers of climate-related strategies: cost savings, 
mitigation of risk and values-based reasons. These drivers are not mutually 
exclusive or comprehensive. Because profits are the ultimate measure of 
corporate success, many seek to make a link between GHG emission reductions 
and bottom-line results. Despite these efforts, the financial case for justifying 
such efforts remains vague. Therefore, companies have relied upon cost-saving 
energy efficiency to achieve GHG reductions, discussing the potential future 
value of managing risk and enhancing institutional knowledge in the present, and 
linking climate-related strategies to corporate culture and values.  
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Cost savings are most closely tied to energy and operational efficiencies that 
deliver bottom-line results in the short-term. Energy efficiency is often easier to 
connect to traditional business strategy than GHG reductions. As an element of 
operating costs, energy use flows directly to the bottom-line and is therefore 
easier to communicate to employees. Furthermore, companies have been 
addressing energy as a cost issue for years, and in many industries it is a 
guarded strategic element. 
 
In contrast, risk mitigation seeks long-term payoff by managing the political, legal, 
price and physical risks associated with climate change. The most consistently-
cited risk identified by companies is the uncertain political environment. However, 
an effort to reduce GHG emissions is a much newer – and trickier – concept than 
energy efficiency. There is no direct link to operating results, and the benefits are 
uncertain, often described as distant and speculative. While an effort to reduce 
GHG emissions is viewed as strategic at the corporate level, building a 
connection to the business unit and employee level has proven more 
challenging.  
 
Values-based reasons center on “doing the right thing” and addressing climate 
change because it is consistent with the corporate culture and values.  Often, the 
targets of these values-based reasons are employees – both to allay the 
concerns about straying from the business plan described above and to improve 
employee morale. 
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Methods of addressing climate change traditionally come in the form of either 
energy efficiency or GHG reduction initiatives. More recently, however, some 
companies have identified market opportunities within the climate change issue. 
Some are changing their product mix, while others are also pushing customers 
and suppliers to seek GHG reductions.  
 
While calculating the financial benefits is difficult, the process for measuring and 
tracking GHG emissions is more clearly defined. The GHG Protocol and other 
GHG accounting standards have established well-accepted principles and 
guidelines for corporate reporting of GHG emissions. However, without strict 
regulations in place, companies face two major issues: what method to use in 
accounting for emissions, and how to measure those emissions. These 
calculations require data that is not always available, sometimes prompting the 
development of new information systems.  
 
Another critical element of a climate-related strategy is funding. Some companies 
in this report simply utilize special pools of capital allocated to climate-related 
projects. Some lower their internal hurdle rate for relevant projects or implement 
a shadow price for carbon when evaluating capital investments. Each of these 
methods increases the likelihood that climate-related projects will be undertaken.  
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Trading GHG emissions credits serves to offset the cost of certain projects. 
Companies can sometimes sell the emissions reductions achieved to generate a 
revenue stream that will improve the financial return. Some companies have 
experimented with internal trading to funnel capital to least-cost solutions. 
However, most have abandoned such efforts due to ineffectiveness and the 
development of external carbon markets.  
 
Organizational Integration 
Effective implementation of climate-related strategies requires alignment with the 
structure and overall strategy of the business. While these strategies are often 
initiated by the Environment, Health and Safety group, success depends upon 
inputs from the entire company, support from management, and buy-in from 
employees. When companies encounter resistance, they apply several 
consistent methods to overcome it. Effective communication remains the 
underlying theme for effective integration of strategies. 
 
How a company addresses climate change is often dictated by the organizational 
structure and the company’s strategy and culture. Some companies, especially 
those that are decentralized, need to allow for flexibility across business lines. It 
is also important, given policy differences, to allow for differences across 
geographic boundaries.  
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Initial champions of climate-related strategies tend to be the Environment, Health 
and Safety group or senior management. Most companies utilize cross-functional 
teams both in the development of and implementation of their strategies. The 
accounting, finance and marketing departments tend to be the least involved, 
though certain companies have developed creative ways to involve them. 
 
Gaining buy-in from employees who can influence the success of strategy 
implementation is essential. The best means of doing so is consistent 
communication of the company’s position and direction. Four common methods 
are used to overcome resistance to climate-related strategies: communicating a 
clear link between the climate-related strategy and the values of the company; 
leveraging strong support from senior management; developing a robust 




Companies find that external communication of climate-related goals and efforts 
to meet those goals is important in earning recognition and in helping produce a 
return for the company’s investment. Equally important is an effective internal 
strategy that achieves results, ensuring credibility of the company’s messages.   
 
The most commonly realized benefit of implementing a climate-related strategy is 
enhanced reputation. With a better reputation companies have experienced 
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increased market share, improved employee morale and improved relationships 
with regulatory agencies.  
 
All companies in this study are publicly reporting climate-related goals and 
progress toward meeting those goals. Goals and progress are reported to boost 
transparency and stakeholder engagement Companies post their goals and 
results in their corporate sustainability reports, annual reports, and sometimes in 
special reports dedicated to climate change. Other important communication 
tools are press releases and climate reporting venues such as the Department of 
Energy (DOE) 1605(b) voluntary reporting program or the Carbon Disclosure 
Project. . Although energy efficiency is a key component of most climate-related 
strategies, energy specific goals and achievements are not as widely reported, 
reflecting their importance as guarded strategic information.  
 
Targets of external communication strategies include a wide array of 
stakeholders, including NGOs, regulatory agencies, shareholders and 
employees. Employees were the most common target, suggesting that these 
reports are as important for internal communication as they are for external 
communication. Although the investment community was not named as an 
important driver of climate strategies, they are a target of external outreach. 
Three quarters of the companies surveyed note that climate change is not a 
material item requiring Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure, but one-quarter does believe 
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it to be material to their business. This suggests that the issue may be relevant to 
mainstream investors very soon.  
 
Another key element of external outreach is partnerships. Many companies 
partner with NGOs, government agencies and other companies to address 
climate change. Such partnerships provide added capacity and expertise to 
companies that are trying to understand the implications for their business. 
Furthermore, partnering with independent organizations adds legitimacy and 
credibility to corporate climate-related strategies.  
 
Although companies find value in working with external stakeholders, they also 
find external resistance from government and trade groups that restrict corporate 
efforts to address climate change. Most notable is the U.S. government’s lack of 
a clear climate policy, which causes uncertainty and hinders investments that 
could create climate benefits. Trade associations are sometimes resistant to 
climate change efforts, and companies tend not to stray too far in forming their 
policy positions and strategies.  
 
Policy 
All of the companies surveyed in this study believe that government involvement 
is required to effectively address climate change, and almost all of them note the 
strategic importance of participating in the policy development process. While 
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some view participation in policy development as a responsibility of business, 
others simply recognize a business opportunity.  
 
It is not surprising, given the selection bias of this study, that all of the companies 
believe major climate policy is imminent in the United States. Many are actively 
lobbying at the state and federal level to shape such policy. While there is 
general agreement on certain policy mechanisms, others are more controversial.  
 
Most companies agree that flexibility and price signals are key components of an 
effective policy that minimizes economic disruption. Most agree that GHG trading 
is the preferred method for achieving this outcome. Other areas of agreement 
include a provision for sequestration credits, and among these first-movers on 
climate change, there is a large push to receive credit for early action. Beyond 
these points, policy interests quickly diverge. Some companies, especially 
utilities, favor an economy-wide policy.  Others, especially the cement industry, 
prefer a sector-specific policy that recognizes different price-elasticity across 
industries. Companies in high-growth industries favor intensity based measures, 
while other companies prefer regulation of absolute GHG emissions. Another 
area of contention is the treatment of indirect emissions, specifically from product 
use.  
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Conclusion 
This study presents several overarching themes for companies addressing 
climate change.  The first theme is that greenhouse gas regulations are coming – 
companies themselves are convinced of it. In fact, companies say the problem of 
global warming cannot be fixed without regulations.  
 
With those regulations in mind, companies are trying to figure out how to prosper 
under a potentially tough regulatory regime. Most surveyed companies believe 
they will face regulatory risks in the next decade. Some are concerned about 
risks to their physical plants. Many are also looking for the business opportunities 
of developing new products that will perform well in a carbon-constrained world. 
In addressing those risk and opportunities, companies are leveraging the 
immediate cost savings they can achieve through energy efficiency programs to 
transition to longer-term greenhouse gas reduction programs.  
 
Another theme is that gaining buy-in – both internal and external – is the key to 
implementation. Companies find that normal internal resistance to climate 
change initiatives can be overcome by strong CEO commitment to the issue, 
combined with a clear demonstration of how climate change work is consistent 
with the company’s values. Similarly, companies find that connecting with outside 
stakeholders, especially NGOs, can help build brand image and credibility in the 
policy arena.  
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Finally, climate change will alter the rules of the game. Climate change is rapidly 
gaining steam as an issue, and will create new markets and create shifts in 
existing markets. In the longer run, some traditional industries may become 
irrelevant. There will be winners and losers; those with an interest in resisting and 
trying to delay such a market transformation and those who will try to capitalize 
on it. The difference between these two groups lies in a careful cost/benefit 
analysis of doing something versus doing nothing. Not all companies will benefit 
from GHG reductions and voluntary reduction programs must be based on sound 
business logic.5
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I. Introduction 
Climate change has garnered much attention recently. The increasingly certain 
science, media attention, rising energy prices, and impacts of recent storm 
seasons have created a greater level of awareness among the American public 
and business community alike. With these developments it is clear that 
corporations must confront climate change head on. However, the impacts of 
such an issue are still extremely complex and long term, complicated by such 
issues as the lack of comprehensive domestic legislation. Developments are 
occurring rapidly, changing the way many businesses operate, and in the 
process creating both risks and opportunities. 
 
The United States has consistently lagged behind much of the rest of the 
industrialized world in developing policies designed to address climate change 
issues. In 2001, the U.S. refused to ratify the Kyoto treaty, and the current 
administration has opted for voluntary emission reduction strategies instead of 
mandatory cap and trade schemes.   
 
However, recent developments indicate that domestic climate policy is on the 
way. The scientific community continues to develop research and data around 
issues of warming rates, glacial melts, sea level rise and acidification, and 
associated impacts on ocean currents.6 In the absence of a comprehensive 
federal policy, cities and states have begun to address the issue on their own. 
California has enacted legislation that would require companies to reduce their 
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emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 – a 25 percent reduction from business as 
usual. Given this growing patchwork of regulation and increasingly clear scientific 
evidence, companies themselves are beginning to call for legislative action. 
Recently, a group of companies including GE, Shell, Wal-Mart, Exelon and Duke 
Energy spoke out in favor of mandatory carbon caps. It seems as if the policy 
makers are listening. 
 
Energy prices continue to rise, affecting all areas of the economy. Fluctuating 
energy prices increase business risk and make the business case for efficiency 
improvements all too clear. Interestingly, the three-decade worst-case energy 
price inputs considered in a 2003 scenario planning exercise published by the 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change were all surpassed as of the writing of 
this report.7  
 
These rising energy prices and the physical impacts of storm events such as 
Hurricane Katrina have made the average citizen aware of climate change as 
well. This awareness is leading to a change in consumer preferences, and 
consumers are searching for new products to lower their costs, such as hybrid 
vehicles and energy efficient appliances. In addition, reputation issues become 
more important as consumers base their purchasing decisions, at least in part, 
on the company’s action, or lack thereof on climate issues. The Carbon Trust 
forecasts that “climate change could become a mainstream consumer issue by 
2010,” placing corporate brands at risk.8  
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In the meantime, the scientific community continues to develop research and 
data around issues of warming rates, glacial melts, sea level rise and 
acidification, and associated impacts on ocean currents.9  
 
Mainstream investors are beginning to pay attention to the issue as well, creating 
implications for future access to capital and investment. For instance, Goldman 
Sachs recently joined the socially responsible investing (SRI) community by 
announcing a new policy for promoting activities that guard against climate 
change.10 The Carbon Disclosure Project, an international organization that 
gathers information regarding companies’ climate change strategies for 
institutional investors, now represents $31 trillion worth of investment. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 creates issues concerning climate change’s relation 
to materiality and fiduciary duty.11
 
Climate change issues have become, and will continue to be, a mainstream 
business issue. The question about whether to act has largely been resolved, 
and has been the topic of a large number of reports in the academic and 
business community. However, an individual company’s response to the issue is 
highly contextual and dependent on a number of factors, including initial drivers, 
product mix and market opportunities.   
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Scope 
The purpose of this report is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the 
strategies employed by companies that are leading the way to address climate 
change. It reviews the development and implementation of their strategies, 
considers the benefits foreseen by them, discusses how they communicate with 
stakeholders regarding climate change, and offers what they have learned along 
the way. It explores the risks, rewards, opportunities and barriers surrounding 
corporate action on climate change and provides lessons learned from 
companies that have led the way in taking early action.  
 
The focus of this report is “climate-related strategies;” defined as the set of goals 
and implementation plans within a corporation that are either intended to reduce 
GHG emissions, or that significantly reduce GHG emissions as a co-benefit. This 
includes strategies and measures for achieving near-term emission reductions 
from a company’s own operations; research, development, and investment in 
low-carbon production and process-related technologies; alternative products 
that have a more attractive carbon profile; energy efficiency initiatives; reductions 
obtained through offsets and emissions trading; and activities to reduce 
“upstream” or “downstream” GHG emissions along their value chain. 
 
Methodology 
There are two primary research methods used in this study. The first is a one-
hundred question survey of twenty-seven members of the Business Environment 
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Leadership Council (BELC) of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change12 and 
four non-BELC members.13 The demographics represent a sample weighted 
toward large, publicly-held, North American-based, multi-national corporations. 
Category Results 
Sector Representation 
Electric Utility: 28 percent 
High tech: 9 percent 
Metals and Mining: 9 percent 
Oil and Gas: 9 percent 
Other*: 46 percent 
Ownership Status Public: 87 percent Private: 13 percent 
Headquarter Location North America: 90 percent 
Multi-National Operations Yes: 72 percent  No: 28 percent 
Market Segment** Business-to-Business: 47 percent Business-to-Customer: 60 percent 
Annual Revenue $1-10B: 45 percent $10-100B: 45 percent 
* Other includes the following: Chemicals, Consumer Goods, Pharmaceuticals, Paper and 
Forest Products, and Cement. 
**This figure exceeds 100% because some companies offer both services. 
 
 
The second method is a set of in-depth case studies of six companies (five 
member companies of the BELC14 and one non-BELC member).15 Each of these 
companies has a stated commitment to address climate change. The authors 
conducted face-to-face and telephone interviews with the key executives and 
managers involved in the development of climate change or energy efficiency 
programs, the implementation of those programs and communication of those 
initiatives with external stakeholders. Typical interviewees included the vice 
presidents for environment, health and safety (EH&S); sustainability managers; 
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operations managers; research and development personnel; and senior 
managers in governmental affairs and communications. Interview questions and 




The report is presented as a synthesis report followed by in-depth case studies of 
the six companies. The synthesis report draws upon the results of the research 
to analyze corporate responses to climate change, and presents the research 
findings in five main sections:  
• Strategy Development. This section explores the details of how 
companies are implementing their climate-related strategies. It includes 
issues such as goal setting, external drivers, program elements, 
measurement protocols, metrics of success, financial mechanisms for 
supporting programs, and benchmarking. 
• Organizational Integration. A key aspect of developing an effective and 
sustainable climate-related strategy is gaining buy-in and participation 
from the internal workforce. This section assesses the level of senior 
management commitment, identifies the initial champions of climate 
change strategies, as well as those responsible for developing and 
adopting those strategies, the general progression from idea to adoption, 
sources of internal resistance, and methods for overcoming that 
resistance. 
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• External Outreach. Recognition for internal action requires companies to 
participate in some form of external outreach, seeking to communicate 
their strategies and objectives to key external stakeholders. This section 
deals with tools for communicating goals and progress, the reasons for 
making those efforts public, identification of critical stakeholders, sources 
of external resistance and methods for overcoming that resistance. 
• Policy. Future policy decisions have real world implications for 
companies, ranging from impact on investment decisions to fundamentally 
altering the characteristics of a market.  Because of this, a critical 
component of external outreach involves interaction with governments on 
policy related to climate change. Most companies see a strategic benefit 
to being engaged in the policy development process. This can include 
possible controls on GHG emissions but also policies that provide tax 
relief or subsidies for research, development and commercialization of 
energy and GHG reducing technologies. In this section we assess 
respondent perspectives on whether government policy is necessary, the 
likelihood and time-frame of it occurring and the form it should best take. 
• Conclusions. The report closes with a summary of the future challenges 
faced by respondent companies: gaps that exist in their knowledge for 
addressing climate change and possible changes in the business world 
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II. Strategy Development 
This section provides an assessment of the actual implementation of climate-
related strategies, including issues such as the drivers, financial justifications, 
measurement protocols, metrics of success, and carbon trading. The case 
studies at the back of this report describe specific technical strategies that six 
companies have used to address climate change. 
 
A. Drivers and Outcomes  
According to the survey and interview results, there are three primary drivers for 
developing corporate climate-related strategies: cost savings, the desire to “do 
the right thing,” and reducing exposure to the broad risks presented by climate 
change. Shareholders and NGOs were relatively unimportant drivers, although 
they clearly play a role. As climate-related strategies evolve, they begin to look 
beyond risk management toward market opportunity.  
 
To reduce costs, company representatives emphasize that the near-term benefits 
of climate-related strategies are derived from improving energy and operational 
efficiency (see Figure 2). Survey respondents rank efficiency improvements as 
both the most prominent measure of success for their strategies (see Figure 3) 
and the action that most often provides bottom-line benefits (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 1 
Drivers of Climate-Related Strategies 
How important were the following external drivers in leading your company to pursue its climate-
related strategy? (Rate their level of importance: 1 = not important; 3 = neutral; 5 = important). 
1 2 3 4
Shareholder resolution (threat of) or other investor pressure
Opportunity for new sources of capital 
Pressure from NGO(s)
Compliance with existing international agreements 
Compliance with projected international agreements
Compliance with existing national, state or local regulations
New strategic direction for company
Compliance with projected national, state or local regulations
Intra-industry energy or climate initiatives
Rising energy or feedstock prices
Remaining competitive with industry peers
Improving company reputation among consumers
Social responsibility
Protecting the global climate
Consistency with existing corporate culture








Measures of Success of Climate-Related Strategies 
Once begun, how important are the following measures of success in undertaking your climate-
related strategy? (Rate their level of importance: 1 = not important; 3 = neutral; 5 = important). 
1 2 3 4
Accessing new sources of capital
Enhancing human resource management and corporate culture




Protect the global climate







 Total Respondents: 30 
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Figure 3 
Climate-Related Programs Which Contribute Financial Benefits 
Please indicate which are providing positive returns to the bottom line.  
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
CO2 sequestration – geological
CO2 sequestration – terrestrial
Selling capital stock assets with high greenhouse gas emissions
Lifestyle incentives (e.g. Promoting telecommuting)
Carbon trading





Acquiring capital stock assets with low greenhouse gas emissions
Branding and marketing
New renewable energy sources 
Public relations
Fossil fuel switching 
Government affairs
Product changes




Total Respondents: 28 
 
Although making the effort to be socially responsible (termed by many as the 
desire “do the right thing”) ranks low in terms of generating bottom-line benefits 
(see Figure 4), companies consider it a driver and measure of success because 
they believe GHG action is consistent with their corporate values (see Figure 3). 
For example, after careful consideration of climate change science, DuPont 
designed and implemented a climate-related strategy to remain consistent with 
its culture of science, safety and environmental responsibility. Cinergy links a 
culture that values responsibility, transparency and stakeholder engagement with 
the adoption of its climate-related strategy. 
 
  26 
DRAFT – Please do not cite, quote or distribute 
Companies are also motivated by the desire to reduce their exposure to the 
broad risks of climate change. These risks could include a damaged brand image 
from failing to act, policy and regulatory risk, legal risk, exposure to volatile 
energy prices and physical risk. What differentiates risk reduction from other 
drivers is timing. Unlike the near-term benefits realized from energy efficiency, 
operational efficiency, and enhanced reputation, benefits from risk reduction are 
longer-term, less certain, and more difficult to measure. 
 
Companies identify the unsettled regulatory environment as a key risk. A 2002 
World Resources Institute report warns that climate change policies pose 
significant risks to shareholder value of oil and gas companies,16 and a recent 
report by Environmental Defense suggests similar vulnerabilities for 
automakers.17 According to the survey results, even though regulation was only 
rated as a moderate driver (see Figure 2), companies consider the ability to 
anticipate future regulations a critical measure of success (see Figure 3). 
Although policy will be discussed in more detail in section V, companies are 
clearly involving themselves in the legislative process to help legislators 
understand the impacts of climate change policy on their fundamental business 
models. It is this concern about the form of future regulation that explains why 
companies rank Government Affairs as an important contributor to the bottom 
line (see Figure 4). Surprisingly, shareholders and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are not considered a major force in driving program 
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development (see Figure 2). As will be discussed in Section IV, however, these 
groups are seen as important in benchmarking and public outreach.  
 
Executives note that interest among shareholders and the financial sector 
increased around the middle of 2005. Goldman Sachs, for example, identifies 
business opportunities in three areas related to climate change: reputation, 
competitive position and new product development.18 Similarly, some companies 
are moving beyond risk management by finding ways to integrate the issue into 
their core business strategy. Shell is seeking to establish a presence in the 
hydrogen markets, and is analyzing how its reserves of tar sands, gas and oil 
impact the company’s GHG strategy. DuPont is investing significantly in its bio-
based materials initiatives and working closely with customers to identify 
opportunities to lessen both its own footprint and that of its clients. 
 
B. Differentiating Energy Efficiency and GHG Reductions 
Companies are doing a better job of meeting internal energy efficiency targets 
than long-term GHG reduction goals. A similar number of companies in the 
survey have established energy efficiency goals as climate-change goals (72 and 
77 percent, respectively). Of those with energy efficiency targets, 100 percent 
have reached them, and two-thirds have established new, farther-reaching ones. 
In contrast, only 60 percent of companies setting GHG reduction goals have met 
those goals.  
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A close look at the goals themselves offers insights explaining this difference. 
First, energy efficiency goals have a longer history. Energy efficiency was first 
discussed by some surveyed companies as early as 1970. On average, 
efficiency goals were set in 1998 and most are ongoing annual targets. By 
comparison, GHG reductions goals entered the discussion much later. GHG 
reductions were first discussed by some surveyed companies in 1990, and on 
average, GHG reduction targets were set in 2000. Some corporate GHG goals, 
with initial deadlines of 2006 or beyond, have not yet run their course.  
 
The specificity of GHG and energy efficiency goals is also different. The goals of 
energy efficiency strategies are generally directed at discrete, energy intensive 
processes, forcing units with operational responsibility to make the decisions 
about how to improve efficiency. Given the rising price of energy, these efficiency 
projects offer a growing incentive as measured by the return on investment. 
Greenhouse gas reduction goals, on the other hand, usually take the form of a 
set number (for example, an X percent reduction by date Y) without well-
articulated ways to filter this number down to the business units. One outcome of 
this difference is that, for many companies, energy efficiency is seen more as a 
strategic issue of importance at the business level; a more proprietary effort that 
has direct impacts on the bottom line. Greenhouse gas reductions, on the other 
hand, are viewed more as a corporate EHS initiative, often carrying a cost rather 
than a competitive advantage. 
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C. Calculating the Bottom Line 
A prominent challenge facing companies attempting to generate internal support 
for their GHG reduction strategies is quantifying the bottom-line financial risks 
and rewards. As David Steiner, Vice President of Government Affairs at Maytag 
plainly notes, the “company must make money first.” Just over half of companies 
surveyed have not developed precise financial data to identify the bottom-line 
benefits of their GHG reduction strategies. Executives express frustration at this 
lack of quantification, saying it hampers efforts to maintain momentum and lock 
in employee support. 
 
However, nearly all respondents have identified benefits from taking early action. 
In interviews and discussions, executives believe that their strategies are 
profitable. “I can’t tell you the exact number when it comes to the business case 
for climate change, but I can tell you the range and an order of magnitude,” says 
Kevin Leahy, General Manager of Environmental Economics and Finance at 
Cinergy. Although the particular form of benefits – such as financial savings, 
emissions reductions, or an improved brand image – differ by company, there 
appears to be consensus among these companies that strategic financial 
planning is essential for moving forward on climate change. 
 
So if companies aren’t able to accurately measure financial benefits of their 
GHG-strategies, how are they justifying them? First, they rely on cost savings 
from energy efficiency programs, which are more concrete and easier to fold into 
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current business strategies. Nearly 50 percent of companies cite financial 
benefits from energy and operational efficiency. For example, Calpine saved 
$25.8 million over a ten-month period last year by implementing its Plant 
Optimization Program, which targets thermal efficiency improvements in the 
company’s power plant operations. DuPont has achieved an estimated $2 billion 
in savings since launching its energy efficiency program in 1990. Examples like 
this reflect the ability to estimate energy savings, and given the recent escalation 
of natural gas prices, these efficiency gains have come at a serendipitous time 
and will continue to grow. According to Pat Atkins, Alcoa’s Director of Energy 
Innovation, taking action is just smart business. “Why wait for climate change to 
make strategic and operational changes if the business case is already there?” 
 
Beyond energy efficiency, companies tend to rely on two less-quantifiable 
methods to justify their climate-related strategies: a general belief among senior 
leadership that these strategies will add value in the future (see Figure 2) and 
values-based “it’s the right thing to do” arguments. “Management believes they 
add value,” says Skiles Boyd, Director of Environment at DTE Energy. “We just 
haven't been able to quantify it.” Some companies believe that getting ahead on 
this issue offers strategic benefits, such as superior competitive positioning and 
the ability to identify new market opportunities. For others, getting further out on 
the learning curve enables them to make the most appropriate investments and 
prepares the company to successfully adapt to future regulation. While these 
softer, less measurable arguments are certainly important when making climate-
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related strategic decisions, the case for action is more compelling when 
combined with more tangible drivers. Tim Higgs, Environmental Engineer for 
Intel, actually avoids “focusing solely on ‘right thing to do’ environmental 
arguments.” 
 
In looking to the future financial implications of climate-change, the vast majority 
of companies (93 percent) evaluate the financial risk related to climate change 
when making general investment decisions. In addition, 60 percent consider the 
related physical risks to assets such as plants and infrastructure. For some 
companies, such as those in insurance and reinsurance industries, these 
physical risks pose significant bottom-line exposure. 
 
D. Calculating GHG Emissions  
While companies struggle to quantify financial returns resulting from non-
efficiency climate-related initiatives, they are effective at measuring their GHG 
emission reductions, which are more precise and therefore often presented as a 
measure of success of climate-related strategies. Greenhouse gas emission 
inventories have been performed by 97 percent of surveyed companies. 
Companies vary in how they measure these emissions. Some measure actual 
emissions, while others estimate emissions using fuel-based calculations. The 
difference depends, in part, on the complexity of the task. Companies with many 
emission sources or extremely hostile stack environments prefer to avoid in-site 
measurement equipment. 
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Sixty-two percent have developed new information systems or monitoring 
equipment to measure and manage their company’s GHG performance. The 
functionality of these measurement systems varies considerably by company; 
some use highly sophisticated, web-based database tools, while others are still 
developing reliable systems. Ruksana Mirza, Vice President of Environmental 
Affairs at Holcim states that the company’s business platform (SAP) is linked to a 
carbon dioxide (CO2) calculation module that allows emissions to be calculated 
automatically every month from operating information entered into the system 
(production volume, energy consumption, fuel type, etc). While most companies 
that have instituted new monitoring systems are satisfied with their performance, 
other companies point to a lack of such tools as a great need moving forward. 
For example, Whirlpool has had difficulty finding an appropriate emissions 
tracking system at an affordable price, noting a recent quote of approximately 
$250,000 for one particular system. 
 
There is variation in what companies measure and include in their GHG emission 
inventories. While 75 percent of respondents measure indirect emissions, there 
are competing definitions of what they include. Many companies measure the 
emissions from purchased energy and 35 percent measure emissions from 
product use. Shell measures the emissions from consumer use of its fossil fuels 
and Whirlpool measures the emissions created by the use of its appliances in the 
home. A small number of companies, particularly those in the financial sector 
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such as Swiss Re, go so far as to measure emissions from material transport, 
business travel and commuting.  
 
Companies are evenly split on whether they use absolute or indexed measures 
for GHG emissions (48 and 52 percent respectively19). Twelve percent of 
companies use a mix, tailoring measurements as appropriate for the reporting 
unit. Shell, for example, uses absolute targets for the whole company and 
indexed targets for individual units to allow for small-unit flexibility. The most 
common measurement methods include: Total tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2e) (73 percent); Tons of CO2e per unit of product (50 percent); BTU (energy 
consumed) per unit of product (39 percent); and Total BTUs (35 percent). 
Notably absent from this list is the indexed measure recommended by the 
National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) of tons of CO2e per dollar of 
revenue.20
 
E. Funding and Investment.  
Most companies use a combination of investment strategies to fund their climate-
related strategies. The most popular methods include reserving a special pool of 
capital for investment in those strategies (47 percent); lowering internal hurdle 
rates (32 percent); and using shadow prices for carbon (33 percent). Incidentally, 
several executives indicated that internal shadow prices are becoming 
unnecessary because of market prices established by external trading programs. 
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In concept, carbon trading is a market mechanism designed to direct capital 
toward the least-cost GHG emissions reductions. Most companies in this study 
are in favor of such mechanisms as will be discussed in Section V. In practice 
however, companies are taking a cautious approach to trading, primarily because 
the market is not well developed in the United States. While 40 percent of survey 
respondents use external carbon trading, these companies note that it is more 
useful in educating the workforce on carbon controls than in reducing costs. 
Furthermore, companies that trade carbon externally usually engage in other 
methods of funding projects, such as a reduced hurdle rate. Nevertheless, many 
companies consider trading something they should be prepared to implement in 
the future.  
 
Of the four companies that have experimented with internal trading, none still 
have programs in place. All concluded that their program did not achieve its 
intended objective of driving reductions to the least-cost options. Shell, for 
example, discovered that the Shell Tradable Emissions Permit System suffered 
from various problems, including a lack of participants, a lack of liquidity, tax 
issues, and problems with permit apportionment. In the end, internal trading, like 
shadow pricing, is becoming irrelevant as external trading markets continue to 
develop. 
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III. Organizational Integration 
Effective climate-related strategies must be aligned with a company’s existing 
business strategy, corporate culture, and core competencies. Success ultimately 
depends upon the level of buy-in among employees. According to Vince Van 
Son, Manager of Environmental Finance and Business Development at Alcoa, 
“Our people link our systems and our success. The best technology only gets 
you so far. Employees will devise innovative ways to achieve clearly stated goals 
when they understand the linkage with the company’s vision and values.” This 
section will consider the importance of various functional roles and management 
levels in the initial development and on-going implementation of climate-related 
strategies. 
 
A. Senior Leadership 
According to survey respondents, senior-level support and engagement are the 
most critical components of any successful climate-related strategy. While some 
respondents referred generally to senior level management, others explicitly 
singled out the CEO and Board of Directors as the most important targets for 
internal buy-in. CEO leadership was identified as a key driver in all stages of 
program development and implementation (see Figures 5 and 6). In the words of 
Alcoa’s Atkins, “On a scale of one to ten, senior level support is an eleven.” 
Melissa Lavinson, Director of Federal Government Relations at PG&E, goes 
further by specifically highlighting the importance of board-level engagement on 
the importance of these issues. In one example, when business units within 
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DuPont were reluctant to push hard to reach the first round of energy efficiency 
goals set in 1994, CEO Chad Holliday stepped in personally to make it clear that 
failure to reach the targets was unacceptable. His commitment to the program 
was cited by “DuPonters” as critical to its early success. Despite the high 
importance of senior-level leadership, CEOs from over 33 percent of the 
companies in the survey have yet to make a public statement on climate change 
or energy efficiency.  
 
CEOs that take the strongest leadership position on climate-related strategies 
tend to have a long-term perspective on their company’s strategy, thinking well 
beyond their own tenure, and measuring time-lines in decades or even centuries. 
“When your time horizon is short, you’re thinking stonewall it and it won’t happen 
on your watch,” explains Jim Rogers, CEO at Cinergy. "If you are a steward, you 
make decisions on a longer time horizon, looking beyond your own tenure. When 
you think of it that way, your view changes. We look 20, 30, 50 years down the 
road.” 
 
Beyond this unusually long time frame, climate change differs from other 
corporate environmental issues because of the complex and dynamic nature of 
the problem. It requires a more concerted level of engagement on the part of 
senior management to understand the issues, determine the importance to the 
organization, and convey the implications and necessary action throughout the 
organization. According to Intel’s Higgs, “Climate change is a more difficult 
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subject to convey to management due to the complexity and scope of the issue 
and the relatively tiny impact of an individual corporation. Other environmental 
issues are often more acute and therefore easier to drive understanding on why 
the company should take action.” Given this complexity, many companies feel 
that challenging stretch goals are necessary to get people’s attention and make 
significant progress on the issue. 
 
B. From Idea to Adoption 
Ninety percent of respondents identified the Environment, Health and Safety 
department (EH&S) as the initial champion of their climate-related strategy (see 
Figure 5). This is not surprising given the technical expertise typically found in 
these departments. Sixty-six percent identified the CEO and the management 
team as an initial champion, which is consistent with the discussion in Section 
IIIA on the importance of top-down leadership on this issue. Not surprisingly, 
initial champions are more likely to emerge from units in countries where the 
Kyoto treaty was ratified. 
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Figure 4 
Functions that were Initial Champions of Climate-Related Strategies 
Which positions, facets and/or department(s) within your company would you consider to be the 
INITIAL CHAMPION(S) for the idea of developing your corporate climate-related strategy? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Business units in non-Kyoto ratified countries








Middle Management – corporate
Government Relations




 Total Respondents: 29 
 
Companies with greater expertise in implementing climate-related strategies are 
finding that responsibilities of implementation are diffused throughout the 
organization. While EH&S and senior leadership are identified as leaders in the 
development and adoption phases, (93 and 74 percent respectively, see Figure 
6) a more diverse set of players eventually assumes responsibility. The 
importance of all categories increases while certain departments, such as 
operations, rise above others. Surprisingly, units in countries party to Kyoto are 
no more likely to be involved in program development and adoption than units in 
non-ratified countries.  
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Figure 5 
Functions Responsible for Developing & Adopting Climate-Related Strategies 
Which positions, facets and/or department(s) within your company were significantly involved in 
DEVELOPING AND ADOPTING your corporate climate-related strategy?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Business units in non-Kyoto ratified countries









Middle Management – corporate




 Total Respondents: 27 
 
The involvement of a particular department varies by industry and across 
companies. For example, marketing is extremely important for product 
companies like GE and DuPont, but less so for service companies like Cinergy; 
operations is critical for process-intensive companies like Cinergy, but less so for 
reinsurance firms such as Swiss Re.  
 
C. Overcoming Resistance 
During the initial development and adoption phases of climate-related strategies, 
companies rank the accounting, finance and marketing departments among the 
least involved, and strategy is considered only moderately involved (see Figure 
6). Similarly, these departments are perceived to be the most resistant to 
implementation (see Figure 7). For some companies, however, marketing and 
finance are assuming an increasingly critical implementation role. For example, 
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GE is spending an estimated $90 million to market its “Eco-magination” 
initiative.21
Figure 6 
Organizational Resistance and Buy-In for Climate-Related Strategies 
What positions and/or departments within your company are significantly involved in the 
IMPLEMENTATION of your strategy, and what is their level of BUY-IN OR RESISTANCE toward 
your corporate climate-related strategy? (Rank their level of buy-in: 1 = Resist; 3 = Neutral; 5 = 
Embrace, Leave blank if uninvolved.)
3 4 5
Business units in non-Kyoto ratified countries






Middle Management – corporate
Strategy
Board of Directors





 Total Respondents: 26 
Survey respondents identify four main strategies to overcome internal resistance. 
Three of these are recurring themes throughout this report: establish a clear link 
between the climate-related strategy and the values of the company; 
demonstrate clear CEO commitment; and create a robust, quantifiable business 
case to demonstrate climate-related initiatives can improve the bottom-line. 
 
A fourth method for overcoming resistance – increasing internal education – 
introduces another dimension to climate-related strategies. In the experience of 
some companies, resistance can derive from a lack of understanding about 
climate-related issues. To increase internal awareness, companies have 
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launched a variety of creative initiatives. For example, Alcoa gives its employees 
tree saplings and asks them to plant and tend to them. The company is also 
asking its employees to reduce their personal carbon footprint through the one-
ton challenge.22 Swiss Re hosts a wide variety of internal marketing events, 
including onsite hybrid car demonstrations during which employees are allowed 
to test-drive the vehicles. DuPont ties environmental performance metrics to the 
bonuses of key employees, and has created an employee award program that 
recognizes exceptional environmental achievements throughout the company.  
 
Companies that have struggled to overcome the challenges of generating 
internal support for climate change – both with executive-level management and 
general level employees – emphasize the importance of an effective 
communication strategy. Given the relative complexity of the issue, the ability to 
identify and communicate the most salient points in an easily understandable 
manner is particularly useful. “When you talk about trading, impact on energy and 
economics, you need something besides words. Its hard stuff,” says Cinergy’s 
Leahy.  
 
Many companies use cross-functional teams to gather input and diffuse 
responsibilities for implementation. Shell and DuPont, for example, utilize cross-
functional teams in both technical implementation of GHG projects and 
managerial implementation. Alcoa’s Corporate Climate Change Strategy Team 
includes professional representation from operations, government affairs, 
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technology, communications and finance and geographic representation from the 
United States, Canada, Australia, Europe, and Brazil. 
 
Executives point out that efforts to build internal awareness must be tempered by 
an acknowledgement that companies often operate in diverse markets or have 
decentralized operational structures. This can create areas of resistance based 
on geography or division when some business units can achieve their goals more 
easily than others. Consequently, Mike Bertolucci, President of Interface 
Research Corporation, advises against “requiring standardized implementation 
programs in a diverse, decentralized culture.” The use of various absolute and 
indexed GHG measures discussed in Section II is one example of how 
companies grant individual business units the authority to identify the most 
effective implementation strategies. Some believe that embracing such internal 
diversity is not only an effective tool for mitigating internal resistance, but an 
important strategic consideration for companies with multinational operations. 
According to Daniel Gagnier, Senior Vice-President of Corporate and External 
Affairs at Alcan. "Although there is a global focus on the issue, there are 
regional differences in approaching the issue that require a company to have 
both a global and regional focus.”  
 
Companies cite a need to know their audience when communicating their 
climate-related strategy internally. “You need to ease people into the discussion. 
Link it to what they already know is possible,” says Cinergy’s Leahy. “For us, it 
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was our experience with cap-and-trade in our acid-rain program.” Whirlpool tries 
to refrain from using the term “climate-change” in internal discussions, preferring 
instead to use more familiar terminology. “We’ve got a train moving on 
efficiency,” explains Mark Dahmer, Director of Laundry Technology at Whirlpool. 
“We’d just start confusing things if we tried to start a new train.” 
 
IV. External Outreach 
External engagement and internal action are complementary. Almost all case 
study interviewees note that recognition for internal action requires companies to 
reach out to external stakeholders. Similarly, leadership and credibility in external 
arenas depends heavily on the extent to which the company has taken internal 
action on the issue.  
 
A. Reputation Benefits 
Reputation improvement is the most commonly experienced benefit of external 
outreach. More specifically, companies cite increased market share, improved 
recruiting and employee retention, and enhanced relations with regulators among 
the direct benefits. At Interface, Bertolucci believes the company’s strategy has 
helped it become “Internationally recognized as a sustainability leader.” For IBM, 
offering telecommuting options as a part of its climate strategy “has had a 
positive impact on recruitment and retention," according to Dionee Edan, Director 
of Corporate Environmental Affairs. As discussed in Section II, reputation and 
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social responsibility are highly-rated drivers and measures of success for 
companies engaging in climate-related strategies.  
 
Other companies are seeing business benefits from reputation improvement. 
Executives at Alcoa were approached by Toyota for possible business ventures 
after the two companies (along with BP) were singled out by Innovest as the 
world’s top three most sustainable companies. Both Alcoa and DuPont were 
recently cited in Business Week23 for their climate change accomplishments, a 
clear indication that external stakeholders are paying attention to the issue and 
recognizing companies that assume a leadership role. 
 
B. Public Reporting 
All companies with a climate change strategy not only publicly report their goals, 
but also their progress toward meeting those goals. In several instances, 
companies are reporting their GHG profile even without a formalized strategy for 
reducing their footprint. Conversely, companies sometimes treat information 
about energy efficiency as part of their competitive advantage, and that 
information is not always made public. Seventeen percent of companies that 
have energy efficiency strategies do not publicize information about their 
performance results.  
 
The most common objectives of public disclosure are transparency and 
stakeholder engagement. Mirza states that Holcim reports information publicly “to 
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establish to our employees, the communities in which we operate, customers, 
investors, and governments that we recognize this as a significant environmental 
aspect of our operations, and that we are taking action to address it.”  
 
Public reporting of climate-related strategies typically occurs through pre-existing 
formats, such as the corporate sustainability report, annual reports and press 
releases. Less common are carbon-specific reporting efforts, such as the 
Department of Energy (DOE) 1605(b) voluntary reporting program and the 
Carbon Disclosure Project.  
 
Swiss Re has undertaken some more unorthodox approaches to external 
outreach. In 2003, the company sponsored the development of a documentary 
called The Great Warming. Narrated by singer/songwriter Alanis Morissette and 
actor Keanu Reeves, the show was broadcast in 2005 on the Public 
Broadcasting System (PBS) in the United States. The company has also 
partnered with the United Nations Development Program and the Harvard 
Medical School to host a conference and produce a report called Climate 
Change Futures: Health, Ecological and Economic Dimensions. 
 
C. Targeted Audience 
External outreach efforts are aimed at a wide array of stakeholders (see Figure 
8), with employees and NGOs cited as the most important. This is consistent with 
the identification of corporate culture and social responsibility as primary drivers 
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of climate-related strategies in Section II. Close behind are the government, the 
general public, institutional investors, and shareholders, supporting the finding 
(also in Section II) that regulation is a long-term issue for external outreach rather 
than a near-term driver for initial program implementation.  
Figure 7 
Targets of Public Reporting and Communications 
How important are the following groups to your company in communicating about its climate-















 Total Respondents: 27 
 
While in Section II mainstream investors are not considered a primary driver of 
climate-related strategies, they are a target of external outreach. Survey 
respondents and interviewees note that interest has thus far been limited to the 
socially responsible investing community, but anticipate mainstream investors 
may play a larger role in the future. “The mainstream investors are not as strong 
on this issue in the United States as they might be, but that could all change if 
legislation is enacted,” says DuPont’s Fisher.  
 
With the advent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, more companies are 
discussing climate change and the associated risks in their annual reports. An 
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open question is whether the issue is “material” under SEC rules. Seventy-four 
percent of companies state that climate change factors do not have a “material 
impact” on the company under the act. In the face of regulatory uncertainty, 
“Quantification would be mostly speculative,” states Cinergy’s Leahy. Others are 
quick to point out that the question of materiality varies greatly by industry and 
depends upon whether GHG controls are legislated. One study suggests that 
“while climate change risks and opportunities are unlikely to have material effects 
over the short-term…the certifications required by Sarbanes-Oxley will put 
ongoing pressure on management to account for and disclose, in financial 
statements or otherwise, any aspect of climate change risk which could be fairly 
said to be quantifiable.”24 Toward that end, Bob Page, Vice President of 
Sustainable Development at Trans-Alta, believes that, “Shareholders must 
understand actions taken to manage GHG and climate risks.”  
 
D. External Resistance 
Forty-three percent of companies encounter external resistance that limits their 
ability to implement or advance their climate-related strategy. Eighty-two percent 
of those cite regulators as a barrier, with some pointing to the lack of clear 
climate policy as an obstacle. All of the companies encountering such barriers 
seek to overcome them by lobbying at the national level and 88 percent lobby at 
the state level. In a recent report by Deloitte, some executives in the Power and 
Utility Sector say “the lack of specific policy guidance makes voluntary remedies 
a guessing game."25 (Lobbying will be discussed in greater depth in Section V.)  
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Trade associations – used by 62 percent of companies in their lobbying efforts –
and standard setting bodies are also an obstacle. More than one-third of 
respondents are members of trade associations or other organizations that 
oppose climate change regulation. However, not all such companies see this as 
a contradiction. Instead of discontinuing their membership, these companies 
prefer to work within these organizations, citing an opportunity to inform and 
influence others as well as understand other positions on this issue. One 
exception is Whirlpool, which decided to withdraw from the American Home 
Appliance Manufacturers (AHAM) over a difference of opinion on energy 
efficiency standards. Whirlpool later rejoined AHAM after changes were made in 
the organization’s bylaws.  
 
E. Partnerships 
The majority of companies do not develop their climate-related strategies in 
isolation. Rather, they partner with NGOs or government agencies and work 
within industry groups to inform and shape their actions. These partner 
organizations are viewed as a source of information – a place to learn about best 
practices, perform benchmarking, exchange ideas and develop possible 
solutions. Shell, for example, has worked with a panel of NGO and Native 
American tribal representatives as part of its Canadian Athabascan oil sands unit 
in Canada. DuPont is leading the Integrated Corn Bio Refinery consortium, which 
includes private, public, and academic participants. The initiative was awarded 
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$19 million in matching funds from the Department of Energy. Collaborating can 
elicit alternative viewpoints not easily seen from within a corporation.  
 
While not seen as a major driver of climate-related strategies, NGOs are seen as 
an important outreach target for credibility, education and enhanced reputation 
(see Figure 8). In the words of Linda Fisher, Vice President and Chief 
Sustainability Officer at DuPont, “You can learn a lot from NGOs. They can open 
your eyes to market opportunities. Also, they add legitimacy to our environmental 
commitments. A big, branded corporation stating its efforts sounds like public 
relations, but an NGO recognizing them carries a lot of weight, both internally for 
employees who are passionate on the subject and externally.”  
 
V. Policy 
Nearly all companies acknowledge the strategic value of having a “seat at the 
table” during policy development. Cinergy’s Rogers feels that this position is 
necessary to avoid “stroke of the pen risk, the risk that a regulator or 
congressman signing a law can change the value of our assets overnight.” 
Rogers continues, “If there is a high probability that there will be regulation, you 
try to position yourself to influence the outcome.” Shell, for example, played an 
advisory role in the development of the E.U. Trading Directive.  
 
While some companies consider it a business opportunity to advocate their 
desired policy; others believe it is a responsibility for good policy. At times, it is 
  50 
DRAFT – Please do not cite, quote or distribute 
hard to tell the difference. “It is important for industry to help government find cost 
effective solutions to the climate change issue. Government can’t do it alone,” 
says DuPont’s Fisher. “They don’t have the capacity to understand all the 
implications of the different policy options.” Carolyn Green, Vice President of 
Health, Environment and Safety at Sunoco, goes further, citing “how little 
environmental regulators and advocates know about the energy intensity of their 
requirements.”  
 
However, not all organizations are as sanguine. A handful of companies cite 
disenchantment with a lack of influence over the Kyoto process or state 
programs in the Western and Northeastern United States. These concerns 
extend to frustration over the lack of acceptance of certain technologies or 
mitigation techniques such as biological sequestration. As DTE’s Boyd remarks, 
“Politics and special interests – even those with the stated claim of 
reducing/offsetting emissions like major environmental NGOs – have hampered 
progress in policy development. It certainly appears that interests beyond simply 
addressing the climate change issue are playing into decision making.” However, 
acknowledging the importance of continuing to engage governments, he 
concludes, “This will be a long path. We need to convince policymakers to begin 
with small steps that clearly will not result in economic harm to get things 
started.”  
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A. Policy Is On the Horizon 
Despite little progress toward national GHG regulations, 100 percent of 
respondents believe that government involvement is necessary to address the 
issue of climate change. According to Yolanda Pagano, Director of Corporate 
Strategy and Programs at Exelon, “We believe that leading companies will do 
what they can do in advance of mandatory programs, but we believe that to go 
beyond the base level of effort that is occurring in the voluntary period and to 
make significant progress in addressing this global issue, government mandates 
will be required.” Cinergy’s Leahy adds, ”The technologies will emerge when CO2 
has a price signal…and that market signal will be created by regulation.”  
 
For companies in this report, there is little doubt that government regulation and 
the associated market push are just over the horizon. In fact, the majority believe 
that regulations will arrive between 2010 and 2015 (see Figure 9), a date that is 
consistent with the 2010 proposed start date of a national tradable-permit system 
by the NCEP.26  
Figure 9 
Anticipated Date of Federal Standards on Climate Change 
[If you believe that federal standards on climate change are imminent] when do you believe these 
standards will take effect? 







 Total Respondents: 24 
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Companies are facing numerous pressures motivating them to support 
government regulation. For companies in highly capital-intensive industries, 
climate policy is a matter of business certainty. For example, when considering 
the investment in a power plant with a 50-plus year life-span, electric utilities 
need to know the type of climate regime under which it will be operating. For the 
insurance industry, the physical implications of climate change have a more 
direct consequence for the fundamental business model. “If we don’t have [a 
predictive model], we are just gambling,” says Chris Walker, Managing Director, 
Head of Sustainability Business Development at Swiss Re. As a result, the 
company has been an outspoken advocate for any policy, though Walker notes 
that he is not interested in engaging in conversations about “whether we need 
five percent or six percent reductions. We need 60 percent reductions!”  
 
Similar to the findings of a 2004 report published by the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, many respondents observe connections between United States 
action, the actions of other nations and international carbon markets.27 According 
to Michael Parr, Senior Manager of Government Affairs at DuPont, “We won’t 
see China and India on board while the U.S. is on the sidelines.” The resulting 
patchwork of regulation creates additional costs and undermines the price of 
carbon. “Complexity requires additional resources,” adds David Rurak, Director 
of Operations at DuPont. “Market liquidity of carbon credits is restrained without a 
global market, which drives down the price.”  
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B. Policy Mechanisms 
As with any new regulation, a core concern for some companies is additional 
cost and red tape. According to DTE’s Boyd, “While the U.S. does not always 
have the most stringent environmental standards in words, it often has the most 
stringent in practice.” Others believe that policy can be instituted in a manner that 
avoids significant costs to the economy. ”What is important is that lawmakers 
know that even some coal fired utilities think it is possible to deal with the climate 
problem without harming the economy,” says Cinergy’s Leahy. Research recently 
conducted by Deloitte supports this perspective, stating, “Trading in emission 
permits will enable power and utility companies to stay within the rules even 
though they may have difficulty cutting their emissions rapidly due to technology 
gaps and cost issues."28  
 
Given the sheer scope of any climate policy, respondents believe that flexibility is 
essential to address such concerns. “Policies need to allow price signals to be 
sent that will allow flexible investments in energy efficiency and clean, non-
emitting generation technologies, such as renewables, nuclear and IGCC coal 
with carbon capture and storage,” warns Jeff Williams, Manager of Corporate 
Environmental Initiatives at Entergy. “These investments will help keep the cost 
of a mandatory program low.” A few companies also note the need for unified 
federal regulation to supersede a patchwork of state and local actions, which 
they believe place an unnecessary burden on manufacturers. In the words of 
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Tom Catania, Director of Government Relations at Whirlpool, “This would be a 
huge misdirection of resources and much less can be achieved if we are 
subjected to a balkanized set of standards from fifty different sources.” 
 
Notwithstanding the broad range of industry sectors represented in this survey, 
there are a number of areas where there is agreement regarding policy 
mechanisms (see Figure 10). At the top of the list is GHG credit trading, followed 
by credit for carbon sequestration. The high prominence of sequestration is 
notable because it was ranked lowest in terms of providing bottom-line benefits 
to companies (see Figure 4). Though this is not surprising given the current 
unavailability of most sequestration technologies, most companies in the survey 
view IGCC paired with carbon sequestration as critical to determining the role of 
coal in the energy future of the United States. Thus, it makes sense that 
subsidies for a technology with lower than average perceived returns would be 
supported by industry.  
Figure 9 
Anticipated Features of Future Climate Change Standards 
What kinds of actions will be most important [in federal standards on climate change]? (Please 
rate their level of importance: 1 = not important; 3 = neutral; 5 = important). 
3 4
Voluntary GHG limits
Credit for indirect emissions
Mandatory GHG limits
Required reporting of CO2e (e.g. Toxics Release Inventory)
Subsidies for GHG reducing R&D
Tax incentives for energy efficient products
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 Total Respondents: 26 
Many of the companies in this survey are early adopters of climate-related 
strategies and many have achieved meaningful GHG emission reductions. 
Among this group, credit for what has already been accomplished is considered 
an important element of policy. For some, such as DuPont and Alcoa, it is critical. 
According to Jake Siewert, Vice President, Environment, Health Safety, Global 
Communications and Public Strategy at Alcoa, “Although I can’t imagine anything 
coming out of Washington that would be too strict for us, the worst case scenario 
is not getting credit for what we’ve already done and having to start today.”  
 
When questioned about their preferred baseline date for emissions reductions, 
companies answered with a median date of 1990 and an average date of 1994. 
This is consistent with both the 1990 baseline set by the Kyoto treaty and 
reflective of the early action taken by most companies in this survey. The primary 
concern for these companies, irrespective of what date is chosen, is that the 
reductions be certified credibly.  
 
Moving beyond these basic elements of agreement, there are notable differences 
among company positions on policy. For example, companies such as Holcim 
prefer setting caps on a sector-level basis. These companies argue that differing 
price elasticities between sectors could create a situation where one sector bids 
carbon prices to a level high enough to adversely impact another sector. Some 
have suggested that a sector-specific approach to gathering industry input would 
prevent energy intensive industries, which are seen to have the most at stake, 
  56 
DRAFT – Please do not cite, quote or distribute 
from capturing the regulatory process.29 On the other hand, companies such as 
Cinergy favor economy-wide approaches where all industries are covered under 
one cap. Intel would like to see an intensity measure that allows for industry 
growth.  
 
There is some disagreement among companies over whether to credit use-phase 
GHG reductions. A number of manufacturing companies want credits from use-
phase emissions reductions. Maytag and Whirlpool consider use-phase 
reductions a central part of their respective strategies. According to Steve Willis, 
Director of Global Environment, Health and Safety at Whirlpool, “If the company 
is going to move forward on climate change, we need to get credits for indirect 
emissions.” Other manufacturing companies, such as Alcoa, see no such issues. 
According to the company, decreasing a vehicle’s weight by 10 percent typically 
yields a seven percent reduction in GHG emissions. So, instead of gaining 
credits for use-phase reductions, Alcoa is more excited about how GHG 
reduction goals will increase the market for its product. The company is satisfied 
with the increased sales from, for example, continued light-weighting of 
automobiles.  
 
Despite the universal belief that policy is needed to adequately address climate 
change, Cinergy’s Leahy paints a sobering picture of how difficult it will be to 
justify climate change regulation to the average voter. “Advocates for a carbon 
control regime should be prepared for an aggressive media campaign by 
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opponents – who was that couple we saw in the early-nineties during the health 
care debate? As soon as anything looks like it may become law, we’ll see them 
again, only this time they’ll say, ‘Honey, did you know we’re going to get hit with 
an X percent tax on energy use?’ ‘Wow, that’s going to force the price of 
everything UP!’ ‘Yes, and it says here X hundred thousand people will lose their 
jobs because of this!’ It’s tough to fit an accurate picture into nice sound bites, 
especially for such a complex issue.” 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Most companies agree that inaction is not a viable option with regard to climate 
change. In the estimation of these respondents, companies that do nothing to 
address climate change or energy issues are not only missing out on potential 
financial savings opportunities, but also setting themselves up for potential 
longer-term political and financial struggle. “Companies should take action now to 
define their global climate-related strategy, set GHG reduction goals and 
implement GHG reduction activities, not just for environmental reasons, but also 
for competitive advantage,” says Baxter’s Meissen. “Energy-saving projects 
result in both GHG reductions and energy savings, which can significantly reduce 
operating costs.”  
 
A. Timing is Critical 
Timing is the most critical element of any climate-related strategy. On the one 
hand, some companies acknowledge the dangers of pursuing climate-change 
  58 
DRAFT – Please do not cite, quote or distribute 
initiatives too early. For example, some executives specifically highlight false 
starts in certain initiatives, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (which 
many believe is not realizing its potential). In contrast, others wish they had 
started earlier. Embedded within this tension is a desire to be in front on the 
issue, but not too far ahead of the rest of the business community. In the words 
of David Bresch, Head of the Atmospheric Perils Group at Swiss Re, “You should 
always remain one step ahead of the competition. But if you are two steps 
ahead, you lose the crowd. The ideal is for you to be the leader of the pack and 
everyone pulling in the same direction.” 
 
Based on the survey responses, it is clear that climate-related strategies take 
considerable time, resources and energy to develop. “A significant amount of 
lead time was needed to select, fund, and complete quality projects before 
realizing CO2 benefits,” acknowledges Entergy’s Williams. Furthermore, if 
companies are serious about the climate change issue, their strategies should 
not be independent of the company’s overall business strategy. According to 
David Hone, Group Climate Change Advisor at Shell, “While we are still learning, 
it is clear that climate change has to be imbedded in the real business strategy 
early on and not just remain an HSE issue.”  
 
A lingering concern for many companies is the poorly defined political and market 
environment. Cinergy, for example, is pushing for change and preparing for a 
carbon constrained future, but Rogers does not believe the company can take 
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definitive action on climate change until there are clear regulatory and market 
signals to do so.  
 
Despite the challenges of timing, there are numerous examples of companies 
who have met or exceeded their internal target before the stated deadline. Alcoa 
reached its 2010 emission reduction goals seven years early, and Entergy not 
only met its stated goal of stabilizing CO2 emissions at 2000 levels, but also 
reduced them by an additional 21 percent through year-end 2004. Shell achieved 
its targeted reductions in 2002 and developed a new set of targets in 2005. And 
DuPont reestablished its climate change goals in 1999 after achieving the 
desired targets early. 
 
The good news for relatively inexperienced companies wanting to push ahead on 
this issue is that there are abundant examples from which they can learn. “Many 
others – companies, governments and NGOs – have plowed this road before,” 
says Exelon’s Pagano. “Seek to leverage their learnings.” Sunoco’s Green has 
the following advice for companies with significant manufacturing operations: 
“GHG emissions from manufacturing operations with combustion units 
overwhelm all other company GHG emissions, so reduction of energy use is the 
most cost effective strategy.” Andreas Schlapfer, Head of Internal Environmental 
Management at Swiss Re, adds that novices in the area of building efficiency 
have an opportunity, “If you’ve never focused on energy efficiency before, 
achieving 30 percent reduction is simple.” Irrespective of company type, there is 
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a growing wealth of expertise about how to most effectively address climate 
change and energy issues in a cost-effective manner.  
 
B. Challenges Ahead 
The examples described in this report offer a glimpse into the state of the art of 
climate-related strategy implementation. But this is a rapidly changing field and 
the nature of these strategies will change accordingly. In fact, over the last one to 
two years, most companies have noted a shift in the climate change arena. The 
general consensus is that recent changes in the level of external awareness, 
government interest, and consumer demand make it more imperative to address 
this issue now. According to Interface’s Bertolucci, “customers are now becoming 
more aware of the importance of the climate change issue.” Shifts such as these 
appear tied to the challenge facing many companies at this point in time; shifting 
their climate-related strategy from one that is focused on risk management and 
bottom-line protection to business opportunity and top-line enhancements.  
 
Looking forward, companies identify three key variables that may significantly 
influence the form of future climate-related strategies. The first is the potential 
impact of rising energy prices, which can have both positive and negative 
implications and varies by industry and business. In the estimation of Cinergy’s 
Leahy, “The sudden ramp up in energy prices may be changing the political 
landscape around this issue. On the one hand, it makes it easier to talk 
conservation but harder to talk about using a carbon price to pull new 
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technologies along. People haven’t made the connection between the fact that 
energy prices move up and down all the time – sometimes a lot – and the fact 
that an entry level carbon price shouldn’t be that noticeable to consumers, yet it 
will change behavior at the margin.” Price increases might help companies such 
as Whirlpool promote more energy efficient products in the marketplace or Intel 
pursue new technologies that are more cost effective than they have been in the 
past. In contrast, rising prices clearly pose a threat to energy intensive industries 
such as aluminum and cement. Regardless of the specific impact on a particular 
company or industry, there is consensus that energy prices will play a significant 
role in the developing climate change debate.  
 
Second, while regulation did not rank highly as a near-term driver of climate 
change strategies, a number of companies note it as a long-term concern. For 
certain companies, the key challenge will be balancing regulation and carbon 
constraints with the company’s growth strategy.  
 
Third, companies acknowledge growing awareness in the investment community 
as a recent change in the business environment that might impact strategy 
implementation. Baxter’s Meissen believes that “there is an increased volume of 
requests from investors for companies to disclose GHG data, define climate 
strategies and report progress in reducing emissions” 
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Adding these uncertainties to the list of risks that opened this report yields a 
picture that climate change is altering the business environment in ways that are 
not yet fully clear. But the companies surveyed have determined that this 
alteration requires preparation for new rules of the game. Climate change 
represents a market transition and, as in any market transition, there are great 
opportunities and grave implications. There will be winners and losers; those with 
an interest in resisting and trying to delay such a market transformation and 
those who will try to capitalize on it. The difference between these two groups 
lies in a careful cost/benefit analysis of doing something versus doing nothing. 
Not all companies will benefit from GHG reductions and voluntary reduction 
programs must be based on sound business logic.30 This report explores the 
strategy considerations of companies that have decided to take action and what 
kinds of actions they have taken. 
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Managing “Stroke of the Pen” Risk 
Cinergy∗
 
Cinergy’s heavy reliance upon coal combustion for electricity generation makes it 
particularly vulnerable to carbon 
regulation. Yet, according to Chairman 
and CEO Jim Rogers, addressing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is not 
only the ethically right thing to do; it is also 
a smart business decision. Rogers 
believes that U.S. industry will soon face 
domestic carbon constraints, a prediction 
that presents Cinergy with a serious 
strategic challenge. While climate change 
is a long-term problem, many industries 
need short-term regulatory and market clarity in order to properly value potential 
investments. For companies like Cinergy within the power sector, the future of 
climate policy and carbon regulation will affect strategic decision-making about 
investments in new generating capacity that have an expected life of 40 or 50 
years.  
Cinergy’s Footprint  
(2005) 
 
Headquarters:  Cincinnati, OH 
Revenues:  $4.6 billion 
Employees: 7,842 
Percentage of Emissions 
In Kyoto Ratified Countries: 0 percent 
Direct CO2e Emissions  
Legacy Generating Units:  64.1 MMtons 
Cinergy Solutions Projects: 2.9 MMtons 
Other Direct CO2e Emissions: 0.3 MMtons 
Aggregate CO2e  
Emissions*: 67.3 MMtons 
Target:   5 percent reduction in GHG below  
  2000 levels by 2010-2012 
Year Target Set:  2003 
 
* Cinergy does not track indirect emissions resulting 
from power purchases nor does it calculate emissions 




Million metric tons. 
** Cinergy does not track indirect emissions result ng 
ower p rchases nor does it calculate emissions 
from product use. 
 
“The greatest risk we face is ‘stroke of the pen’ risk, the risk that a regulator or 
congressman signing a law can change the value of our assets overnight,” says 
                                                 
∗ We would like to thank Eric Kuhn, Kevin Leahy, David Maltz, Darlene Radcliffe, Jim Rogers, 
Catherine Stempien, and John Stowell for their contributions to this case study. 
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Rogers. “If there is a high probability that there will be regulation, you try to 
position yourself to influence the outcome.” Cinergy is actively managing this 
regulatory risk through its voluntary GHG emission reduction program and its 
aggressive leadership role within the utility industry. These actions make the 
company a legitimate participant in the national policy debate, creating the 
opportunity to work with government, trade associations, environmental 
organizations and other stakeholder groups to help shape legislation on GHG 
emissions. But, while Rogers leads Cinergy with a long-term focus, he does not 
feel that the company can take definitive action on climate change until there are 
both clear regulatory and market signals to do so. As Kevin Leahy, General 
Manager of Environmental Economics and Finance, explains, ”The technologies 
will emerge when CO2 has a price signal. All we need is a market signal to act, 
and that market signal will be created by regulation.” 
 
Company Profile 
Cinergy is one of the leading diversified energy companies in the United States, 
with 2004 revenues exceeding $4.6 billion and a workforce of 7,842 employees. 
The company was created in 1994 through the merger of Cincinnati Gas & 
Electric (CG&E) and PSI Energy, Inc., the largest electric utility in Indiana. 
Cinergy is currently organized into two core businesses: Regulated Operations 
and Commercial Businesses.  
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The Regulated Operations unit consists of PSI’s regulated generation, 
transmission and distribution operations, and CG&E’s regulated electric and gas 
transmission and distribution systems. This unit plans, constructs, operates and 
maintains Cinergy’s transmission and distribution systems, and delivers gas and 
electric energy to consumers. It owns over 7,000 megawatts (MW) of electric 
generating capacity serving 1.5 million electric customers, and operates 9,200 
miles of gas mains and service lines that serve about 500,000 customers.31  
 
The Commercial Businesses unit is comprised of the wholesale generation and 
energy marketing/trading operations. This includes CG&E’s 6,300 MW of electric 
generating capacity in Ohio, which was deregulated in 2001. The wholesale 
generation division also includes the subsidiary company Cinergy Solutions 
(“Solutions”), which owns or operates 27 cogeneration projects with over 5,400 
MW of electric generating capacity and performs energy risk management 
analyses, provides customized energy solutions and is responsible for all 
international operations.32 Solutions’ projects usually entail taking an ownership 
position in the energy production or distribution facilities of strategic partners and 
reworking the facility to improve energy efficiency and environmental 
performance. In addition to producing bottom-line revenues, these projects 
usually generate GHG reduction benefits as well.  
 
In 2004 Cinergy generated 69 million megawatt hours of electricity, 98 percent of 
which were generated from the combustion of 28.2 million tons of coal, 
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approximately 2.8 percent of the total 1.016 billion tons of coal consumed for 
electric power in the United States.33 Cinergy’s 2004 CO2 equivalent (“CO2e”) 
emissions totaled 68.6 million metric tons, representing almost one percent of 
total CO2e emissions in the U.S.34 The majority of these emissions (94 percent) 
are from “legacy generating units,” those electric generating plants that were part 
of the original CG&E and PSI utility systems, as well as those electric generating 
plants acquired by the unregulated merchant group that are not Solutions 
projects. These figures will soon change as Cinergy has agreed to be acquired 
by Duke Energy through a $9 billion stock swap . 
 
Strategy Development 
Cinergy began its attention to climate change with a study in the early 1990s by 
ICF Consulting on the feasibility of adopting an internal CO2 cap. Given the 
coincident activities surrounding the CG&E/PSI merger, the study only served to 
awaken concern within the company. GHG goal development was initiated as in 
1993 with Cinergy’s participation in the Edison Electric Institute/DOE Climate 
Challenge. In September 2003, Cinergy formally announced its voluntary GHG 
emissions reduction program, with the goal of reducing annual emissions to five 
percent below the 2000 baseline for the years 2010 through 2012. The 
company’s decision to more aggressively embrace climate change was made 
possible by three forces converging: an internal management push, pull from 
external stakeholders and technological developments that would allow the 
company to move forward in a carbon-constrained world.  
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Internal Management Push. Chairman and CEO Jim Rogers leads Cinergy with 
a long-term view and an approach that is rooted in stewardship. Given the 
expected 40 to 50 year lifespan of investments in generating capacity and the 
regulated nature of the industry, long-term planning is common for utilities. 
However, the principles of stewardship employed by Rogers are rare. “When 
your time horizon is short, you’re thinking ‘stonewall it and it won’t happen on 
your watch,’” Says Rogers. “If you are a steward, you make decisions on a longer 
time horizon, looking beyond your own tenure. When you think of it that way, 
your view changes. We look 20, 30, 50 years down the road.”  
 
Today, when Rogers looks out over the business horizon, he sees six “signposts” 
indicating that climate change is an issue to be dealt with head on35. Notably 
absent from this list is scientific research and analysis. According to Rogers, “Our 
decisions are purely business based. The science is interesting, but not truly 
relevant for our purposes.” Based upon these trends, he believes it is his 
responsibility to prepare the company for the likelihood of operating in a carbon-
constrained world.  
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Cinergy deals with climate change as a long-term systematic effort primarily 
through capital investments and a focused public policy stance. This approach is 
well suited to the utility industry and aligned with the long-term nature of the 
climate change issue. Because climate change is caused by the concentration of 
long-lived GHGs in the atmosphere, there is cause to begin action but not 
immediate draconian reductions. The mantra is “slow, stop and reverse the 
growth of emissions.” Yet, according to Eric Kuhn, Principle Environmental 
Scientist, “There is a real commitment on Jim Rogers’s part to provide resources 
for this issue. CEO buy-in is critical, especially for a voluntary program.” 
 
Rogers’ leadership style infuses the corporation with a strong focus on 




Signpost #1: States are taking action. 
 
 
Signpost #2: An increasing number of U.S. 





Signpost #3: The Kyoto Protocol was ratified 
and became law on February 16, 2005. 
 
   
   
  
Signpost #4: A growing number of shareholder 
groups are asking companies to quantify the 
risks associated with GHG emissions.
   
 
Signpost #5: CO2 and GHG emissions trading 
markets are developing in Europe and the United 
States. 
Signpost #6: Global warming is becoming 
part of our everyday consciousness. 
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credentials lend legitimacy to his messages and engender trust from his 
audiences. Prior to joining PSI in 1988, he acted as an intervener on behalf of 
consumers in gas, electric and telephone rate cases in the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, served as Deputy General Counsel for Litigation and Enforcement of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and legally represented 
energy companies before the FERC, the Department of Energy, various 
Congressional committees and federal courts. Rogers has testified before 
Congressional Committees 13 times since 1989, on issues ranging from the 
environment to national energy strategy to industry restructuring. 
 
The culture of stakeholder engagement dates back to when Rogers became 
head of Public Service Indiana (PSI) in 1988. At that time the company had a 
failed nuclear program, very poor relations with customers and was nearly 
bankrupt. Rogers introduced a strategy to improve relations through meaningful 
engagement with environmentalists, consumers and industrial groups in the 
state. Having a dialogue and listening with an open mind has developed trust 
from stakeholders, which has proven to be an asset for the company in efforts 
ranging from rate cases to locating infrastructure development. This credibility 
has extended into the policy arena, allowing Cinergy to base discussion on 
climate change on what it views as an economically rational foundation. Cinergy 
believes its collaborative approach is good for all of its stakeholders, including 
investors, customers, employees, policymakers, regulators, suppliers, partners 
and communities. 
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In fact, stakeholder engagement played a significant role in stimulating a more 
public position from the company on climate change. Early collaboration with the 
DOE on the Climate Challenge program and on-going interaction with policy 
makers on three air pollutant issues (sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides and mercury) 
provided insight into the future of carbon regulation. Subsequent to these efforts, 
Cinergy made a commitment to participate in the current administration’s Climate 
Leaders Program. 
 
Pull from external stakeholders. In 2002, the Committee on Mission 
Responsibility through Investment (MRTI) of the Presbyterian Church (USA) 
submitted a shareholder resolution requesting that Cinergy provide information 
on GHG emissions and disclose the risks associated with climate change. 
Cinergy appealed to the Securities and Exchange Commission and was granted 
no-action relief. After MRTI tried again in early 2003, the company chose to 
reach out and engage in discussions that ultimately led to MRTI withdrawing the 
proposal. This dialogue also resulted in the development of a plan to disclose 
Cinergy’s risks related to climate regulation.  
 
In September, 2003, the company formally announced its internal GHG reduction 
program, a response to both the Climate Leaders Program commitment and the 
intervention by MRTI. In February 2004, the company announced it would 
partner with MRTI to develop the Air Issues Report to Stakeholders (AIRS). The 
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December 2004 issuance of AIRS was a watershed moment for Cinergy. The 
report provided a broader analysis of the company’s risks related to climate 
change and other emissions, with a thorough discussion of the linkage between 
energy, economics and the environment. The effort also represented a more 
public positioning on climate change and a culmination of analysis that had 
begun years earlier. 
 
Technological developments. Heavy reliance on coal exposes Cinergy to 
regulatory risk in any form of carbon regime. Despite this fact, coal’s abundance 
and low cost in the United States leads the company to believe that coal will 
continue to be central to the country’s longer term fuel mix. Cinergy’s work with 
environmentalists gave it an early indication of a potential to break the carbon-
environmental impasse; some environmentalists were warming to the idea of 
coal being part of the solution.  
 
The most promising means currently available for utilizing coal in a carbon-
constrained world is through the implementation of Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle (IGCC) technology combined with Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration (CCS). The coal gasification process converts coal into a 
synthesis gas (syngas) and produces steam. The hot syngas is processed to 
remove sulfur compounds, mercury and particulate matter before it is used to fuel 
a combustion turbine generator. The heat in the exhaust gases from the 
combustion turbine is recovered to generate additional steam. This steam, along 
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with that from the syngas process, then drives a steam turbine generator to 
produce electricity. The technology has the potential to capture CO2 much more 
economically than other coal technologies because a concentrated stream of 
CO2 can be more readily removed from the syngas of an IGCC plant. Captured 
CO2 would then be injected deep underground for geologic sequestration. 
Industry analysts estimate that carbon capture could add as much as 72 percent 
to the cost of electricity from a conventional pulverized coal plant, 60 percent to 
the cost of a natural gas combined cycle plant, but only 25 percent to the cost of 
electricity from an IGCC plant.36  
 
The company has been involved in IGCC since the early 1990s when it built one 
of the first demonstration plants in the United States in partnership with the DOE 
through the Clean Coal Technology Demonstration Program. The West Terre 
Haute, Indiana plant is still in operation today with Cinergy purchasing syngas 
from it for one of the units at its Wabash River Station. In 2004, Cinergy entered 
into an agreement with GE Energy and Bechtel Corporation to study the 
feasibility of a commercial scale (600 MW) IGCC generating station. Although 
various sites were evaluated as potential candidates, Cinergy’s preferred IGCC 
site is the current location of a 160 MW pulverized coal plant near Edwardsport, 
Indiana built in the late 1940s. Given the importance of the climate change issue 
and the ability to continue to use coal, geologic sequestration potential was 
included as one of the site criteria for the first time as part of the company’s 
internal evaluation. A Front End Engineering and Design (FEED) study is being 
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undertaken and should provide enough detailed design and cost information for a 
decision to be made whether or not to move ahead with the plant by late 2006.  
 
Ultimately, Cinergy believes that resolving the climate change issue will require a 
paradigm shift regarding the technologies employed to refine and use energy. 
The types of technologies being discussed today and deployed over the next 20 
to 30 years will all continue to utilize fossil fuel as their source of energy; even 
hydrogen would likely come from fossil fuels. Although they are more energy 
efficient and have the capability to capture CO2, they are only stop gap or 
bridging technologies to be used until low or zero carbon technologies are 
developed and deployed in the second half of this century. 
 
But, notes Kuhn, “We are not a technology developer or owner. We are a 
customer for new technologies to enable us to economically operate our plants 
and/or produce electricity. We will however work with partners to provide test 
sites and assistance. But we’ll likely not be the owner of resulting patents. We 
know intuitively that the cost of reductions could be huge so that the pennies that 
we are investing in research today could have tremendous returns in the future if 
only a small portion of the costs are reduced.” 
 
Climate Program. Cinergy’s GHG Management Goal of five percent below 2000 
levels for the period 2010 through 2012 was developed to position the company 
to take meaningful actions on GHG emissions and provide the company with 
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credibility to lead the climate change policy debate. But developing the goal first 
involved a risk assessment process, performed by Cinergy’s risk management 
and portfolio optimization teams, which examined a variety of options for action. 
 
Once an optimal goal was selected, it was reviewed by various non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and with that input, revised goals were 
presented to Cinergy’s senior management. Many were uneasy with the wisdom 
behind setting such a goal, but most were persuaded that the strategic 
positioning and organizational learning were worth the associated risks. The 
goals were presented to Cinergy’s Board of Directors as a matter of course, 
although not for official adoption. Similar to DuPont’s response to both CFCs and 
GHGs, Cinergy set a target that was a stretch, not knowing precisely how it 
would achieve it. 
 
The first step in implementing the new goal was performing an assessment of the 
baseline year 2000 GHG emissions. This effort was completed in 2004 and 
reviewed by Environmental Defense, who acted as an independent third party to 
add validity to the process. Environmental Defense has reviewed Cinergy’s 
definition of its corporate emissions footprint, approved how GHG reductions are 
identified and measured, evaluated the company’s implementation of the GHG 
fund, and serves as an ex-officio member of the GHG Management Committee 
that is charged with implementation of Cinergy’s GHG goal. Cinergy has not yet 
engaged a third party auditor to verify its calculations, but plans to do so in 2006. 
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Baseline year 2000 emissions were calculated to be 73.8 million metric tons 
CO2e.37  
 
Baseline year 2000 CO2 Equivalent Emissions 
 





Legacy Electricity Generating Units 69,768,000 94.48 
Fugitive Natural Gas 409,000 0.55 
Cinergy Solutions Projects 3,454,000 4.68 
Fleet Vehicles 36,000 0.05 
SF6 Emissions 176,000 0.24 
Total 73,843,000 100.00 
 
Given historical trends in energy demand, Cinergy’s GHG Management Goal of a 
five percent reduction translates to approximately 70 million metric tons per year 
or less.38 The goal was reviewed by EPA Climate Leaders staff, who determined, 
based on their own projections for electricity demand in the region, that the 
proposed goal was substantial. During the three year period 2010 through 2012, 
approximately 30 million metric tons of CO2e emissions reductions would be 
achieved.39
 
Reductions will come from the company’s regulated and non-regulated electricity 
generating units, combined heat and power (CHP) facilities, natural gas 
distribution system, vehicle fleet operations and other operations that emit 
significant amounts of GHGs. Cinergy takes credit for emission reductions from 
its Solutions business, but only if it has an ownership position and operates the 
facility. The emission credits are not prorated based on a percentage of 
ownership since Cinergy is taking responsibility for all of the GHG emissions from 
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the facility. Cinergy operates, but does not own, a number of industrial power 
generation and CHP facilities. When Cinergy has no control over capital 
investments or operational changes at these units, their emissions are not 
included in the GHG baseline. Unless ownership passes to Cinergy, such 
emissions will not be included in future measures. Furthermore, Cinergy does not 
track the indirect emissions that result from power purchases, as it is virtually 
impossible to determine the origin of electricity purchased by traders. Finally, 
emissions from the mining and transport of coal are not included in the 
calculations.  
 
Cinergy intends to achieve at least two-thirds of emission reductions “on-system” 
(or within its operations), and up to one-third “off-system”.40 On-system emission 
reductions involve projects that impact Cinergy’s direct emissions. Examples 
include: CO2 emissions from smoke stacks and vehicular tailpipe CO2 emissions, 
methane emissions from the natural gas distribution system, or SF6 emissions 
from the transmission and distribution system. Examples of off-system reductions 
include: forestry projects, electric end-user efficiency projects, and research and 
development projects. Implementing both on-system and off-system projects will 
generate experience and knowledge regarding in-house technical capabilities for 
reducing GHG emissions as well as real-time data regarding the cost-
effectiveness of such efforts. By taking these actions now, Cinergy will be better 
prepared to contribute to the policy discussion and to operate in a carbon 
constrained future. 
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As emissions reductions are achieved, they are reported to the DOE’s Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) through the 1605(b) reporting system and to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as part of Cinergy’s commitment under 
the Climate Leaders program. Cinergy feels strongly that early actors must 
receive credit for their voluntary reductions when legislation is ultimately passed.  
 
Carbon dioxide is directly measured at generating units equipped with continuous 
emissions monitors (CEMs). For stations not equipped with CEMs, estimates are 
calculated using the BTU value of the fuel consumed multiplied by the pounds of 
CO2 emitted per million BTU as provided through the DOE’s EIA 1605(b) 
reporting program.  
 
Measurement and verification of biological CO2 sequestered by tree plantings 
undertaken by Cinergy begins with the identification of measurement plots for 
testing. Within each sample measurement plot, tree volumes, underbrush and 
soils are measured for carbon content. The measurements are repeated at 
regular intervals, data is extrapolated between years when the measurement 
plots are surveyed and the measurement results are applied to the entire 
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Organizational Integration 
In the years 2004 and 2005, Cinergy budgeted $3 million (what Leahy calls 
“tuition to learn”) for projects to reduce GHG emissions, the first two installments 
of seven comprising the total $21 million GHG fund through the end of the 
decade. This budget is managed by the GHG Management Committee (the 
Committee), which is comprised of ten senior representatives from business 
areas that would be affected by GHG restrictions (legislation) and one ex-officio 
member, Environmental Defense. Annually, GHG reducing and offsetting 
projects are solicited throughout the company and are open to any employee 
who would like to propose a project. Project proposals are limited to five pages in 
length and include a description of how the project will reduce GHG emissions, 
quantification of projected reductions, evaluation of the project’s permanence, 
and an analysis of cost estimates for the project. Another critical factor is whether 
or not the project would be implemented without GHG Funds. Projects are 
reviewed, evaluated and ranked by staff using criteria established by the 
Committee. The projects are then presented to the Committee for their 
consideration and funding. 
 
In 2004 and 2005, the Committee received over 150 project proposals. The 
majority of on-system projects were small efficiency projects in the power plants. 
Other on-system projects included wind and solar demonstration projects, the 
purchase of four hybrid vehicles for the Cinergy transportation fleet, and 
customer end use electric efficiency projects. Customer electric efficiency 
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projects are considered on-system because they reduce the CO2 emissions from 
Cinergy’s power plants. Examples of off-system projects included tree planting 
and the funding of research and development projects in the areas of carbon 
sequestration, biomass fuels, and renewable energy generation. 
 
In evaluating potential projects, Cinergy does not use a shadow price for carbon, 
largely because internal sentiment is that regulation is too remote and uncertain 
to reliably quantify a price. Another reason to not use a particular cutoff price for 
carbon is the secondary benefits commonly associated with the efficiency 
projects, such as reduced fuel consumption and reduced SO2 and NOx 
emissions. Preliminary data collected for the power plant efficiency projects 
implemented in 2004 indicate that the projects actually return value to the 
company in the form of fuel savings and generation of SO2 and NOx allowances. 
These projects were considered “low hanging fruit” but as the company moves 
forward with its climate change program, reductions are expected to become 
more costly.  
 
The criteria currently used to evaluate project proposals are more subjective than 
objective, including considerations such as the age of the facility and its 
availability rate. Ultimately, the Committee is interested in the cost per ton of 
CO2e emissions reduced, but it also considers issues such as project 
replicability, longevity of reductions achieved, and whether funding sources other 
than those related to GHG would be available. However, the cost data being 
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gathered is part of the institutional learning desired by the program, generating 
hard data from historical actions on available reductions at various price levels. 
This has value internally as well as in policy debates. 
 
According to Kuhn, many of the on-system reductions have been projects “that 
were on the cutting room floor because they did not meet internal rate of return 
criteria.” These projects had been previously forgone because the return on 
modest efficiency gains, in the form of fuel cost savings, was negligible given low 
coal prices. “However,” says Kuhn, “these projects become attractive when the 
value of GHG emission reductions is taken into account.”  
 
Of the $6 million allocated in 2004 and 2005, $4.4 million (73 percent) was 
invested in on-system projects and $1.6 million (27 percent) funded off-system 
projects, reducing annual CO2e emissions by approximately 600,000 and 25,000 
metric tons respectively. While it is not fully accurate to calculate a cost per ton 
from these figures due to the research and development projects that are 
included, Cinergy estimates that the actual average cost per ton of CO2e 
emission reductions was $8.28 in 2004 (On-system reductions averaged $6.43 
and off-system reductions averaged $609.00) and $12.49 in 2005. Cinergy has 
reviewed its reduction calculation methods with Environmental Defense and EPA 
Climate Leaders staff, and has pledged to hire a third party auditor to verify 
emissions reductions and provide assurance that figures and estimates are 
accurate for meeting its period 2010 to 2012 goal.  
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On-System       
Heat Rate Improvement Projects at Generation Stations  $1,940,000 349,882  $1.11
Markland Dam Software Upgrade $285,000  7,400 $7.70
Hybrid Cars $20,000  26 $153.85
Renewable Energy Demonstration Projects * $55,000  35 $314.29
       
Off-System       
The Nature Conservancy Reforestation Project $180,000  1,000 $36.00
Vestar - Oldenburg Academy Energy Conservation Project * $90,000  62 $290.32
Cincinnati Zoo Education Center Solar Project * $150,000  33 $909.09
EPRI Research Project $250,000  ---  
       
Total All Projects $2,970,000  358,438 $1.66
       
On-System Projects and Reductions $2,300,000  
77.4 
percent  




* Small demonstration projects are more expensive than the costs per ton that Cinergy would 
accept for full scale utility projects. 
 
Looking more long-term, Cinergy is examining the potential of larger scale 
renewable energy sources in its service area, including wind, solar and 
biogas/biomass. But, according to Leahy, “Investment options depend in part on 
what one believes will happen on the technology front when regulation is set. For 
now, plant efficiency improvements will be first. These will be followed by loose 
methane from leaking pipelines and landfills, bio-mass co-fire in existing coal 
plants, and upgrades in renewables as possible. Tree planting will be part of the 
mix, but less than originally assumed as it is more costly than originally thought. 
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There may be technologies like algae based ‘scrubbers’ to lower CO2 from 
existing plants – though this is very early stage – that will be useful for existing 
plants.”  
 
Some modest funding has been allocated to the development of renewable 
energy generating capacity, an energy conservation project, and carbon 
sequestration.41 However, it is not believed that renewable energy sources will 
play a significant role in the voluntary GHG emissions reduction program, 
primarily due to their intermittent characteristics. When renewable energy 
sources are dispatched in regions where Cinergy operates, economics dictate 
that the most likely impact is displacement of a gas fueled unit, rather than a coal 
fired unit. However, should GHG legislation be passed, such technologies would 
become more competitive in a rising wholesale electricity market, and therefore 
could also become a more viable part of Cinergy’s generating portfolio. 
 
That said, not all projects are chosen for low cost emission reductions or long-
term research value. Some are chosen for their symbolic or educational value. 
For example, the company’s purchase of hybrid vehicles for its fleet does not 
represent the most cost-effective GHG emissions reductions available, but they 
do succeed in making the program tangible to employees and stimulating 
conversation.  
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Overall, the corporate culture of stewardship, the leadership of Jim Rogers, and 
the structure of the program have all been critical in garnering internal support for 
the climate change program. Naturally, having capital available to fund projects in 
a time of capital constraints makes the program much more real for staff working 
at the plant level. But the most critical component of Cinergy’s program 
implementation, according to John Stowell, VP of Federal Legislative Affairs, 
Environmental Strategy & Sustainability, has been communication. “Internal and 
external communications are part of the culture at Cinergy,” says Stowell. “Plant 
managers know about this program. We have meetings with them, and Jim 
Rogers discusses the issue often.”  
 
External Outreach  
External communication is an on-going component of Cinergy’s GHG reduction 
program as well. In fact, it is such an integral part of the company’s on-going 
initiatives and strategy already discussed that treating it as a separate initiative is 
not completely correct. Cinergy actively engages stakeholders to keep them 
informed and involved throughout the policy discussion and also to gather 
important feedback. In reality, the company finds the nuts and bolts of the 
program are of most interest to other specialists, while the wider public is 
interested in Cinergy’s policy position and endorsement of regulation.  
 
One way Cinergy began to engage its many stakeholders on climate change was 
through a third party consultant who conducted interviews which were published 
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in the 2004 Annual Report titled Global Warming: Can We Find Common 
Ground? Taken as a whole, they led to a number of conclusions that reflect the 
core of Cinergy’s approach to climate change: global warming is a complex 
problem that must be dealt with holistically; time is of the essence; the customer 
is still the top priority; good corporate governance is based on stewardship, and; 
uncertainty will likely persist on this issue.42
 
But the challenge the company discovered in reaching out to stakeholders was 
finding a balance between the short-term interests of some groups of investors 
focused on quarterly earnings results, and the long-term interests of other groups 
such as employees, customers and communities. According to Rogers, “It’s 
important to deliver for the investor, but when running your company from a 
stakeholder perspective, you include customers, communities, everyone. You 
need to raise rates slowly for the customer. You often need to make decisions 
that do not necessarily maximize the next quarter.” The company has found that, 
because the financial risk associated with climate change is still uncertain, 
institutional investors are not as interested in this issue as they are about the 
prospects for near term financial results. 
 
Policy 
The uncertain regulatory environment flows through to uncertainty regarding the 
value of Cinergy’s assets. It also makes it very challenging to evaluate large 
capital investments going forward. To help resolve this uncertainty, the company 
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has laid out a number of broad criteria that it believes future regulation should 
encompass. GHG policy should focus on all sectors of the economy, embrace 
market-based cap-and-trade principles combined with a “safety valve,” and be 
neutral to fuel type. In addition, compliance flexibility, including off-system 
reductions, is critical to finding a least-cost solution. Finally, GHG policies should 
be international.  
 
Ultimately, Cinergy believes the policy should take steps to slow, stop and then 
reduce emissions growth while promoting public-private partnerships for the 
development of technology solutions (such as IGCC with CCS). The cost for 
individual companies of complying with GHG regulation will depend upon the 
timetable for implementation, emissions reduction requirements, allowance 
allocations, the impact on fuel prices and ultimately the format of the regulation. It 
is believed that a cap-and-trade program would be less expensive than a 
command and control approach.43  
 
Cinergy communicates this message to lawmakers through the normal channels 
of the regulatory and legislative processes, including meetings, discussions at 
conferences and public statements. The company is not alone in its policy 
stance; utilities such as Exelon, Entergy and PNM have taken similar positions. 
According to Leahy, “What is important is that lawmakers know that even some 
coal fired utilities think it is possible to deal with the climate problem without 
harming the economy. We’ve spent more time working on this problem and so 
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have a better understanding of it than most. Our job now is to help other firms by 
being open with what we’ve found – facts are friendly.” Industry groups such as 
the Edison Electric Institute provide a forum for CEOs to share perspectives and 
hear from experts. When Rogers takes the rotating Chairman’s position in June, 
2006, he hopes to help the organization move toward a broad consensus 




Cinergy’s strategy is designed to position the company as an industry leader on 
climate change. That has paid off with recent recognition by Ceres as one of the 
electric power sector leaders (tied with AEP).44 But when asked what the 
company could be doing better, Stowell responds that the company needs to go 
even further in presenting its policy position. “Being clearer on the details of 
desired policy would be helpful. We could probably benefit from communicating 
more with other utilities and coal companies about what we’ve learned regarding 
the risks and potential upsides. At the same time, we don’t have all the answers 
or any precise legislative language to promote. But it’s clear we’re getting close 
to the point where all of us will have to come up with something more defined. 
That includes who’s covered, what sort of allocation process to use, what’s the 
base year for determining the level of the cap and so on. As is often the case, the 
devil will be in the details – but that’s where we should be able to help.” 
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And for all its strides, Cinergy people still feel the pressure to stay on top of 
technology developments so as to prepare for the market shift that climate 
change will create. According to Kuhn, “There are opportunities for reducing the 
cost of compliance by being active in the shaping of policy. There are also 
opportunities available by getting ahead of the curve to be in a position to be a 
first mover. If you’re looking for the technologies, you’ll be there to make the 
investments.” 
 
Like David Hone at Shell, Rogers worries how climate change could alter the 
fundamentals of his industry. “I worry that we are using 100 year-old technology. 
There will be a transformative technology. At what point will our generation and 
transmission lines become obsolete? There are a lot of things you might do, if 
you think there will be a new technology in 25 years. You need to hit your 
numbers with a short term view, but you need to run your company with a long 
term view.” Having a seat at the policy table and influencing the final legislation 
will help ensure that it fits with Cinergy’s interests and future direction.  
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Cinergy’s Merger with Duke Energy 
In May 2005, Cinergy and Duke Energy announced they would merge in an all stock 
transaction. The combined company will retain the Duke Energy name, and will be 
headquartered in Charlotte, NC, the current home of the much larger Duke Energy (2004 
revenues of $22.5 billion and generation capacity of 32,000 MW.)45
 
The merger is attractive on many dimensions, climate change being one of them. 
Rogers feels that the strong cultural fit between the two utilities assures that efforts on 
climate change will continue. Duke Energy CEO Paul Anderson (who will become 
Chairman of the combined company while Rogers takes over as President and CEO) 
“has already socialized the issue at Duke,” says Rogers, “my assignment is to continue 
to lead on it.” 
 
Synergies between the two companies’ fuel diversity may help that process along. For 
example, Duke Energy’s 3,600 MW of gas fired capacity located in the Midwest has not 
been profitable for Duke in the past. But these assets could be utilized immediately by 
Cinergy to meet system capacity requirements. If gas prices were to drop significantly, 
they could also reduce carbon emissions by shifting generation away from older coal 
fired units, thus creating a partial hedge. 
 
Another important aspect of this merger is nuclear power. Rogers explains, “If you think 
about a carbon-constrained world and our need for energy, nuclear may be an option for 
the future.” However, both legacy companies that formed Cinergy (PSI and CG&E) had 
failed attempts at building nuclear capacity. Rogers continues, “Given our history, 
nuclear was not an option for us; coal and gas were it. Combining with Duke, one of the 
best nuclear operators in the country, gives us the assets and expertise to work in a 
future where nuclear is an option.”  
 
Despite these benefits, the risks associated with climate change were not part of the 
asset valuation process. Rogers explains, “They are regulated in rate base, as are we. 
Intrinsic value does not really change with carbon regulation because the cost would be 
passed through to rate payers. The [non-regulated] Ohio assets would change in value, 
but with their very low variable costs, they could remain competitive with a carbon 
charge.” The larger picture shows that the portfolio of the combined company will be 
more diverse, lowering the regulatory risk profile.  
 
The favored policy outcome of the combined company remains to be seen. Cinergy has 
maintained that a cap-and-trade policy would be best, while Duke has promoted a 
carbon tax. “We’ve been thinking about this for a long time,” says Rogers, “We see how 
successful cap-and-trade is with SO2. Further, we don’t think a tax is politically viable. In 
any case, the least expensive long term policy will employ a price signal of some sort.” 
Rogers acknowledges the need to develop a position that best suits the combined entity. 
Yet one thing is clear, the size of the combined entity will provide much greater weight in 
shaping the policy debate moving forward.  
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Staying One Step Ahead on Climate Change, Not Two 
Swiss Re∗
 
Where other companies in this report are motivated by the potential risk of future 
climate change regulation, Swiss Re stands out as being more at risk from the 
physical impacts of climate change itself. 
The insurance industry may experience 
dramatically increased costs due to a 
growth in climate-related effects; 
including growth in natural disasters, 
disease vectors and mortality rates over 
the next ten years.46 But in keeping with 
the nature of reinsurance, the company 
has been working hard to integrate this 
risk into its business model. According to 
former Chief Executive Officer John 
Coomber (retired at the end of 2005), “While com
avoid risks, reinsurers create value by analyzing
those they judge to be insurable.”47 “Climate c
starting to have a major impact on Swiss R
question is no longer whether global warming is
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According to Chris Walker, Head of Sustainability Business Development, 
climate change is a central concern to the company because, “It could change 
the predictive model. If we don’t have that model right, we could face problems in 
pricing some business going forward.” In short, climate change undermines the 
fundamental model upon which reinsurance is based: that the earth’s systems, 
though somewhat unpredictable in the short-term, are stable in the long-term. 
“What Swiss Re wants most is statistical regularity,” says Brian Thomas, 
Manager of Content and in-house editor. But that statistical regularity is 
disappearing. According to Swiss Re, the insurance industry recorded $38 billion 
weather related natural catastrophe losses in 2004, the largest amount to date 
(see table). In 2005, the company estimates that total insured natural catastrophe 
property, and business interruption losses for the industry reached $78 billion. 
This figure does not include uninsured natural catastrophe-related economic 
losses, which the company values at $174 billion for windstorms.  
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Considering the company’s substantial climate-related risk, Swiss Re has worked 
hard to promote understanding and action on climate change for more than a 
decade. Though the company received public notoriety for its early actions to 
address the issue, efforts at creating business opportunity through climate 
change mitigation related products and services have fallen short of financial 
expectations. Walker feels that, “Considering how the political climate 
subsequently developed we were in the game too early; as a consequence, we 
lost momentum.” Where Swiss Re was once the most visible financial services 
company on this issue,49 that may no longer be the case. A 2005 Business Week 
article ranked the company eighth among its peers, behind climate newcomers 
such as HSBC and JP Morgan Chase.50 Walker believes this is a result of a 
recent increase in attention to new entrants rather than a judgment of Swiss Re’s 
10 years of activity and commitment on the issue. 
 
But the company is careful in its attempts to rectify this situation, wishing to be 
sure that there is no discrepancy between the company’s external perception and 
internal reality. According to Mark Way, Head of Sustainability Issue 
Management and Reporting, “This is not about PR. We believe that the 
materiality of our commitment is comparable with the best of our peers. However, 
there is a danger to being perceived as a leader.” David Bresch, Head of the 
Atmospheric Perils Group, agrees. “You should always remain one step ahead of 
the competition. But if you are two steps ahead, you lose the crowd. The ideal is 
for you to be the leader of the pack and everyone pulling in the same direction.”  
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Company Overview 
Headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, Swiss Re is the world’s largest life and 
health reinsurer, and second largest reinsurer overall.51 With operations in 70 
offices spanning 30 countries, the company has three divisions: Products, Client 
Markets and Financial Services (which includes Asset Management). Forty-nine 
percent of Swiss Re’s premiums come from North America, 38 percent from 
Europe and 13 percent from other parts of the world, mainly Asia. “We’re a Swiss 
company with an American accent,” quips Cosette Simon, Senior Vice President 
for Government Relations and Public Policy. 
 
Swiss Re has historically operated as a quiet company in a low public profile 
industry. That said, there is a strong sense of pride within Swiss Re about its 
roles as a “knowledge company” and an “enabler” with a very long-term 
perspective. The company, for example, tries to avoid advocating a particular 
policy or regulation. Rather, it wants to be called upon for objective expertise on 
informing the development of that policy. “We want to be the first or second call 
someone makes if they want advice on the financial side of climate change,” 
says Walker. As an “enabler,” the company makes business deals and 
development projects possible by providing the necessary instruments to offset 
and diversify risk.  
 
Because Swiss Re is a reinsurance company, it naturally tends toward more 
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long-term and global perspectives when it comes to risk diversification. Climate 
change fits perfectly with that focus. According to Simon, “Climate change is a 
conservative issue with Swiss Re. It’s about caretaking, stewardship, and a fifty-
year time horizon.” As a result, Swiss Re has distinguished itself through a 
relatively long-standing strategy of external awareness building. In fact, more so 
than other companies in this report, awareness building, external outreach and 
scientific research programs as well as innovative climate adaptation products 
such as the use of weather derivatives and catastrophe bonds, where they are 




Swiss Re produced its first publication on climate change – Global Warming, 
Elements of Risk – in 1994. This report was ground breaking for the simple fact 
that it came from a financial services company and argued that the repercussions 
from climate change “could be enormous, with threats posed not only to citizens 
and enterprises, but also to whole cities and branches of the economy, even 
entire states and social systems.''52 With that as a starting point, the company 
has continued to establish its leadership position on this issue through efforts 
aimed at building awareness with clients and the broader public. Between 1995 
and 1998, the company released four publications and conducted three client 
seminars on the topic. 
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Moving beyond education, Bruno Porro, former Chief Risk Officer (retired in 
2004) tasked Walker in July 2000 to look at potential business opportunities 
related to climate change through a group wide feasibility study. Walker identified 
nine areas of possible relevance to the company’s business lines and, with the 
support of two executive board members on his advisory board, he identified nine 
champions within those areas who were willing to dedicate the extra time needed 
to explore them. In this process, Walker took special care to make sure that he 
brought the right people on board, remarking that he “only wanted intrinsically 
motivated managers – people who would read things at night.”  
 
Six months later, Walker presented his findings to the executive board. Not 
surprisingly, the central question following his presentation was, “Is this going to 
make money?” Though Walker admits that he did not have specific numbers to 
back up his rationale, he said that it would. The executive board supported the 
creation of Greenhouse Gas Risk Solutions (GHGRS) by approving a staff of 
four. “Before this,” says Walker, “climate change was more a scientific concern. 
Now it was becoming more of a business development issue.” The company 
narrowed the original list of nine areas to four business elements: investments, 
third party asset management, insurance/derivatives and emissions trading. 
Swiss Re’s general approach to climate change is centered on the elements of: 
research, products and services, management of its own emissions profile, and 
awareness building. 
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Research. Similar to DuPont, Swiss Re seeks to better understand its business 
exposure to climate change by developing internal expertise in climate science. 
According to Bresch, “The role of science at Swiss Re is to know what is possible 
because it helps the company identify, analyze, mitigate, and then, if possible, 
transfer our risk.” Bresch also notes that while most reinsurers have scientists 
Swiss Re is unique in that it is one of the few that does all its modeling in-house. 
As a leading reinsurer, Swiss Re develops and maintains Natural Catastrophe 
(NatCat) state-of-the-art in-house models for all major perils worldwide, relying 
both on the knowledge and expertise of 30 NatCat experts in Zurich, Armonk 
(New York), Munich and Hong Kong as well as on active collaboration with 
leading scientific institutions worldwide. 
 
The NatCat modeling did not always have such a prominent role in the company. 
As recently as 1980, Swiss Re employed only two full-time scientists within the 
NatCat unit. The staff grew over time to cope with the increasing complexity and 
the growing demand for detailed NatCat risk assessment and proper portfolio 
management. Starting from earthquake and windstorm models for key markets, 
the unit further developed tropical cyclone and flood models and now covers all 
relevant (re)insurance markets worldwide.  
 
While climate change has been monitored by climate specialists within the 
NatCat team since about 1990, quantitative analysis and integration in risk 
assessment and management processes started only when detailed impact 
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studies became available. Where Swiss Re has been able to establish 
quantitative relationships, it has started to account for climate change risk in 
reinsurance pricing. This actually happened when Swiss Re decided to adjust its 
hurricane model in September 2005 to reflect the effects of natural climate 
variability, any superimposed human induced trend, and increased modeling 
uncertainty. Swiss Re’s NatCat experts follow and participate in actual research 
through collaboration with leading scientific institutions in order to identify climate 
effects at an early stage. 
 
Products and Services. To be more proactive, Walker has adopted the mantra, 
“Distinguish ourselves relative to our peers.” In that vein, he is searching for ways 
to improve underwriter’s ability to bring climate change into policy decisions. “In 
Property and Loss (P&L), this is a stronger pitch,” says Walker. “In Life and 
Health (L&H), it is harder.”  
 
One area where the company sees a possible link between its products and 
climate change is Directors and Officers coverage (D&O). According to Walker, 
“As soon as the obligation to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions becomes 
regulated, failure to comply or a mismanagement of carbon exposure could affect 
a company’s performance and potentially create personal liabilities for directors 
and officers. Such regulations are already in force in some countries and are 
likely to become effective in the reasonably near future in the United States.”  
 
  98 
DRAFT – Please do not cite, quote or distribute 
Signifying the risks of being a leader on climate change, Walker was once 
misquoted in the Wall Street Journal Europe as stating that Swiss Re will not 
provide coverage for climate change related D&O risks. Instead, the company 
uses climate change as one measure among many to determine risk exposure. 
For example, with corporate clients, Swiss Re now looks to see if the applicant 
company has responded to inquiries from the Carbon Disclosure Project. If not, 
the company may add climate related questions to its standard questionnaire to 
D&O insurance applicants.  
 
The company is also testing the waters of integrating climate change related risk 
factors into other traditional offerings. Business Interruption (BI) coverage is one 
promising area that Walker is evaluating. While BI insurance traditionally 
provides coverage for a plant that is forced to close temporarily, Walker is 
analyzing whether this coverage should include the value of tradable credits for 
ceased emissions during the shut down. In another area, the new Environment 
and Commodities unit has received a mandate to trade emissions. This unit is 
the combination of the old weather unit (insurance and derivatives) and 
emissions (SOX/NOX and GHG) and is presently in the process of staffing up and 
has not yet started to trade.  
 
Another important area of products and services is asset management which had 
an investment portfolio of CHF 114.9 billion in company assets as of the end of 
2005. Of these assets, 89 percent are invested in fixed-income, seven percent in 
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equity, and the remaining four percent in alternative investments, including real 
estate. As early as 1996, Swiss Re asset management started to build up a 
dedicated Sustainability Portfolio comprised of investments which support 
sustainable development and efficient resource utilization. By 2004, 
approximately CHF 90 million had been invested in this area. In 2005, the 
company integrated the Sustainability Portfolio (including staff) into the 
alternative investments unit to benefit from a dedicated, institutionalized 
investment process.  
 
Today, the company channels its sustainability investments into a number of 
sectors including alternative energy, water and waste management/recycling. 
More specifically, the company seeks opportunities representing medium to high 
risk-return profiles in: Infrastructure investments such as wind-farm-, biomass-, 
and solar projects; Investments in publicly quoted, small- to medium-capitalized 
growth companies, and; Cleantech venture capital investments, representing the 
highest risk-return profile. Lastly, the team seeks to invest in different 
geographical regions, with the target to reach a solid portfolio diversification in 
different markets. As tightening policy frameworks increase demand for such 
projects, the company’s investment strategy is beginning to pay off. The 
portfolio’s market value rose substantially in 2005 thanks to strong share 
performance as well as new investments. 
.  
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Emissions Reduction. In October 2003, Swiss Re was the first company in the 
financial services industry to announce that it would eliminate/compensate all 
GHG emissions, with a goal of becoming carbon neutral by 2013.53 According to 
Walker, “We need to do this if we are going to be seen as credible.  
 
At present, the company’s GHG emission footprint is roughly 50 thousand metric 
tons, an amount management acknowledges is merely “a rounding error” of 
many of the companies in this survey. Direct emissions come from the 
combustion of office heating fuels (13 percent) and indirect sources include office 
electricity use (44 percent) and business travel (43 percent). Swiss Re plans to 
achieve a 15 percent reduction of these emissions through actual facility 
reductions and the remaining 85 percent through the World Bank Community 
Development Carbon Fund. The company is committed to increasing its 
purchase of renewable energy from 14 percent of the company’s total worldwide 
energy consumption in 2005 to 37 percent in 2006 and 50 percent in 2007. 
Although the majority of this energy will come from wind, the particular source 
and quality in each location will depend upon regional availability.  
 
Andreas Schlaepfer, Head of Internal Environmental Management, heads up the 
initiative and believes that for non-manufacturing companies like Swiss Re, 
substantial reductions in emissions resulting from energy conservation are quite 
easy; “If you’ve never focused on energy efficiency before, achieving 30 percent 
reduction is simple.” However, for Swiss Re to achieve 15 percent will not be 
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easy since this target is in addition to savings made in previous projects. To 
achieve the company’s goals, the program will focus on two primary areas: 
curbing emissions from both Swiss Re’s offices around the world and business 
travel.  
 
Office emissions come from the nine buildings that the company owns and 
another 61 in which it rents space nine. While the nine owned buildings are 
responsible for 87 percent of the company’s total energy consumption, the 
company includes rented office space in its carbon neutral initiative. Swiss Re 
employs a three-tiered approach to reduce its energy consumption. The first tier 
is zero-cost investments, such as turning down heating and cooling, and turning 
off lighting systems during non-working hours. The second tier focuses on small 
investments with paybacks of one year or less, such as motion sensors and 
compact fluorescent light-bulbs. The final tier includes refurbishments of property 
and buildings owned by Swiss Re, such as replacing cooling towers, generators, 
insulation or windows. The payback period for these investments can be as high 
as 10 years. Swiss Re has not established a formal budget to address these 
tiers, but will draw from the company’s annual logistics budget. 
 
To date, the company has conducted energy audits and provided 
recommendations for corrective measures in its three highest carbon-emitting 
offices. Based on the recommendations, local action plans have been drawn up 
for the next three years. Meanwhile, the company has learned some key insights 
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into why some offices have more emissions than others. In some cases, it may 
just be age, location or that one building manager is more energy conscious than 
another. In other cases, operations that are split between two separate buildings 
with different property managers minimize the company’s leverage with property 
management. Swiss Re is consolidating office space wherever possible and 
actively organizing tenant groups to create change within the management 
company.54  
 
One prominent example of the company’s efforts to become more energy 
efficient (and more visible) is its new office building at 30 St. Mary Axe in London. 
The building, known as the “Gerkin” after its unique shape, utilizes natural 
ventilation in addition to air conditioning. Due to this efficient design, it is 
expected that for much of the year the heating, ventilating and cooling (HVAC) 
systems can be switched off, thus reducing energy consumption and CO2 
emissions.  
 
Emissions from business travel are the second, and more difficult, component of 
Swiss Re’s carbon neutral initiative. Responsible for 43 percent of total company 
emissions, these emissions have been growing in both nominal and relative 
terms in recent years and are expected to overtake other emissions within the 
next two years. The reduction strategy is directed exclusively at reducing short 
distance trips for internal meetings. According to Schlaepfer, it would be 
unrealistic and inconsistent with Swiss Re’s business growth strategy to regulate 
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business travel aimed at meeting current or potential clients, particularly in 
rapidly growing regions of the world such as Asia.  
 
Although the company has not created any formal incentives encouraging 
employees to reduce internal travel, Schlaepfer has the support of top 
management for this initiative. In a CEO Newsletter in 2005, CEO Coomber 
touted the environmental and economic benefits from reducing business travel 
for internal meetings. Employees are required to secure the approval and 
signature of an immediate supervisor before taking such a trip. According to 
Schlaepfer, the most significant challenge is overcoming the human hurdle and 
unspoken professional incentive to network face-to-face with employees in other 
offices. To overcome this bias, Swiss Re provides employees with the latest 
telephone or video conferencing technology and Schlaepfer arranges video 
conference training sessions to help mitigate any potential technological hurdle.  
 
While the company plans to register its emissions reductions with the World 
Economic Forum’s Greenhouse Gas registry, Schlaepfer states that Swiss Re 
will retire them rather than sell them. The company will also retire any renewable 
energy credits (RECS) that it purchases to meet a goal of 30 percent of its 
electricity purchases coming from green sources in the United States in 2006. 
The company may place carbon on the Chicago Climate Exchange (having 
joined in 2005) for trading purposes in the future but initially, the goal is to spur 
the market by demonstrating fungibility between markets by exchanging United 
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States based carbon credits with those from another jurisdiction. Explains 
Schlaepfer, “Our aim is to do something for the climate. This is a voluntary 
action, and it is not triggered by profit thinking.”  
 
Awareness Building and External Outreach 
Of all the companies studied in this report, Swiss Re places the most emphasis 
on external awareness building within its climate-related strategy. The irony is 
that the company has historically sought to remain quiet and not draw attention to 
itself or its positions. Although the company had been in the United States for 
over 100 years, “no one knew who Swiss Re was,” states Walker. “We were 
always a B2B55 company.” The company’s approach to global warming ended 
this anonymity.  
 
In July 2002, Swiss Re orchestrated a watershed event by sponsoring, along with 
AON, Duane Morris LLP and Natsource, a two-day conference at the New York 
Museum of Natural History called Emissions Reductions: Main Street to Wall 
Street – The Climate in North America. Bringing together more than 200 
business, government and environmental leaders, this meeting was among the 
first instances in which Wall Street engaged on the climate change issue. More 
importantly for Swiss Re, it successfully garnered enormous attention from the 
press, public and financial community. 
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Building off this success, the company has continued to work to educate those 
within the financial industry. Using its in-house conference center (the Swiss Re 
Centre for Global Dialogue at Ruschlikon), the company creates forums to 
discuss “global risk issues and to facilitate new insight into future risk markets.” 
The center has hosted three forums on climate change, including one in 2003 
cosponsored by International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) that focused 
on developing carbon markets.  
 
In another ground breaking move, Swiss Re partnered with Stonehaven CCS 
Canada in 2003 to develop an educational video about climate change designed 
for the general public. The Great Warming is a three part (45 minute 
installments), television documentary highlighting the roots of climate change and 
its possible implications in the future. Narrated by singer/songwriter Alanis 
Morissette and actor Keanu Reeves, the internationally promoted series was 
filmed in eight countries on four continents and was endorsed by dozens of the 
world’s leading scientists. First aired on Discovery Canada in 2004, it was 
subsequently broadcast in the fall of 2005 on the Public Broadcasting System 
(PBS) in the United States under the title Global Warming: the Signs and the 
Science. It has also been edited into a theater version which will be showing in 
the spring and summer 2006. In retrospect, The Great Warming is considered a 
huge success for the company. Not only did it distribute well to major television 
studios around the world, but Swiss Re has received only positive feedback on 
the final product.  
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From a more academic perspective, the company partnered with the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Center for Human Heath and the 
Global Environment at the Harvard Medical School in 2004 to host a conference 
involving 250 scientific and business experts. They gathered to examine the 
physical and health risks of climate instability and formulate climate change 
scenarios and potential impacts on the environment, human health and the 
economy. Released in 2005, the final report – Climate Change Futures: Health, 
Ecological and Economic Dimensions – explains the links between climate 
change and human health. 
 
Through such events and materials, the company has steadily transitioned from 
producing strictly client-centered publications to producing materials for a much 
broader public. It is clear that climate change has significantly altered the 
company’s approach to external outreach. In Baker’s estimation, “Climate 
change is one issue where we moved from internal to external dialogue.” For 
example, according to Baker, “There was a lot of soul searching within the 
company on whether to get into television. Reinsurance is traditionally faceless.” 
But he believes that The Great Warming is largely responsible for giving “a 
faceless Swiss company” some public recognition, particularly in the United 
States. “Although people may not know what we do, they know our name.” 
Toward this end, CEO Coomber was instrumental in helping the company 
overcome internal concerns.  
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More importantly, the company’s broader outreach approach is critical for 
creating awareness of climate change, and therefore its business interests. 
According to Baker, “Our client’s clients (such as you and me) are also a part of 
the problem. Reinsurers are at the back end of the game. Some insurers may be 
under less pressure to change the behavior of their clients because it doesn’t 
hurt their pockets as much as ours. But we can’t dictate. We must try to gradually 
build awareness.” For example, The Great Warming was aimed largely at a North 
American audience, a demographic that the company sees as in critical need of 
climate change awareness building. As Gerry Lemcke, Deputy Manager of the 




Within Swiss Re, some of the most significant future areas of group-wide 
strategic relevance are categorized as “top topics.” Climate change has been a 
top topic since the program was developed in 2001. The selection process for top 
topics is currently run by the Issue Management Unit. Using sources such as 
SONAR (Systematic Observations of Notions Associated with Risk), this group of 
three employees conducts four or five meetings a year with staff to get input 
about relevant, emerging business issues. After a brief is drafted about any 
particular issue, it is submitted to the 15-member Issue Steering Committee, a 
diverse group of senior employees, up to executive board level, from areas such 
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as property, casualty, and HR. It is the responsibility of this committee to 
determine whether a particular suggestion is categorized internally as an “issue,” 
“topic,” or “top topic,” in increasing order of importance. Each categorization 
receives differing levels of attention and budgets. Beyond climate change, the 
other eight top topics, most of which come from the risk side of the business, are: 
natural catastrophes, water, insurance linked securities, liability regimes, 
mortality, nanotechnology, solvency and terrorism.  
 
While top topics signify internal and external commitment to issues such as 
climate change, there are organizational challenges to generating internal 
consensus and support for the issue. Way argues that “internal awareness is 
built by making a clear link between climate change and our business bottom 
line.” To increase awareness within the Asset Management Division, for 
example, the company has worked with Sustainability Asset Management (SAM) 
to bring in sustainability professionals to educate portfolio managers on how 
climate change, environmental, and social issues impact stock prices and the 
valuation process.  
 
The company also works to educate employees on the changes they can make 
in their own lives to benefit the environment. And again, “You have to try and link 
the issue to employee’s daily lives,” says Schlaepfer. “Remind them to live up to 
Swiss Re standards (such as integrity) and take them home with you.” 
Schlaepfer believes the company can do this because, in return, Swiss Re 
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encourages employees to bring their diverse values and ways of thinking back to 
the company. But, says Schlaepfer, ”the key is not telling employees what to do.”  
 
Educational efforts begin with new employees. In Zurich, a component of new 
employee orientation specifically focuses on climate change. In the last three 
years, the company has also held a series of marketing and educational 
initiatives during lunch hours to make the connection between climate change 
and employee’s lives more clear. The voluntary events focus on energy, 
business travel, commuting, video conferencing and other issues. In one event, 
the company arranged for 15 hybrid-electric vehicles to be brought to the Zurich 
office for all employees to test drive. The company has also arranged a series of 
“Lunch and Learn” sessions, during which internal and external speakers present 
climate change related research and information to all employees over lunch. 
Finally, the company recently organized an on-site climate change art exhibit that 
depicted glacial melting in various regions of the world by contrasting postcard 
images from the early 20th century with photo images from the early 21st century. 
Although all previous marketing efforts have been in the Zurich office, the 
company plans to repeat similar, tailored events in offices around the world. 
 
Policy 
Swiss Re’s foray into government relations is a relatively recent effort. In the 
United States, the company’s operations are primarily regulated by individual 
states rather than the federal government. Cosette Simon, who joined the 
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company in 2001, is the company’s first government relation’s professional. (The 
company has recently hired a second person to work in this area.) 
 
Although Simon admits that climate change issues account for less than five 
percent of her time, the company has leveraged its resources and has been 
vocal on Capitol Hill. Walker has traveled to Washington D.C. no less than 25 
times and has testified before the Senate. In addition, Walker has testified before 
the New York State legislature’s Insurance committee, and the company has 
weighed in support of California’s Greenhouse Gas initiatives by serving on the 
California Climate Change Advisory Board and the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade system covering seven states in the Northeast 
United States. These efforts are viewed by many within the company as an 
extension of the “knowledge company” mantra. As Simon explains, “We feel an 
obligation to share our expertise with policy makers. We search for the proper 
public policy, not just what is good for Swiss Re. We sometimes even engage in 
issues where we have expertise but we may not have a dog in the fight.” She 
adds, this allows her to go to Congress without an axe to grind. 
 
When it comes to specific policy, the company is very open to suggestions. 
Given its vulnerability to the physical implications of climate change, what is most 
important to the company is progress of any kind. As Walker notes, Swiss Re 
has no vested interest in engaging conversations about “whether we need five 
percent or six percent reductions. We need 60 percent reductions to stabilize 
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climate change. Period.” According to Simon, “Swiss Re supported McCain-
Lieberman because it is progress and has been the only game in town. We’re 
just trying to get traction someplace. We may have supported something else if it 
had a chance of passage.” In short, the company is willing to endorse policies in 
which the government is involved, compliance is mandatory, and, according to 
Simon, “market mechanisms that strike the right balance between environmental 
and societal policy objectives.”  
 
Swiss Re has also been involved in a number of global forums on climate 
change. For example, the company joined 23 multi-national companies in signing 
the declaration prepared by the G8 Climate Change Roundtable in 2005. The 
statement calls on the world’s governments to create a long-term policy 
framework to allow for “clear, transparent, and consistent price signals” for 
carbon. In addition, the company has been participating for the last four years on 
the issue in the World Economic Forum in Davos, and has been closely involved 
in the efforts of Prime Minister Tony Blair as part of the United Kingdom’s 
leadership in the G8 process and focusing on climate change.  
 
Challenges Ahead 
Given its early action on climate change, Swiss Re provides a wealth of lessons 
on how to act, as well as notable impediments that could be faced by a broad 
array of companies. Like other companies in this report, a key lesson from Swiss 
Re has been the importance of executive-level buy-in for the company’s strategy. 
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Walker says that whenever he approached senior management for support and 
resources for climate change activities, “I’ve always felt like I was knocking on 
open doors.” According to Swiss Re’s Menzinger, upper management’s 
commitment to the issue is the most important factor ensuring that climate 
change remains a strategic area of focus. These comments were echoed by 
Baker who remarks that, in general, “Board level support silences internal 
opposition.”  
 
But recent events have altered the internal landscape at Swiss Re for moving 
forward. In the summer of 2005, Swiss Re was restructured. Soon before a new 
CEO, Jacques Aigrain, was announced. Implications for on-going GHG initiatives 
include the creation of a centralized logistics department to oversee office space 
management and carbon neutrality. Also, the formal structure of GHGRS was 
dissolved. The group’s mature offerings – including carbon trading and weather 
derivatives – were redistributed to mainline product groups.  
 
In addition to continuing his focus on D&O and BI insurance, Walker has been 
reassigned to act as a manager of Sustainability Business Development, which 
aims to bring other climate change and sustainability related products to market. 
Walker admits that “these efforts may not be huge potential revenue streams, but 
they will help to better manage risk both for clients and ourselves and integrate 
sustainability into the business and investment lines. This has benefits in 
technical knowledge and risk awareness, as well as leveraging the reputation of 
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Swiss Re.” More succinctly, Walker sees four areas of benefits for the company: 
Leverage Swiss Re’s knowledge of sustainability matters to generate high quality 
investment opportunities and additional fee income; Attract new clients to 
Conning Asset Management (Swiss Re’s third party asset management 
company; Provide superior risk-adjusted investment returns for its investors, and; 
Protect Swiss Re’s brand by reinforcing its position as a leader in the corporate 
sustainability area, and avoid association with “sustainability laggards.” 
 
Moving Climate Change from the Periphery to the Core of the Organization 
Like incubators at many companies, the dissolution of GHGRS was planned. 
When the group was formed, the intent was for it to serve as a center of 
competence on the emissions reduction issue and to look for business and 
investment opportunities for Swiss Re’s existing areas of business. As such, it 
was to be a climate change knowledge facilitator for the company and was not 
intended to replicate existing business and investment functions. The concept 
was to develop lines of business in conformity with existing products and then 
pass them on to mainline offerings when the business was mature. With the 
emergence of the European ETS and Kyoto market mechanisms, the need for a 
separate unit was diminished as the Capital Markets and Advisory Units were 
convinced that the trading and derivative areas represented a complimentary 
businesses opportunity to their existing weather business. As such, GHGRS, was 
successful in integrating the issue into various core businesses within the 
company, such as Capital Markets and Advisory (trading related products), risk 
awareness (D&O insurance) and Carbon/clean energy asset management 
(Conning). 
 
Walker is also working to develop applications to assist companies to achieve 
carbon or footprint neutrality. For example, the company tried partnering with the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia to offer a GHG neutral initiative. This program 
offered companies three critical tools: 1) A “platform for communicating climate 
change issues and a way to differentiate their products in a pre-regulated 
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marketplace”57; 2) A management system for calculating and obtaining the 
necessary offsets as well as a system to manage potential compliance 
obligations, and; 3) A way to better enable the creation of carbon markets by 
allowing project developers the opportunity to monetize the environmental benefit 
that the project is providing. This program has evolved into the “Footprint Neutral” 
concept which the company is creating along with the UNDP to enable 
businesses, communities and consumers to voluntarily offset their footprints.  
 
But, while initiatives like this hold promise for the company, limits in central 
coordination stand in the way. Although climate change is relevant for many 
departments within the company, “This is very much driven by individuals who 
have a commitment,” says Menzinger. “The loss potential is enormous and our 
ability to diversify is limited. But there is also a huge opportunity in areas like 
weather derivatives. To get there, we need to make more internal consistency 
and coordinate our efforts on climate change better across the business as a 
whole.” Like other companies, Swiss Re is challenged by the task of directly 
linking climate change to the balance sheet. Says Baker, “A lot of research is 
lacking on modeling to connect the science and economics.” Dudle wants to see 
more work in “getting the numbers to make the business argument for investment 
decisions.”  
 
But in the end, Swiss Re remains persistent. The nature of the climate change 
issue and the impact it can have on the company’s business model requires that 
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it continue on the path it began in the early 1990’s to build more robust bridges 
between science, human health, environment and economics on the climate 
change issue. At times, the company has gotten too far ahead on the issue. 
Walker, for example, expresses disappointment at the lost opportunities when 
the market for carbon collapsed with the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify 
Kyoto. “We got in too early and lost some momentum.” But, he adds, “As a 
change agent, you have to be willing to take your lumps. Luckily, as a reinsurer, 
we’re patient. Now it is easier to make the business case.” Recent policy 
developments on climate change around the world are leading to greater 
opportunities for the company’s efforts. According to Simon, “I’ve seen a real 
change in the last 12 months. I’m sensing a real shift.” So, while the company 
may have gotten too far ahead at times, Menzinger believes that its early 
approach paid off because “it moved the market and raised the company’s 
profile.”  
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Once again, DuPont is transforming itself. One of the oldest companies in the 
United States, DuPont began as a black powder58 company in 1802, transformed 
into an explosives manufacturer in 1880, 
turned to polymers, paint, plastics and 
dyes in the early 1900s, added energy 
to its portfolio in 1981 and now, as it 
enters its third century, is pursuing new 
business lines of agriculture, nutrition 
and bio-based materials.59 To make this 
latest transition, the company has been 
shifting away from lower growth 
businesses that are heavily reliant on 
fossil fuels – evidenced by the sale of 
the Dacron®, Lycra® and Nylon® 
divisions in the early 2000s – and expanding into high-growth businesses such 
as bio-based materials – evidenced by the acquisition of Solae60 and Pioneer Hi-
bred International61 in 1999. 
DuPont’s Footprint  
(2005) 
 
Headquarters:  Wilmington, DE 
Revenues:  $26.6 billion 
Employees: 60,000 
Percentage of Emissions 
In Kyoto Ratified Countries: 8 percent 
Direct CO2e  
Emissions: 9.64 MMtons 
Indirect CO2e  
Emissions*: 4.02 MMtons 
Aggregate CO2e  
Emissions: 13.66 MMtons 
Target:  65 percent reduction in GHG 
 below 1990 levels by 2010 
Year Target Set:  1994 
  Recast in 1999 
 
* Measured as purchased electricity & steam 
9.64 MMtons*
*: 
illion metric tons. 
** Measured as purchased electricity & steam. 
 
                                                 
∗ We would like to thank John Carberry, Uma Chowdhry, John DeRuyter, Linda Fisher, Craig 
Heinrich, Don Johnson, Mack McFarland, Ed Mongan, Michael Parr, James Porter and Dawn 
Rittenhouse for their contributions to this case study. 
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But at present, DuPont is still the 2nd largest chemical manufacturer in the United 
States, and remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels for energy and feedstock in 
its industrial chemicals, polymers, and high performance materials businesses. 
As such, climate change is an issue that the company cannot, and does not, 
ignore. In 2005, DuPont was listed as the “top company of the decade” (1995-
2005) by Business Week magazine62 and Ceres picked the company as the 
leader in its industry,63 both based on accomplishments in greenhouse gas 
(GHG) reductions. But “DuPonters” (a name that employees use in reference to 
themselves) still see a pressing need to do more. In fact, the challenge they now 
face is the most important – transitioning their company’s treatment of climate 
change from one of risk management to one of business opportunity. Don 
Johnson, Group Vice President (VP) for Operations and Engineering, says, “We 
have to begin to think of energy as a value and not as a cost.” James Porter, VP 
of Safety, Health, and Environment and Engineering, adds that, “to shift from risk 
management to business opportunity you need to understand the value chain. 
You’ve got to discover new ways to use what you’ve got, while also developing 
new materials to serve new needs and concerns.”  
 
Company Profile 
Based in Wilmington Delaware, DuPont has operations in more than 70 
countries, 60,000 employees worldwide and 2005 revenues of $26.6 billion. The 
company’s products and services span agriculture, nutrition, electronics, 
communications, safety and protection, home and construction, transportation 
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and apparel. DuPont’s corporate vision is “to be the world's most dynamic 
science company, creating sustainable solutions essential to a better, safer and 
healthier life for people everywhere.”64  
 
In fact, safety has always been a key component of DuPont’s culture, stemming 
from the dangerous nature of the company’s first product, black powder. Porter 
states that with respect to safety, health and environment, there is a “cultural bias 
to do the right thing.” But it is DuPont’s long history of scientific innovation that is 
at the center of the organization. With more than 75 research and development 
(R&D) and customer service labs,65 the company uses integrated science to 
develop new products and vigorously pursue what it terms “knowledge intensity” 
– getting paid for what the company knows rather than simply for what it makes.66
 
DuPont prides itself on being at the forefront of the environmental sustainability 
movement, a leader in ozone layer protection (DuPont was awarded the 2002 
National Medal of Technology for “CFC Policy and Technology Leadership”), and 
an early actor on climate change. DuPont’s sustainable growth initiative is the 
latest evolution of strong CEO leadership on environmental issues. Former CEO 
Dick Heckert (1986 - 1989) led the decision to phase-out of fully halogenated 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in the late 1980s. Former CEO Ed Woolard (1989 -
1995) referred to himself as the “Chief Environmental Officer” and set the 
company on a “goal of zero” – zero injuries, illnesses, incidents, wastes and 
emissions. And Present CEO Chad Holliday, former chairman of the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development and co-author of the 
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sustainability book Walking the Talk, set sustainable growth goals for DuPont 
which require an integration of economic, social and environmental performance.  
 
But there is more to these environmental efforts than just top-down leadership. A 
reinforcing loop is at work – strong leadership is born out of the committed 
culture, and in turn relies on the culture to set and achieve aggressive goals for 
initiatives. The company’s strong, goal-oriented culture “drives everything,” 
according to Ed Mongan, Global Manager for Energy and Environment. “We set 
goals and everyone feels challenged to do their part. We openly track progress 
by individual sites and business units to meet those goals so no one can hide.” 
The key to setting goals on environmental issues is strong and forward-looking 
leadership; the key to achieving the goals is the corporate culture.  
 
Strategy Development  
DuPont’s actions related to climate change were foreshadowed by its experience 
with ozone depletion in the 1970s and 1980s. Relying on its strong scientific 
expertise, the company reacted to the ozone issue when it first emerged in the 
scientific journals. According to atmospheric scientist and DuPont Environmental 
Fellow Mack McFarland, Molina and Roland’s 1974 Nature article linking CFCs 
with ozone depletion “got the ball rolling.” As the largest manufacturer of CFCs at 
the time, DuPont initiated an internal task force to address the issue and senior 
management was briefed. Realizing that regulation was imminent, DuPont began 
exploring alternatives. In March 1988, after the signing of the Montreal Protocol, 
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DuPont announced a voluntary and unilateral phase-out of CFCs through an 
orderly transition to alternatives. In 1991, the company began operation of the 
world’s first manufacturing facility for the hydrochlorfluorocarbon HFC-134a, an 
alternative to CFCs. Today, CFC alternatives comprise two to three percent of 
DuPont’s portfolio.  
 
This experience taught DuPont that understanding atmospheric science, 
engaging the policy arena, and realizing the market impact of future regulation 
was critical for its future growth. As Business Week describes it, DuPont is “an 
experienced hand at making the most out of changing regulations.”67 When the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued its first assessment 
report in 1990, DuPont saw a familiar scenario playing out and, given its 
experience with CFCs, then CEO Woolard directed that DuPont become an early 
adopter of a GHG reduction strategy.  
 
The company began measuring and tracking their largest GHG emissions – CO2, 
nitrous oxide (N2O) and HFC-23 – in 1991 and also made an internal 
commitment to reduce net emissions. This action coincided with a larger 
expansion of environmental efforts at DuPont. In 1992, the company published 
its first external environmental report and an Environmental Policy Committee 
was created on the Board of Directors.  
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DuPont made its internal commitments to reduce GHGs and energy use (per 
pound of product) public in 1994 by becoming the first company to join the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)/ Department of Energy (DOE) Climate 
Wise program. The initial goal was to reduce GHG emissions 40 percent below 
1990 levels by the year 2000. Establishing the goals was a two step process. 
First, each business unit identified possible reductions. Then, the Safety, Health 
and Environment Excellence Center (a Corporate function comprised of policy 
and technical experts under the VP for Safety, Health and Environment, the role 
of which is to develop and facilitate implementation of corporate environmental 
policy) pushed those reductions further, creating a stretch goal.  
 
The first actions taken toward achieving the GHG reduction goals were aimed at 
the “low hanging fruit” in the company’s operations. At the time, there was little 
sense of opportunity for competitive advantage other than getting ahead of the 
curve on regulation. DuPont’s “low hanging fruit” consisted of reducing emissions 
of two potent GHGs: N2O, with a Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 310 times 
that of CO2, and HFC-23, with a GWP value of 11,700. In fact, given these high 
GWPs, CO2 emissions were not a major issue for the company when GHG 
reduction goals were first initiated. 
 
In 1991, a scientific paper68 implicated Nylon production as a source of 
atmospheric N2O, a GHG regulated under the Kyoto Protocol. In response, N2O 
producers reached an industry-wide agreement in 1993 to reduce emissions by 
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1999.69 To reach this goal, DuPont developed an end-of-pipe capture and 
destroy technique which eliminated 90 percent of emissions, at a cost of $50 
million with no payback to the business unit’s profit and loss (P&L) statement. 
This additional burden was acknowledged by headquarters and earnings 
expectations for the unit were adjusted accordingly. For DuPont, accepting the 
$50 million hit was not only an issue of avoiding government regulation, but also 
of sticking to the company’s principles by “doing the right thing”. DuPont shared 
the technology with the other N2O producers in the agreement as it was an end-
of-the-pipe addition, separate from the core process, and substantial benefits 
required adoption by the entire industry.  
 
The second target, HFC-23, is an unintended byproduct from the production of 
HCFC-22, a common refrigerant, and part of DuPont’s product line.70 Reductions 
of HFC-23 were primarily achieved through a process improvement, resulting in 
greater yield of HCFC-22 and therefore reduced HFC-23 byproduct. Additional 
reductions were accomplished through thermal destruction of all or a portion of 
the remaining HFC-23. Unlike the N20 reduction technology, the HFC-23 
reduction was not driven by an industry-wide agreement, involved an alteration in 
the core process and resulted in competitive cost savings. Therefore, the 
technology remained proprietary.  
 
When it was realized that the initial GHG reduction goals would be readily 
achieved through these two initiatives, DuPont management moved swiftly to 
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establish new goals. The new targets, set in 1999, were expanded to incorporate 
energy efficiency goals and to fit with DuPont’s sustainable growth initiative. They 
consist of three elements: Hold energy flat at the 1990 baseline; Source 10 
percent of energy from renewable sources at cost competitive rates, and; 
Reduce net GHG emissions to 65 percent below 1990 levels, all by the year 
2010. Maintaining the 1990 baseline for the GHG reduction goal was a deliberate 
move, consistent with the baseline for countries under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and also reflective of the company’s 
desired baseline for early action credits. 
 
To achieve these new goals, “We have to attack energy,” says Linda Fisher, VP 
and Chief Sustainability Officer. “We have a heavy dependence on fuel, and so 
rising energy prices are a major concern.” DuPont is vulnerable to energy prices 
on two fronts because much of the feedstock it uses is derived from 
hydrocarbons, especially natural gas. This vulnerability was reflected in DuPont’s 
fourth quarter 2005 earnings, which were half the amount predicted due to higher 
energy and ingredient costs, as well as hurricane disruptions, plant outages and 
lower sales in some segments.71 Uma Chowdhry, VP of Central Research and 
Development, states it simply: “What energy prices have done to us focuses the 
mind very quickly.”  
 
DuPont’s attention to energy efficiency is currently at a point of transition. 
According to John Carberry, Director of Environmental Technology, energy 
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efficiency efforts between 1990 and 2000 were dominated by yield, capacity and 
utilization gains, cogeneration and power partnering, and replacing low 
value/high energy products with those that are high value/low energy. For 
example, coatings for the auto industry are being replaced with very low VOC 
coatings, and commodity fibers are being replaced by Pioneer HiBred’s corn and 
soy seeds. Since 2000, he says the focus has been more fine tuned and aimed 
at instrumentation changes to affect yield, capacity and utilization, process 
changes, continuing use of combined heat and power, and modern heat 
management including insulation, steam traps, waste heat recovery and modern 
motors. The difference between the past and the future is that the latter is highly 
investment intensive.  
 
Through the company’s efforts, energy use has decreased seven percent 
compared to 1990 levels, despite a 30 percent production increase, saving the 
company over $2 billion since 1990 and yielding a decrease in GHG emissions of 
420 million metric tons. This financial savings figure is calculated as the costs 
avoided through energy reductions achieved by improving yields and creating 
less energy intensive product portfolios versus the business as usual scenario. 
 
Sourcing renewable energy, the second energy goal, has the potential to reduce 
upstream emissions, fuel costs and exposure to volatile price fluctuations. While 
progress in this area has led to an annual cost savings of approximately $8 
million, meeting the goal of 10 percent has proven challenging. According to 
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Porter, this will be the “toughest goal, yet if we didn’t set a goal, we wouldn’t have 
done anything.” Cost competitive projects are relatively scarce and difficult to 
identify. The company has only been able to source about five percent of its 
energy from renewable sources, with most efforts coming from the use of landfill 
gas. In one example, the company partnered with a municipal landfill near its De 
Lisle, Mississippi plant. A third-party laid seven miles of pipeline and installed 
compression equipment to bring low cost gas for the plant’s boilers. Although it is 
a less reliable source than the local gas provider, the effort has displaced 30 to 
50 percent of natural gas used to run the boilers.  
 
With regards to the third goal of GHG emission reductions, DuPont has been 
quite successful. As of 2003, DuPont achieved a 72 percent reduction from 1990 
GHG emissions. After the 2004 divestment of the nylon business, Invista®72, 
related GHG emissions were removed both from the baseline and the realized 
reductions and overall reductions were recalculated as 60 percent. (This practice 
of recalculating emissions follows the WRI/WBCSD GHG protocol as well as that 
of the Chicago Climate Exchange). 
 
As the company’s programs have developed, its strategies have become more 
sophisticated. Going forward, the challenge for DuPont is to treat climate change 
and energy efficiency as business opportunities by connecting them to the overall 
objectives of the firm. Company leadership believes that the right product mix will 
offer an advantage in a carbon-constrained world. Fisher, who is tasked with 
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embedding sustainable growth into strategic planning, gives her view on what 
climate change means at DuPont, “It’s more than just science. It is also a matter 
of understanding our role in both the problem itself and our opportunities to 
address it; and to get internal agreement on that.”  
 
For DuPont, the business aspect of the issue has two components: risk 
management – will DuPont be put at a competitive disadvantage from carbon 
constraints? – and business opportunity – can DuPont capitalize on carbon 
constraints to expose new market opportunities? According to Fisher, “In 
developing future business plans and strategies, we need to understand the 
implications of GHG restraints and whether they pose a risk or opportunity for our 
family of products.” As regulation becomes more likely, such analyses will be 
further developed.  
 
John Ranieri, VP and General Manager of the Bio-Based Materials division, sees 
a number of areas in which DuPont has developed “sustainable innovations” that 
have already shown great promise.73 “The real challenge is beyond our own 
footprint, it is in the market opportunities,” says Fisher. “Can we measure the 
benefits to the customers? Are there growth opportunities? Some businesses are 
doing it. We need to work closely with customers to identify their needs and work 
to find a solution for them,” either from new uses of old material or from 
developing new solutions to customer problems. Since 2000, DuPont has 
steadily increased its revenue from new products, growing from 20 percent of 
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revenue from products introduced over the previous five years in the early 1990s 
to 33 percent in 2005. 
 
For example, customers in the auto industry required coatings with much lower 
volatile organic compounds (VOC) than previously available which, once 
developed, required much less organic solvents from the company’s suppliers. 
Also, DuPont developed a special grade of Tyvek® house wrap74 in response to 
European customers (where residential reductions are part of the national 
climate strategy) for a product that would lower CO2 emissions and heating bills. 
In some cases, DuPont engineers work with customers to help them reduce their 
own energy use, delivering higher value to customers and ultimately enhancing 
business through closer customer relationships and a stronger understanding of 
customer needs. Such efforts have been rewarded by larger or longer-term 
contracts. 
 
Looking forward, DuPont has identified the most promising growth markets in the 
use of biomass feedstocks that, through metabolic engineering, can be used to 
create new materials such as polymers, fuels and chemicals, new applied 
BioSurfaces in the personal care, coatings and colors areas and new Biomedical 
materials for use in the cardiovascular and dental fields. The company has set a 
goal to have 25 percent of its revenue come from such non-depletable resources 
and is two-thirds of the way toward meeting that goal.  
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One promising development is Sorona® polymer. In a joint venture between 
DuPont and Tate & Lyle PLC set to go on-line in the third quarter of 2006, the 
company will begin producing 1,3-propanediol, the key building block for the new 
polymer using a proprietary fermentation and purification process based on corn 
sugar. This bio-based method uses less energy, reduces emissions and employs 
renewable resources instead of traditional petrochemical processes.  
 
Another promising development is the 2006 creation of a partnership with BP to 
develop, produce and market a next generation of biofuels. The two companies 
have been working together since 2003 to develop materials that will overcome 
the limitations of existing biofuels. The first product to market will be biobutanol, 
which is targeted for introduction in 2007 in the U.K. as a gasoline bio-
component. This biofuel offers better fuel economy than gasoline-ethanol blends 
and has a higher tolerance to water contamination than ethanol.75
 
Both of these developments represent the new direction in which the company is 
headed – one that significantly reduces the company’s environmental footprint. 
According to Chowdhry, this is not a subtle shift, but rather a significant change 
in product lines and research focus for DuPont. She is hoping that DuPont will 
soon be known for leading the industrial biotechnology revolution and predicts 
that over 60 percent of DuPont’s business will stem from the use of biology to 
reduce fossil fuels in the next few decades. 
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Organizational Integration  
To integrate climate-related strategies into the business, DuPont employs a vast 
network of teams and committees. Overseeing and driving this complex structure 
is strong leadership from the top. CEOs Holliday and Woolard are (and were) 
both visionary spokesmen for the company’s goals on environmental issues and 
personally involved in pushing the company to achieve that vision. Mongan 
describes one pivotal moment, “We almost missed our 2000 goal. One business 
said it was too expensive. The CEO and Paul Tebo (former VP of Safety Health 
and Environment from 1993 to 2004) sat down with the business manager and 
firmly stated, ‘we will not miss this goal!’” That kind of personal attention to the 
issue leads Mongan (and many others) to list the most important ingredient in 
initial successes on climate change as the “CEO staying the course.”  
 
Beyond strong leadership, achievement of the goals is encouraged and diffused 
in several ways. First, goal setting involves a broad spectrum of representatives 
throughout the company. This is an effective way to create buy-in for the climate-
related strategies. Second, while attaining individual goals is left largely up to the 
business units, their progress is tracked through the Corporate Environmental 
Plan (CEP); a database that captures environmental performance (such as 
waste, emissions, GHGs, and energy) annually from global facilities and tracks 
future reductions or increases in alignment with business plans. It is maintained 
and managed by the corporate Environment and Sustainable Growth Center (a 
Corporate function comprised of policy and technical experts under the VP and 
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Chief Sustainability Officer whose role is to lead the development and facilitate 
implementation of corporate sustainable growth programs and policies.) 
 
Third, Sustainable Growth Reviews, performed by the Environment and 
Sustainable Growth Center, provide an opportunity to discuss challenges and 
opportunities within specific business units. In these reviews, experts from the 
sustainable growth team meet with business leaders annually to review key 
performance indicators for safety, health, environment and sustainability in 
relation to business and corporate commitments and goals. The discussion 
focuses on how these goals and indicators are integrated into their business 
plans and strategies, especially with regards to future growth plans and 
opportunities.  
 
Fourth, DuPont ensures organizational buy-in and action on its climate-related 
strategies by linking compensation and bonuses for key employees, such as 
business leaders and energy experts, to program results. This provides an 
incentive, but remains a small portion of overall compensation for these 
individuals.  
 
Finally, local champions are a critical factor for both programmatic and cultural 
reasons in an organization with decentralized businesses such as DuPont. That 
is why DuPont created Competence Centers to operationalize its goals. For 
example, energy experts within each business unit combine to create the Energy 
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Competence Center, a formal network of energy professionals. Their job is to 
incorporate the ideals of energy efficiency into the operations of DuPont by 
embedding climate issues into decision making, examining the entire value 
chain, and involving individuals wherever possible.  
 
An Energy Efficiency Champion on the Ground 
 
One energy champion in DuPont is Craig Heinrich, leader of the global energy team for 
Titanium Technologies; a fast-growing division with plans to double production by 2010 
from 1990 levels while increasing energy use by only 40 percent. This is no small task 
given that energy comprises a significant percentage of the selling price of titanium 
dioxide (TiO2). Heinrich must be a vigilant internal salesman, aware of everything going 
on in his department. In describing his job, he states, “You need to communicate, you 
need to network… The business case for energy efficiency has grown increasingly 
strong as energy prices have escalated,” says Heinrich. “Even so, we have discovered 
the value of having an advocate for continued emphasis on improved energy efficiency. 
That is the role I play. It is necessary to repeatedly communicate the value so projects 
receive the appropriate priority.” 
 
One method he employs to stay ahead of new projects is Sustainability Screening, a 
process which evaluates a program’s energy consumption and GHG emissions as part 
of the capital authorization process. The screening is performed early in the process, 
prior to other review steps, and involves both business unit and corporate level 
personnel. His Energy Competency Center’s efforts have led to approximately 10 
percent of the business unit’s capital budget being invested in programs that improve 
energy efficiency, bringing year-over-year savings of $3 to $5 million. According to 
Heinrich, some projects may have a return of 300 to 400 percent. “For example, an air 
cooled condenser was used to supply desuperheating water76 to one of our plants. We 
are switching to a third-party supplied reverse osmosis system, improving energy 
efficiency and reducing water costs.” By outsourcing the project, DuPont avoided the 
capital costs. 
 
His goal is to incorporate energy efficiency in every project possible. As he describes his 
projects, very few of them are exclusively energy, often having an aspect of quality, 
volume or other emissions. But because large capital investments are being made to 
facilitate business growth, Heinrich has the opportunity to add energy and environmental 
improvements up front, before investment occurs. “Energy efficiency needs to be integral 
to the process. It cannot be an add-on,” he states. But in units where energy projects are 
set to compete for limited resources against more mainstream investment proposals, the 
challenge is greater. 
 
Reducing energy consumption in capital investments can often be met with resistance, 
particularly if the pool of resources is dwindling. Carberry points out that the certainty of 
returns in energy efficiency projects can actually become a liability. The company has 
ruled out such instruments as lowered hurdle rates, internal carbon shadow pricing or a 
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set budget for energy efficiency projects. “Energy efficiency must meet the same hurdle 
rate as other projects. The problem is that when we pitch 20 percent return with 99 
percent certainty on energy, we lose to a marketing group pitch of 40 percent return with 
60 percent certainty.”  
 
But, while energy efficiency projects are required to be cost competitive, and compete 
with all other capital projects for funding, many environmental projects, including those 
within the sustainable growth and climate change initiatives, are done with no capital 
return on the justification of either avoiding potential regulatory or legal liability, or 
avoiding reputational damage. The distinction is between projects that deal with risk 
management and projects that present a business opportunity. 
 
As for the aggressive growth and efficiency goals set for Heinrich’s unit, he prefers it that 
way. “You need the tension of a very challenging goal. Inspirational goals call an 
organization to act beyond conventional boundaries. These goals are built on the 
premise that real potential is beyond our ability to envision. An easy goal fails to 
challenge the creative potential of the organization.” His advice for any company 
undertaking a climate change program is to “get passionate people engaged and 
challenge them to do something really extraordinary. They need a vision beyond what 
they can perceive and they need leadership to get them excited about what they can 
achieve.” 
 
In an organization that depends upon a common culture to achieve buy-in for 
new initiatives, communicating the importance of climate change is vital. One 
way in which DuPont achieves recognition is through the Sustainable Growth 
Excellence Awards, where environmental projects in business units are 
submitted for corporate review. Of the 400 or so projects submitted every year, 
12 finalists are chosen, rewarded with a dinner with the CEO, recognition 
throughout the company, and $5000 to donate to the charity of their choice. 




As with other companies in this report, DuPont engages a number of 
stakeholders, including civil society, customers, trade associations and 
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government. Managing these relationships helps DuPont build knowledge, 
convey actions and concerns, understand trends and engage more effectively in 
the political arena. Maintaining open communication channels enhances the 
company’s business in the long-run.  
 
DuPont currently engages with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a 
multitude of ways. Often, a partnership is formed to meet specific project goals, 
with the primary driver being the expertise and different points of view brought to 
the table by NGOs. According to Fisher, “You can learn a lot from NGOs. They 
can open your eyes to market opportunities. Also, they add legitimacy to our 
environmental commitments. A big branded corporation stating its efforts sounds 
like public relations, but an NGO recognizing them carries a lot of weight, both 
internally for employees who are passionate on the subject and externally.” 
Examples include partnering with the World Resources Institute and their Green 
Power Market Development Group to assist in meeting the 10 percent renewable 
energy goal, and joining with the Pew Center as a member of its Business 
Environment Leadership Council.  
 
Unlike some other companies in this report, one venue for DuPont’s external 
outreach on the climate change issue has been through the sales and marketing 
departments. As publicity surrounding DuPont’s leadership in climate change 
initiatives increases, and general awareness of these issues grows, customers 
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have been calling upon DuPont to deliver new, better performing products that 
are relevant within a carbon-constrained world. 
 
In an example of collaborative partnerships, DuPont is leading a four-year, $38 
million consortium (with NREL, Diversa Corporation, Michigan State University, 
and Deere & Co.) to develop an “Integrated Corn Bio Refinery.” With $19 million 
in matching funds from the DOE, the consortium will design and demonstrate the 
feasibility of the world's first fully integrated bio-refinery, which will be capable of 
producing a range of products from a variety of plant-material feedstock; for 
example, converting corn into bio-derived chemicals, like Bio-PDO™, and bio-
fuels, like ethanol. It “will create a new business model for sustainable 
production of chemicals, fuels and energy,” says CEO Holliday.77 “The 
technology will lower reliance on petroleum, reduce greenhouse gases, and 
create a global and sustainable bio-based economy.”  
 
DuPont is also a member of numerous trade associations, including the 
American Chemistry Council (ACC), the International Climate Change 
Partnership (ICCP), and the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners (CIBO). DuPont’s 
involvement in these organizations represents the full gamut of industry issues, 
and the company works within these organizations to further climate change 
issues. Its efforts are more or less aggressive depending on the particular 
organization. According to John DeRuyter, Principal Consultant, Energy 
Engineering, “You should not become overly aggressive if you cannot get 
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agreement. And with the ACC it can be very hard to get agreement with 
companies on either end of the spectrum.” Recognizing that the diverse set of 
companies within associations do not always share their views, DuPont takes a 
cooperative approach, focusing its climate change efforts within organizations 
that are actively engaging the climate issue, like the Pew Center, the ICCP and 
the Business Roundtable. 
 
In spite of all these initiatives, DuPont has minimal engagement with their 
shareholders and the broader investment community on climate change. Instead, 
the company’s efforts on climate change are helping it avoid shareholder action. 
“We have not had to respond to proxy resolutions because of our proactive 
actions on the issue,” reports Mongan. According to Fisher, while “Mainstream 
institutional investors are not as focused on this issue in the United States as 
they might be. That could all change if legislation is enacted.”  
 
Policy 
As with trade associations, DuPont has taken a cooperative approach to 
engaging government on the climate change issue. In the 1990s, DuPont 
consulted with the Clinton administration and Capitol Hill representatives 
regularly. The company was quite active in the development process for the 
Kyoto Protocol, advocating market-based systems that shift capital to the most 
cost effective solutions; such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a 
program that has frustrated the company thus far. DuPont has played an active 
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role in advising and commenting on the development of the E.U. ETS. DuPont 
was also very active in the development of the U.K. ETS and participated in 
registration and trading of U.K. allowances through its Invista® subsidiary (now 
divested). Because climate change is a global problem, a global solution that 
includes all industrialized countries is critical.  
 
Frustration with the Clean Development Mechanism 
 
John Carberry calls the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) “brutally political and 
complex” and like others in this report, feels that it is not living up to its potential. Mack 
McFarland believes that the principles of CDM are correct but the implementation rules 
need to be fine tuned. For example, he explains, under the present rules, “HFC-23 
destruction [a waste byproduct] can be worth more than HCFC-22 production [a 
commercial product]!”  
 
He explains, “A make-rate of 4 percent (the percentage of byproduct HFC produced) is 
the default value in the IPCC inventory guidelines for countries to use in plants where 
HFC-23 byproduct is not measured. When measured and managed, the lowest make-
rate is normally just over 2 percent.” Using proprietary technology in DuPont’s Louisville 
plant, a make-rate of 1.37 percent was achieved, resulting in more of the desired product 
and less waste byproduct. The process was not expensive, but has effectively reduced 
the amount of HFC-23 produced. Yet three (non-DuPont) facilities with approved CDM 
projects are producing HFC-23 at nearly three percent.  
 
Given that Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) are selling at a price of about $10/ton 
of CO2e, one could make more money from selling the CERs resulting from the 
destruction of the HFC-23 than they could selling the intended product (approximately 
$3.50 for destroying the HFC-23 associated with production of one kilogram of HCFC-22 
that was selling in some regions for around $1.80). The originally approved methodology 
that has since been modified and would allow credit for destruction of HFC-23 up to 4 
percent, providing revenue of $4.70 for the destruction of HFC-23 associated with 
production of one kilogram of HCFC-22. This, in effect, rewards operations for being less 
efficient.  
 
DuPont supports inclusion of HFC-23 projects under CDM but believes that CDM should 
not provide incentives that discourage use of Best Available Technology. The financial 
incentive described above would have encouraged new plants to make as much HFC-23 
as possible up to 4 percent rather than optimizing the process to make as little HFC-23 
as possible. The subject of the methodology for HFC-23 CDM projects for new plants is 
currently under discussion by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC.  
 
McFarland concludes, “DuPont submitted comments under the CDM process on this 
issue. But right now CDM discourages the use of the Best Available Technology for 
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reducing HFC-23 production in the manufacture of HCFC-22.” Justifying DuPont’s 
actions despite the CDM problems, he concludes, “We would not have looked for such a 
solution to reduce the amount of HFC-23 produced if not for the internal commitment to 
climate change and the need to meet that commitment on the most cost effective basis.”  
 
Fisher believes that participation on the part of DuPont and other companies in 
domestic policy development is critical. “It is important for industry to help 
government find cost effective solutions to the climate issue,” she explains. 
“Government can’t do it alone. They don’t have the capacity to understand all the 
implications of the different policy options. The public comment period provides 
the government with critically valuable information.” More recently, Fisher 
describes DuPont as “somewhat engaged, but not high profile” on government 
lobbying related to climate. “It takes resources to lobby and, as Congressional 
action on this issue gets more intense, we will put more time and energy into it.”  
 
Lobbying efforts dropped off when it became clear that the United States would 
not take action on climate change. Time and resources were spent on more 
critical issues, such as natural gas prices and availability. But renewed interest 
from policy-makers has DuPont stepping up its activity. Today, the company is 
struggling with the balance between the desire to see movement toward a federal 
standard with credit for early action, and the concern that comes from not 
wanting to alienate or adversely affect its customers by advocating aggressive 
actions.  
 
Looking toward future regulation, DuPont sees an opportunity for longer-term 
views that encompass a global system with developing countries, including China 
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and India. “This is an ideal time for renewed US leadership on the issue,” says 
Parr. “We won’t see China and India on board while the U.S. is on the sidelines.”  
 
One of the most important, if not the most important, aspects of policy for DuPont 
is recognition of early voluntary action. Whether these early actions are an asset 
or a liability depends on the baseline set in the final form of regulation. The other 
major critical issue is the effect of legislation on natural gas prices, an important 
feedstock.  
 
Over the past several years, the company has become more vocal on the need 
to tailor regulatory mechanisms for different sectors of the economy. For 
instance, while DuPont supports market mechanisms such as emissions trading 
or tax incentives as an effective way to distribute capital efficiently, it believes it is 
necessary to delineate between the manufacturing, buildings and transportation 
sectors due to differing price elasticity and responses to price signals in terms of 
GHG reductions. Otherwise, one sector (such as transportation) might bid carbon 
prices to a level high enough to adversely impact another sector (such as 
manufacturing) while not making the needed GHG reductions. It is critical to 
balance the need for reductions across all sectors with awareness that economic 
ramifications are unequal across sectors. And McFarland is quick to add, “You’ve 
got to get consumer emissions under control if you ever want to get anywhere.” 
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Challenges Ahead 
DuPont has a history of energy efficiency and climate change related action that, 
like its overall age as a company, is much longer than most of its peers. This puts 
the company in a unique position. With 15 years of experience tracking GHGs 
and 12 years of experience in implementing emission reduction goals, the 
company has achieved a great deal of success in reducing its own GHG 
footprint. Being further along the learning curve than most allows DuPont the 
ability to see the next hurdle much more clearly. DuPont must successfully 
transition climate change and energy efficiency from an issue of risk 
management to one of business opportunity.  
 
But, in DuPont’s view, it is relatively easy to set goals, measure progress, learn 
process improvements, and find reductions in energy use. And although work on 
process improvements and energy efficiency projects continue, most of the big 
reductions have already been realized. The real challenge lies in moving beyond 
reductions and identifying and evaluating business opportunities in a carbon-
constrained world. “Identifying market opportunities is a different challenge from 
footprint reduction,” says Fisher. “With footprint reduction, it’s easy to clarify what 
you want people to do – reduce X percent of what you are emitting. Alternatively, 
to look at 22 businesses and envision market opportunities in a carbon-
constrained world is more difficult. It starts with an analysis of what you do, 
looking down the value chain, understanding what your customer needs and 
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meeting those needs. As with any type of innovation, you have to make sure that 
new ideas will meet customer needs and satisfy regulations.”  
 
In order to understand and take advantage of this new focus, DuPont must 
navigate the complexity of the climate change issue, including the science, the 
politics, the economics and the uncertainty surrounding the timing. For example, 
rising energy prices this past winter have raised interest in green building and 
energy efficient housing, but it remains unclear if energy prices will be 
persistently high enough to increase demand for related products from builders. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how policies, ranging from Federal energy policy to 
local building codes, will influence the marketplace. It will be a complex issue 
involving both push and pull from suppliers, producers, builders, end consumers 
and regulators. 
 
Sharing information internally in such a large organization also remains a 
challenge. Despite an extraordinary organizational structure for sharing and 
disseminating information, the company “is still stove-piped,” says Dawn 
Rittenhouse, Director of Sustainable Development. (A problem that executives 
feel is not unique to climate change and applies to the company in general.) 
Having widely distributed decision making contributes to the risk of business 
units acting in a bubble. The danger, especially regarding climate change and 
energy efficiency issues, which can be seen as add-on issues, is that technical 
expertise and success stories make it up, but not across, the organizational 
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hierarchy. With the company being so diverse and products involved in almost 
every value chain, it can be difficult to make sure that all opportunities are 
identified and pursued across all of the DuPont businesses. 
 
Another challenge is streamlining and fine-tuning their emissions measuring and 
tracking system, which many consider labor intensive. Energy related emissions 
are calculated based on fuel consumption according to the WRI/WBCSD GHG 
Protocol and fuel specific measures. The current system requires input of data 
from direct metering of gas, invoices for other fuel purchases, reconciliation to 
inventories, and the application of emissions factors for a variety of fuels to 
calculate emissions. Process emissions are reported separately and indirect 
emissions must be calculated based upon localized information. All of this 
information is collected once per year in a corporate database. Despite having 
tracked emissions since 1991, DeRuyter still sees the company’s “biggest 
headache is in capturing and reporting data, particularly energy reporting and 
verification of 3rd party invoices.” There is no link with the company’s SAP 
system, which would be desirable but is currently prohibitively expensive. 
 
In the end, the key for a science and innovation based company such as DuPont 
is the development of new materials that will take the company through its next 
transformation and into its third century. Says Fisher, “We need to understand, 
measure, and assess market opportunities. How do you know and communicate 
which products will be successful in a GHG constrained world? How should we 
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target our research? Can we find creative ways to use renewables? Can we 
change societal behavior through products and technologies? The company that 
answers these questions successfully will be the winner.”  
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Weaving Climate Change into the Business Case 
Alcoa∗
 
What do you do about climate change when energy comprises a major portion of 
the total cost to manufacture your product? That is the dilemma that faces Alcoa; 
a company that spent over two 
billion dollars on energy last year. 
Consequently, locating and 
securing reliable, low cost energy 
sources has always been among 
the company’s most pressing 
strategic concerns. According to 
Jake Siewert, Vice President, EHS, 
Global Communications and Public 
Strategy, “the biggest differentiator 
in primary metals is long-term 
energy supply; 20 to 40 plus 
years.” With global energy prices 
continuing to rise, and climate change assuming a more prominent role in 
international policy discussions, energy intensive companies such as Alcoa are 




Headquarters: Pittsburgh, PA 
Revenues:  $26.2 billion 
Employees: 129,000 
Percentage of Emissions 
In Kyoto Ratified Countries: 16 percent 
Direct CO2e  
Emissions*: 34.4 MMtons  
Indirect CO2e  
Emissions**: 27.0 MMtons 
Aggregate CO2 e  
Emissions: 61.4 MMtons 
Target: 25 percent below 1990 levels 
 (achieved and maintained since 2001) 
Year Target Set:  1998 
 
* 100 percent of the direct emissions from 
facilities managed by Alcoa. 
** 100 percent of the indirect emissions 
associated with purchased electricity from 
facilities managed by Alcoa based on estimates 
of the sources of generation used by suppliers. 
34.  M tons**
*: 
 Million m tric tons. 
*** 100 percent of the indirect emissions 
associated with purchased electricity from 
facilities managed by Alcoa based on estimates 
of the sources of generation used by suppliers. 
                                                 
∗ We would like to thank Pat Atkins, Ken Martchek, Richard Notte, Randy Overbey, Jake Siewert, 
and Vince Van Son for their contributions to this case study. 
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from other companies and industries for the remaining sources of abundant, 
inexpensive energy.  
 
But, by leveraging its strong history of environmental leadership and 
responsibility, Alcoa is striving to transform this potential source of vulnerability 
into a competitive advantage. The company has already managed to reduce its 
managed direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25 percent below 1990 
levels and is being recognized for its progress: Alcoa was named one of the Top 
Green Companies in the world by Business Week magazine78 in 2005 and Ceres 
in 2006.79 But despite such praise, the company is looking toward two key 
developments that could result in further dramatic reductions: the development of 
a new aluminum smelting process and a vigorous effort on recycling and 
automobile light-weighting. When you combine what Alcoa has accomplished 
with the potential that lies ahead, Alcoa “is in a unique position and one that is 
very positive, given the attributes of the products we make,” says Randy 
Overbey, President of Primary Metals Development.  
 
Company Profile 
Headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Alcoa is the world’s leading producer 
of primary aluminum, fabricated aluminum, and alumina. The company employs 
approximately 129,000 “Alcoans” (a term that employees use to refer to 
themselves) in 43 countries. The company earned revenues of $26.2 billion in 
2005 by producing approximately 11 percent of primary aluminum in the world. 
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Customer segments include aerospace; automotive; packaging, building and 
construction; and commercial transportation. Alcoa also produces and markets 
consumer brands including Reynolds Wrap®, Alcoa® wheels, and Baco® 
household wraps. Among its other businesses are vinyl siding, closures, 
fastening systems, precision castings, and electrical distribution systems for cars 
and trucks.  
 
Because energy is so critical to Alcoa, the company generates approximately 25 
percent of its own electricity needs. Overall, its energy supply portfolio consists of 
hydropower (35 percent), coal (36 percent), natural gas (18 percent), and oil (9 
percent). Total direct GHG emissions from company managed facilities in 2005 
were approximately 34.4 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents (CO2e), coming 
primarily from its smelting operations, power generation facilities, and refineries. 
In 1998, Alcoa set a target to reduce its direct GHG emissions from managed 
facilities 25 percent below 1990 levels, an ambitious goal when compared to 
other Fortune 500 companies actively pursuing GHG reduction strategies. Much 
like DuPont, Alcoa has a history of setting and attaining far-reaching targets, 
particularly in the environmental arena. The company achieved its GHG 
reduction goal in 2001 and has maintained that level ever since. 
 
Strategy Development 
When asked about the impetus for its climate change strategy, Ken Martchek, 
Manager of Life Cycle and Environmental Sustainability, states that: 
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“Sustainability is a primary driver since Alcoa defines sustainability as: financial 
success, environmental excellence, and social responsibility. Our climate 
strategy is an essential part of our sustainability efforts given Alcoa's level of 
energy consumption particularly in an increasingly carbon-constrained world." 
But it is even more than that, according to Pat Atkins, Alcoa’s Director of Energy 
Innovation. Reducing environmental impacts is smart business too. “Why wait for 
irreparable harm from climate change, or policy requirements to make strategic 
and operational changes if the business case is already there? Alcoa is 
vulnerable because of our high energy demands and our need to grow to supply 
the market demands for our products. If we become part of the solution rather 
than part of the problem, we have a much better chance of continuing to 
contribute in the future. Many businesses tend to focus on the next quarter or 
next year, not their fourth century. Alcoa has operated in three consecutive 
centuries so far, and if we don’t focus on climate change, we may not make it to 
our fourth century. Our products need to be sustainable in the broadest sense.”  
 
This attention to the long term goes to the top of the organization, an aspect not 
lost on those responsible for managing Alcoa’s climate-related strategies. “On a 
scale of one to ten, senior level support is an eleven,” says Atkins. “Climate 
change is generally not chosen as a priority unless it is supported by those at the 
top.” While a systematic focus on energy efficiency has enabled Alcoa to reduce 
the amount of energy required to refine bauxite into alumina, reduce alumina into 
aluminum in its smelters, and fabricate aluminum into value adding products, the 
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primary focus of Alcoa’s GHG reduction efforts thus far rests in reducing 
perflourocarbon (PFC) emissions through anode effects and increasing the use 
of recycled materials.  
 
The Anode Effect. In 1992, then CEO Paul O’Neill, an industrial engineer turned 
economist (and former Treasury Secretary), asked Alcoa’s engineers why the 
company did not eliminate the anode effect from operations. Believing that stable 
operations reduced waste, O’Neill challenged the company’s engineers to 
eliminate the need for the anode effect by devising an alternative method for 
managing the aluminum smelting system. The engineers responded with 
skepticism, claiming the solution would be cost prohibitive with thousands of new, 
more accurate alumina feeders, as well as better algorithms in the company’s 
computer programs. And after all, scheduling anode effects as part of the 
process control scheme was the way that aluminum smelters had been run for 
many years. Undaunted, O’Neill continued to challenge engineers to minimize 
the number of anode effects, and after numerous iterations engineers discovered 
that new feeders were not always needed. Instead, they found that what was 
needed were new advanced cell control algorithms to manage the feed of 
alumina into the cell without having anode effects. At the same time, Alcoa 
signed a voluntary agreement with the EPA to reduce anode effects. With every 
iteration of the algorithm, control engineers noticed both a reduction of anode 
effects and an improvement in cell efficiency and alumina quality.  
 
  148 
DRAFT – Please do not cite, quote or distribute 
 
Anode Effect: An Overview 
 
The aluminum smelting process is a highly energy intensive electrolytic reduction 
process used to break the atomic bond between oxygen and aluminum in alumina 
(aluminum oxide, Al2O3). The smelting process uses consumable carbon anodes to 
reduce the alumina creating aluminum and CO2. 
 
A critical aspect of the aluminum manufacturing process is maintaining the proper 
concentration of alumina in the electrolytic bath solution. If the alumina concentration is 
too high, undissolved alumina falls to the bottom of the cell causing inefficiencies and 
potential damage to the cell lining. If the alumina concentration is too low, the electrical 
current starts to break down other chemical components in the bath (namely aluminum 
fluoride) necessary to continue making aluminum. This reaction creates the 
perflourocarbon (PFC) gases CF4 and C2F6 which form beneath the anode and increase 
the cell resistance. When the increasing resistance causes the cell voltage to exceed a 
threshold, the cell is said to be on “anode effect”. The anode effect is not extinguished 
until the alumina concentration has been increased and the voltage is reduced. Anode 
effects have three primary drawbacks: they disrupt the stability of the continuous 
electrolytic process, consume excess energy, and create PFC emissions. 
 
In the past, the level of alumina concentration in the process was routinely determined 
by purposefully scheduling anode effects by underfeeding alumina. This practice had 
provided an easy and reliable means of determining the amount of alumina in solution. 
The anode effect would give the plant manager an exact point of reference as to the 
amount of alumina in solution and helps avoid the risks and consequences of over-
feeding alumina into the cell.  
  
 
Alcoa no longer schedules anode effects. Although they still occur periodically, 
the company has reduced the anode effect frequency in its best plants from 
approximately one or more anode effects per cell per day to one anode effect per 
cell every 10 to 30 days. This reduction in frequency, coupled with reductions in 
anode effect duration, has reduced PFC emissions by over 75 percent since 
1990. To continue to improve performance, Alcoa has company and plant 
specific goals for minimizing the frequency and duration of anode effects. At 
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some locations, a portion of each employee’s annual incentive payment is tied to 
anode effect performance.  
 
According to Overbey, even though Alcoa was considering the anode effect 
before the arrival of O’Neill, it was his leadership that made it clear that the 
company was ready to move beyond the climate change debate and take real 
action. The company needed someone to ask the right questions, help the 
employees overcome some in-house biases, and think about operations from a 
different perspective. O’Neill was that person. 
 
Today, Alcoa is working to develop a new smelting technology based on an inert 
anode, which would eliminate consumable carbon anodes and related CO2 
emissions from the aluminum smelting process, and also eliminate all PFC 
emissions.  
 
Recycling Initiatives. In a 2002 speech to the US Aluminum Association, John 
Pizzey, then Group VP for Primary Products, argued that it was his fundamental 
responsibility to effectively manage climate change, energy reduction, and water 
quality issues. He then pledged that 50 percent of Alcoa’s products, other than 
raw ingot sold to others, would come from recycled aluminum by 2020. According 
to Overbey, “recycling is not only the right environmental choice; it can be the 
right economic choice for Alcoa.” Considering that aluminum produced from 
recycled materials requires only five percent of the energy needed to make 
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primary aluminum and that energy prices will likely continue to rise, increasing 
recycling rates is among the more significant long-term strategic opportunities for 
the company. Almost 70 percent of the aluminum ever produced is still in use 
today, totaling approximately 480 million metric tons. The amount of aluminum 
recycled in 2004 equaled the total amount of primary aluminum produced in 
1974. 
 
To meet its target for higher recycled content, Alcoa will have to overcome some 
of the challenges that have traditionally undermined recycling initiatives. In 
addition to resolving some metallurgy issues associated with recycling, Alcoa will 
need to devise innovative strategies for collecting large quantities of metal and 
ensuring that it satisfies the company’s quality standards. Further, it will have to 
engage with external groups to increase aluminum can recycling rates, which in 
the United States have declined from well over 60 percent to 50 percent in the 
last few years. The company is currently reevaluating how to engage these 
customers by focusing on the long-term financial benefits offered by elevated 
recycling rates.  
 
Organizational Integration 
Alcoa relies on three dedicated teams to further its climate change and energy 
efficiency goals: Corporate Climate Change Strategy Team, Greenhouse Gas 
Network and Energy Efficiency Network. These teams complement each other 
under the umbrella of Alcoa’s values and drive to share best practices across the 
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company. And, although the company has a long standing culture of technology 
and best practice transfer, employee engagement is crucial. According to Vince 
Van Son, Manager of Environmental Finance and Business Development, “Our 
people link our systems and our success. The best technology only gets you so 
far. Employees will devise innovative ways to achieve clearly stated goals when 
they understand the linkage with the company’s vision and values.” Similarly, 
according to Atkins, Alcoa’s managers are becoming more aware of the 
importance of the company’s strategy because they understand how climate 
change impacts their respective business units. They realize that, “if you want to 
build a new plant, having Alcoa’s reputation helps.”  
  
In 1997, Alcoa launched the Corporate Climate Change Strategy Team. 
Traditionally directed by some of Alcoa’s top-level executives, the team is 
comprised of eleven diverse members, including professional representation 
from operations, government affairs, technology, communications and finance 
and geographic representation from the United States, Canada, Australia, 
Europe, and Brazil. The team is responsible for evaluating the impacts of climate 
change on Alcoa’s business interests and disseminating the company’s goals 
and progress to internal and external audiences. According to Overbey, the 
current director, the secret to the success of the team is its multi-functional 
membership. “The members may not always agree with each other, but having 
such diverse representation increases the robustness of our results.” The team 
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meets face-to-face at least twice each year and conducts conference calls 
between meetings.  
 
To build on the success of reaching its goal of reducing GHG emissions 25 
percent below 1990 levels Alcoa launched the Greenhouse Gas Network in 2004 
to help further reduce GHGs among locations involved in power generation, 
refining, and smelting – which collectively account for approximately 90 percent 
of Alcoa’s total emissions. The network works with global process technology 
teams and various regional GHG teams across the world to coordinate and share 
information and best practices.  
 
One of the most important projects of the Greenhouse Gas Network is the recent 
launch of an internal web-based GHG information system. Alcoa has 
systematically collected GHG data for all operations worldwide since 1998 
through its environmental data system. This system makes it easier for locations 
to monitor their performance through time and compare it relative to internal and 
external benchmarks. By increasing overall transparency, the information system 
provides underperforming plants with a stronger incentive to improve efficiency 
and to lower GHG emissions. Centralizing GHG emissions accounting also 
promotes consistency with protocols and enables locations to focus resources on 
making reductions. Alcoa also relies on the system to facilitate global networking 
among the participants and help stimulate sharing of best practices.  
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The new GHG information system currently includes detailed process and energy 
consumption information for 41 facilities worldwide, including four power 
generation facilities, nine alumina refineries, and 26 smelters. The system uses 
the methodology of the E.U. ETS to calculate emissions and sweeps databases 
each evening to pull process and production data directly. Designated individuals 
at each plant are responsible for manually entering energy consumption data on 
a monthly basis. Reminders to update monthly energy data are issued 
automatically to help ensure a comprehensive overview of the performance of all 
facilities is available as soon as possible after the end of each month.  
 
One example of leadership and sponsorship for GHG emission reduction is a 
global PFC reduction “challenge.” Each plant has been challenged with closing 
the gap between its 2004 average anode effect (and thus PFC emissions) 
performance and its best monthly performance on record. Each month, a global 
scorecard is published comparing smelters to themselves and others in terms of 
CO2e emissions, CO2e emissions per ton of aluminum, and anode effect 
performance. As the scorecard is a highly visible way to track the leaders and 
laggards, it fosters healthy competition on GHG reduction progress as plant 
managers strive to have their facilities be leaders. But, the company also 
encourages cooperation and cohesion by mandating that each facility disclose 
barriers to meeting its targets, as well as the actions they are taking to overcome 
them and reach their targets. By emphasizing transparency and the sharing of 
best practices, the company ensures the focus on meeting targets is sustained. 
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Some of the plants making the greatest amount of improvement to date have 
done so in part by sending employees to smelters that have lower emissions to 
learn first-hand of the latest changes they have made to cell operating, 
maintenance and control practices.  
 
Similar to Shell’s Energise program, Alcoa launched the Energy Efficiency 
Network (EEN) in 2002. The EEN consists of more than 450 Alcoans worldwide. 
There is a set of core resources assisting plant personnel comprised of one high-
level Alcoa employee and various external experts. These resources have three 
roles. They are invited by operating locations to conduct energy efficiency 
assessments that confirm and help solidify the business case for possible 
improvement. They also identify, document and distribute globally, any strong 
energy practices observed at the plant locations. Finally, they provide technical 
support and access to further resources as needed. As of mid-2005, 
assessments had been completed at more than 50 plants. To increase 
ownership of assessment results, plants participate in reviewing initial 
recommendations and reach agreement on potential savings before a final report 
and action plan is issued. Plants have confirmed nearly $80 million in annual 
savings potential and captured sustainable annual savings exceeding $20 
million.  
 
A principal goal of the EEN is to help Alcoans understand and value the long-
term benefits of the company’s energy efficiency and climate change strategy. 
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According to Vice President of Energy Services Richard Notte, who manages a 
global portfolio of energy for Alcoa and the EEN, “The challenge is to provide a 
business case which influences us to make a shift on how we think about energy. 
The Network, including all its members globally, encourages us to consider 
energy as a manageable expense and also to consider life-cycle costs. As that 
shift occurs, we build into our business concept that production can be met using 
less energy per unit of output without sacrificing quality or production. Also, it 
encourages us to know and consider the cost of energy flowing through the 
equipment when making maintenance and end of life equipment replacement 
decisions. This shift in thinking provides significant financial and environmental 
paybacks.” Although the precise cost of setting up the EEN is difficult to quantify, 
Alcoa estimates are as high as $500,000 after accounting for travel, human 
capital, and use of internal resources. Notte believes that the vast majority of 
companies will not require the same level of sophistication as Alcoa. “Our system 
is as complicated as anyone is going to get.” 
 
Projects requiring capital investment are pursued based on their financial return 
and the fit with the other local needs and strategic interests. The availability of 
capital and the threshold financial return or internal rate of return (IRR) required 
therefore depends on the business situation of the individual location. The 
company has traditionally not pursued such projects unless they have had a 
payback of one year or less. However, as the program has matured, provided 
real returns and demonstrated its potential, Alcoa is moving beyond the “low 
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hanging fruit” and investing in projects with longer payback periods. Plants have 
been asked to keep track of all energy efficiency projects as they can become 
more attractive with time (as energy prices rise). Within the Primary Metals 
division energy efficiency projects with an IRR as low as 20 percent can be 
considered even if needed funds might not be allocated as part of a given plant’s 
annual capital budget. According to Van Son, the identification and tracking 
process is critical: “The most important step is to get all opportunities 
systematically on the radar screen. Just as every piece of fruit ripens at a 
different time, not all projects should be pursued immediately. The process starts 
with quality information.”  
 
Alcoa has also taken significant steps to extend the reach of its climate change 
strategy beyond operations and into the personal lives of Alcoans in an effort to 
help broaden engagement in the issue. For example, following on the heels of its 
successful One Million Tree program the company launched an even more 
ambitious Ten Million Tree program on Earth Day in 2003 to help increase 
employee awareness about climate change, carbon sequestration, and the 
importance of reducing GHGs. To reach the goal of planting 10 million trees by 
2020, each participating Alcoa location purchases the trees from a supplier of 
choice and distributes them to employees. Alcoans are then encouraged to plant 
the trees in their communities and on Alcoa property. Through 2005 the number 
of trees planted via these internal programs is estimated at 1.5 million. The 
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company also plants millions of trees each year as a part of its mine reclamation 
projects around the world.  
 
Alcoa has also encouraged its employees to participate in local and regional 
programs such as Smart Trips80 to encourage use of public transportation and 
car pooling and the one-ton challenge launched by the Canadian Government in 
2003. The one-ton challenge enables individuals to measure their GHG footprint 
and pledge to pursue those actions they can take to reduce their personal 
emissions by one ton per year.81  
 
External Outreach 
As with other companies in this survey, Alcoa’s climate-related strategy reflects 
in part the insights it gains from its external outreach. To accomplish this, Alcoa 
has formed partnerships with various environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Although the company acknowledges that such 
partnerships provide the company with credibility and third-party verification, it 
emphasizes that these relationships are much more than just stamps of approval. 
According to Siewert, “We know we’re not the expert on these issues; we need 
help. Our people broaden their view of sustainability by interacting with others 
who think more broadly, with the people who help manage the growth process 
more effectively. When we think too narrowly, we get in trouble because the rest 
of the world doesn’t think that way.” Martchek believes these partnerships also 
provide the company with more leverage to participate in the process of shaping 
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climate change policy. “Working closely with organizations like the World 
Resources Institute and Pew Center on Global Climate Change provides us with 
some insights about what the future may look like.” 
 
Moving beyond environmental NGOs, Alcoa has worked with several external 
groups to further its goals of increased recycling. The company is a member of 
the Curbside Value Partnership (CVP). CVP is an outgrowth of the Aluminum 
Can Council, a trade organization comprised of companies that make aluminum 
can sheet and aluminum cans. CVP joins with large and small communities 
across the United States, and their material recovery facilities, to increase 
education and promotion of recycling of a variety of valuable materials through 
existing curbside collection channels. CVP assists communities with participant 
education and promotion, data collection and interpretation and understanding 
the value proposition of recycling, especially aluminum can recycling. While 
proven to increase recycling rates, deposit legislation has traditionally been 
opposed by some of Alcoa’s largest business customers. Alcoa and many of its 
customers favor a more comprehensive approach to recycling, such as that 
advocated through the Curbside Value Partnership. And finally, aluminum can 
sheet makers continue a partnership with Habitat for Humanity, which channels 
money earned from recycled cans into materials for homes constructed by 
Habitat.  
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Alcoa routinely seeks the input of its key investors. Since 2003, Alcoa has 
convened its top five to fifteen investors during one to two visits to key facilities 
each year. During these visits the company has frank discussions about its 
corporate governance and sustainability initiatives. These events are an integral 
part of its communications and investor relations strategy. In addition, Alcoa’s 
annual sustainability report is used by analysts and other interested stakeholders 
and documents how the company mitigates risk by reducing its footprint.  
 
A final prong in Alcoa’s outreach is directed at the aluminum industry; a highly 
consolidated industry and that offers a potential opportunity. As Siewert explains, 
“At any time, the aluminum industry can easily get 75 percent of world capacity at 
one table. This is not true of other industries.” But despite such high industry 
consolidation, the industry lacks a consistent strategy or approach to addressing 
climate change or energy issues. Therefore, Alcoa recognizes a value both in 
making great strides in emissions reductions and encouraging others to follow. 
Mindful of competition from cheaper, less energy-intensive metals, Alcoa 
believes it is in its own economic interest to raise the reputation and standards of 
the entire aluminum industry, particularly in places like Europe. And Alcoa’s 
international competitors are beginning to respond to the challenge by improving 
efficiency and reducing emissions. To increase access to certain financial 
markets, competitors from Russia, China, and the Middle East are increasing 
transparency of operations by publishing sustainability reports.  
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Policy 
In general, Alcoa supports cap-and-trade systems where regulatory limits are 
imposed if all gases are included. Alcoa currently empowers local management 
to determine the company’s official position within each country. And elements of 
these positions can vary based on local circumstances.  
 
Of greatest concern to Alcoa is climate change legislation that does not 
recognize companies for taking early action. Alcoa seeks the use of a 1990 
baseline for determining allocations. According to Siewert, “Although I can’t 
imagine anything coming out of Washington that would be too strict for us, the 
worst case scenario is not getting credit for what we’ve already done.” It is for this 
reason that Alcoa is concerned with the Department of Energy’s 1605(b) 
program. Alcoa believes the recent DOE decision to disallow any reduction 
before 2003 not only discourages companies from taking early action, but 
potentially encourages increases in the short-term.  
 
To prod federal action, Alcoa testified on behalf of the McCain-Lieberman 
Climate Stewardship Act in 2003. The company feels strongly that there must be 
a global standard and uniform playing field for all companies. According to 
Siewert, “We need to know that what happens will happen to everybody.” In 
2005, Alcoa called for a comprehensive national registry and mandatory 
emissions reporting as its internal successes have shown measurement and 
reporting are a fundamental part of attaining any target. 
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Unlike Whirlpool, which seeks to retain credits for the improvements in energy 
consumption its products may offer, Alcoa does not lobby for gaining credits for 
emission reductions by users of its products. Since Alcoa mostly produces semi-
fabricated products and not final products as Whirlpool does, the company is 
satisfied with increased sales if GHG reduction goals increase the market for 
their product. Alcoa believes that the high performance-to-mass ratio of 
aluminum products will become increasingly attractive to its transportation 
customers (such as autos, trucks, rail cars, and planes) in a more carbon and 
energy constrained world. This reinforces an already strong business case for 
aluminum, and market pull for its rolled sheet, extrusions, cast components, 
forged wheels, and other related products. While airplanes are comprised of 90 
percent aluminum and titanium, the ratio for automobiles is only about 10 
percent. Reducing a vehicle’s weight by 10 percent typically yields a seven 
percent reduction in GHG emissions. Based on current growth rates, Alcoa 
projects that light-weighting coupled with increased recycling by the global 
aluminum industry has the potential to offset all industry direct and indirect 
emissions by 2017. Lighter cars and resulting improvements in fuel economy and 
lower emissions can potentially save 400 million metric tons of CO2e. To increase 
the demand for aluminum, Alcoa supports both GHG reduction standards and 
federal CAFÉ size-based standards for fuel economy as size and intelligent 
design have shown to help improve passenger safety and fuel economy (and 
subsequently reduce GHG emissions). 
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Challenges Ahead  
Of all accomplishments in the area of GHG reductions, Alcoans acknowledge 
that the development of its web-based systems for measuring and tracking 
emissions reductions is a major step forward in both achieving its goals and 
making all locations aware of their carbon footprint. 
 
And the company is pleased it has leveraged its efforts on climate change and 
other sustainability issues, leading to reputation and strategic benefits. For 
example, the company was invited by the Icelandic government to build a 
smelting facility in their country; a country with an extremely low GHG electricity 
profile and extremely low energy prices. Alcoa’s growth in Iceland is a direct 
reflection of its preference to use renewable energy resources (hydroelectric 
power) to achieve the lowest total GHG intensity per ton of aluminum possible. 
When Alcoa’s new smelter begins operations in 2007 it will become one of the 
lowest GHG intensity smelters in the world. Another example of gaining from its 
efforts is being recognized by Innovest (along with Toyota and BP) as the world’s 
top three most sustainable companies. The rankings were based upon how 
effectively companies have managed strategic profit opportunities by recognizing 
new environmental and social markets. Shortly after the rankings were released, 
Toyota approached Alcoa to discuss potential partnerships and synergies 
between the companies – again, a strategic aspect of the company’s future 
plans.  
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Looking forward, Alcoa seeks to make increasing progress into the light-
weighting of vehicles. And the market looks bright. Over the past decade, the 
demand for aluminum has increased at a compound annual growth rate of 4.3 
percent and the aluminum is becoming the second most used material 
(overtaking iron) in ground transportation vehicles after steel. For example, Alcoa 
developed "Dura Bright" commercial truck wheels that are lower mass than 
conventional wheels and don't require polish or scrubbing. These wheels have 
high strength to mass ratio, are visually attractive, corrosion-resistant, and 
require no maintenance beyond spraying with soap and water. In February 2005, 
Alcoa announced that Hyundai Motor Manufacturing America (HMMA) will use an 
Alcoa cast aluminum rear upper control arm for the Korean automakers all-new 
2007 Santa Fe crossover vehicle; the first Alcoa component to be used by 
Hyundai Automotive.  
 
But, Alcoa is still working to improve its GHG related-strategies. Despite recent 
initiatives to engage and educate its employees, some managers believe the 
company would have benefited from launching such programs much earlier. 
Atkins admits that the company would be even further ahead if we’d “done this in 
year two, instead of year ten. It takes time to educate 130,000 people.” And 
looking forward, Overbey worries about the fact that the company’s global reach 
truly requires a global answer to the GHG issue. This highlights one important 
challenge for the future. Political and regulatory uncertainty via the absence of a 
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uniform global climate change policy creates an uneven playing field with regard 
to its global operations. Alcoa believes such uncertainty coupled with high energy 
prices provide a disincentive for companies to set up new operations in many 
developed countries.  
 
But despite such challenges, Alcoa sees climate change as a major 
differentiating factor in the future. According to Overbey, “Whatever enterprise 
you represent, you must ask ‘How can I be part of the solution?’” Adds Atkins, 
“What would the best company in the world do? We are citizens of the world and 
we must act responsibly.” With this as its starting point, Alcoa continues to move 
forward through leadership and action to be part of the solution – and sees 
benefits in reinforcing its reputation for doing so.  
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Maintaining a Seat at the Table 
The Shell Group∗
 
Royal Dutch Shell, like all major oil producers, finds itself at the heart of the 
debate over climate change. In 
2005, Shell’s own operations 
emitted 105 million metric tons of 
CO2 equivalents (CO2e). The 
downstream combustion of the 
fossil fuels it produces emits 
another 76382 million metric tons. 
Together these emissions account 
for some 3.6 percent of global 
fossil-fuel CO2 emissions in any 
year – a total greater than that of 
the entire United Kingdom. But 
rather than sit on the side-lines and 
wait for carbon constraints to alter the company’s business environment, Shell 
took an early position on the issue and engaged in actions that began to manage 
its carbon footprint. These actions have earned the company credibility and a 
powerful voice within policy, advocacy and market circles. And this voice grants 
the company a measure of control over its future business environment. In the 
words of David Hone, Group Climate Change Advisor, “To validly have a seat at 
Shell’s Footprint  
(2005) 
 
Headquarters:  The Hague, NL
Revenues:  $307 billion
Employees: 112,000
Percentage of Emissions 
In Kyoto Ratified Countries: ~30 percent
Direct CO2e 
Emissions: 105 MMtons
Target**: 10 percent below 1990 by 2002
 5 percent below 1990 by 2010




Year Target Set:  1998
 Revisited in 2002
 Recast in 2005/6
 
* Measured as emissions from product use in 2002. 
** Direct emissions reductions only. 
105 MMtons*
**: 
illion metric tons. 
*** Measured as emissions from product use in 2002. 
                                                 
∗ We would like to thank David Hone for his contributions to this case study. 
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the table, you have to bring experience. You cannot just take a seat because you 
are interested.” 
 
In order to maintain that seat, the company must continue to develop the breadth 
and depth of its climate change program. The company now finds itself facing the 
challenge of integrating what had historically been treated as two separate tracks 
– energy strategy and climate change strategy. Shell is seeking ways to merge 
the two tracks into one synergistic approach that helps them explore new 
business opportunities. This harmonization of strategies must also coordinate the 
activities of units stretched around the globe, ensuring information sharing that 
takes advantage of Shell’s wide and varied technical expertise.  
 
Company Profile 
Royal Dutch Shell plc operates in over 140 countries and employs 112,000 
people. Shell is headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands and organized into six 
operational units: Downstream (oil refining, marketing and chemicals); 
Exploration and Production; Gas and Power; Renewables (including hydrogen 
and carbon management); Trading; and Shell Global Solutions (technology 
services). The executive directors of the first three (and most important) business 
units also sit on an executive committee, the head of which is the CEO of Shell. 
The primary developer of the Shell climate change strategy has historically been 
Corporate Affairs, which reports to the CEO. More recently, to reflect the growing 
importance of climate change as a strategic issue, the company has developed a 
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new CO2 Unit. In addition, all parts of Shell will coordinate on the issue through a 
“CO2 Forum.” 
 
The culture of the company centers on technology and trading, but there is also a 
strong sense of corporate social responsibility. In the words of Hone, “Concern 
[for climate change] goes quite deep. There is expectation among employees 
that the company is in a sustainable-development mindset. They see it as a 
positive thing, although it may vary by region. Employees expect Shell to uphold 




Shell has been watching climate change since the early 1990s through its Issues 
Management team, a team within Corporate Affairs that monitors issues that may 
impact the business units. In 1998, Jeroen van der Veer, then a group managing 
director (and now CEO), championed a more formal study of climate change and 
its potential impact on Shell businesses globally. This study came after the 1997 
signing of the Kyoto Protocol and at a time when the company was feeling 
bruised over its 1996 fight with Greenpeace over the disposal of the Brent Spar 
oil platform. A cross-functional team that spanned the company was put together 
and made the business case for implementation of a greenhouse gas (GHG) 
management strategy. This study raised the bar for climate action and, as a 
result, created resistors – “There’s always a challenge to what you create,” Hone 
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says, “but building a strong business case is key to overcoming this resistance.” 
The business case revolved around the trio of ideas that the company would 
eventually face a real price for carbon, that a leadership position on climate 
change would be a business opportunity in terms of building brand and 
reputation, and that a seat at the table with the governments that would set the 
rules was important for the company’s future. Out of this initiative emerged the 
goal of “Securing Shell’s future by seizing opportunities that arise from the 
climate change issue.” Achieving this goal has historically followed two tracks. 
 
The first track, energy strategy, considers the Shell energy portfolio. Planning for 
energy diversification is led in part by the company’s well-established long-range 
planning tools like the Shell Scenario. Like Alcoa, Shell has long thought in time 
horizons of half a century or more. And climate change requires a similarly long-
term focus. “You can’t look at this issue in a five-year time frame, it’s almost 
meaningless,” says Hone. “But you can look at it in a 25-year time frame – 




Shell uses scenario planning as a strategic framework for thinking through challenges 
and identifying risks and opportunities. The most recent (2005) edition of Shell’s 
scenarios, Shell Global Scenarios to 2025, articulates a vision of how worldwide forces 
might shape markets over the next two decades. The development of scenarios provides 
the company with a toolkit to assess risks, make investment decisions, develop a 
common strategic language for leadership teams, and engage in key public policy 
matters. Like the other Shell Scenarios, the 2005 edition uses alternative parallel story 
lines to explore how politics, economics and technology relate to its energy and energy 
services business. Shell uses story lines because stories are how humans understand 
the world, and stories allow for multiple levels of understanding while still giving 
emotional and intellectual impact. This time, for example, the three stories are: Flags, a 
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“dogmatic, follow-me world”; Open Doors, a “pragmatic, know-me world”; Low Trust 
Globalization, a “legalistic, prove-it-to-me world”. Through the lens of these three stories, 
Shell looks at issues from the US-EU-China power balance to climate change and 
biodiversity. On carbon, all three stories come to the same conclusion: the world (and 
companies) will face a price for carbon. Practically speaking, for Shell’s strategy this 
means focusing on increased natural gas production (especially liquefied natural gas - 
LNG), wind, solar, bio-fuels, coal gasification and experimentation with hydrogen 
delivery systems. But Shell emphasizes that it is still working to make its core business – 
fossil fuels – succeed in a carbon-constrained world.  
 
The second track, climate change strategy, focuses on managing the carbon 
footprint of Shell, sharing experience and validating the company’s position on 
climate change with governments, the NGO community and the general public. 
The goals of this track are to build capacity for action within the company and to 
participate in policy development. Recognizing that carbon would have value in 
the future, the company began working on first, taking inventory of GHG 
emissions, second, developing a proficiency in carbon trading and third, 
integrating carbon values into financial decision-making. The logic is that there 
will be a business benefit to both developing the experience of operating in a 
carbon market and working with governments to help develop those markets.  
 
Following the 1998 study, Shell set a long-term goal of matching the Kyoto 
standards of a 5 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2010. The first target 
within that goal was a 10 percent GHG reduction by 2002. This was the first hard 
target for Shell and it would be achieved through the elimination of associated 
gas venting at oil production units and the reduction of associated gas disposal 
by continuous flaring. The second hard target (remaining 5 percent below 1990 
emissions through the year 2010) was a more difficult sell than the first. To 
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address internal sentiments that the company had done enough and that further 
public action was unwise, a process of workshops with the company’s various 
business units as well as discussions with senior leaders were arranged. The 
workshops considered various target-setting and implementation options for the 
units themselves. The greatest resistance to the idea came from business units 
with significant growth opportunities in their forward plans. As such, a point of 
significant debate centered on whether to measure emission reductions targets 
through an absolute (for example, MMtonsCO2e) or indexed approach (for 
example, MMtonsCO2e per unit of revenue or product). Shell decided that setting 
one universal standard for such a large company would be impractical, as it 
overlooked the company’s very size and the challenge that size creates. The 
company chose a blend of these two approaches. Individual business units 
would use indexed or energy efficiency measures while the Group as a whole 
faced an absolute target.  
 
To reach its first target, Shell looked first at the lowest-hanging fruit, achieving a 
sizable portion of its pre-2002 emissions reductions by ending venting of 
associated gas (methane) from its exploration and production facilities and most 
significantly, from its Nigerian operations. As the company heads toward its 2010 
target, the emphasis has shifted to ending the flaring of the same gas. The 
company devotes energy and resources into capturing these gases and either 
pumping them back underground or feeding them into nearby facilities for small 
power stations. When the economics are right, these gases can also be 
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converted into LNG, a major growth area for the company. Through these 
actions, Shell hopes to reduce its CO2 emissions by a further 13 MMtons (from 
2005), but recognizes that this reduction makes room for future growth, such as 
the expansion of its oil sands facilities in Canada. Shell had a global goal of 
ending all but small-scale continuous flaring of associated gas by 2008. Shell has 
said that it will miss this deadline in Nigeria, where the government has set 
elimination of flaring as a country-wide goal.83  
 
The Group wanted to involve all operations in its efforts to meet the second GHG 
target and wanted to shift attention away from a sole focus on gas flaring. So, it 
sought further involvement and further reductions through individualized attention 
to energy use at local units. To spur reductions, Shell has set 2002 to 2007 
energy efficiency targets in the refining and chemicals operations at five and 
eight percent improvements, respectively. 
 
For this effort, the company also engaged its internal consulting arm, Shell 
Global Solutions (SGSi). SGSi consultants have helped develop many of the 
Group’s technical solutions while also offering its consulting expertise to external 
clients. The consultants can be called in for projects as large as the design of 
refineries or as small as individual unit efficiencies. One of the SGSi programs, 
Energise, works specifically on energy efficiency strategies. At the request of unit 
managers – typically at refineries – Energise deploys teams to evaluate possible 
efficiency improvements. The work of these teams is similar to Alcoa’s Energy 
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Efficiency Team, which recommends operational, equipment and behavioral 
changes. Site management decides whether and how to implement the 
recommendations. Energise personnel are drawn from all areas of Shell, giving a 
broad range of technical expertise.  
 
To gain access to available capital, energy efficiency and GHG emissions 
reduction projects must meet the same internal hurdle rate as other investments. 
However, the company uses internal shadow prices for carbon in evaluating its 
investments that then give such projects additional impetus. Shell currently uses 
three different (proprietary) carbon prices for valuing climate change in its 
investment decisions; one for the E.U., a second for other developed countries 
and a third for the developing world. Mandatory carbon regimes such as the 
Kyoto Protocol have helped to drive these internal pricing models and have made 
GHG and energy efficiency projects more attractive on a bottom-line basis since 
GHG emissions now have a real price in an external market.  
 
By way of illustration Hone explains how the value of carbon can be a significant 
driver in energy efficiency decisions. One barrel of oil produces about 0.36 metric 
tons of CO2. At current (early 2006) crude prices of around $60/bbl, an EU-ETS 
CO2 price of €25 is like adding a further $11/bbl to the price of oil, which makes 
an energy saving project even more compelling. The company uses long-term 
premise values for both oil and carbon when valuing internal efficiency projects 
(the actual numbers used by Shell are confidential and change with the market).  
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But to realize the full benefits of carbon shadow pricing and monetize the cost of 
carbon, emissions trading has become an important prong of Shell’s strategy. “It 
is an enabler of energy efficiency projects,” states Hone. For that reason, the 
company was one of the early innovators in both internal and external GHG 
emissions allowance trading. These experiences are a good example of how the 
climate change issue started at the periphery of the company and moved to the 
core of its operations. Carbon trading began as an issue for the Health, Safety & 
Environment (HSE) group within Corporate Affairs with the creation of a 
company-wide internal trading system (ended in 2002), and then for Shell 
Trading with creation of a CO2 trading desk at the end of 2001. The new trading 
desk allowed Shell to participate in both the Danish and U.K. emissions trading 
schemes, which ran prior to the EU-ETS, hence gaining valuable experience. 
Shell made the first swap between the Danish and UK systems in 2002 and, 
while the market did not formally open until 2005, Shell made the first actual 
market trade in EU Allowances in 2003. By moving from HSE to Shell Trading, 
“GHG is becoming more and more internalized” according to Hone. 
 
The results of Shell’s internal trading experience are mixed. They show less-
than-satisfactory results on its intended outcome: gaining the greatest reductions 
at the lowest cost (see box). But the company feels that internal trading was 
successful in making people aware of the need to reduce GHG emissions and 
the use of trading mechanisms to do it. This expertise also gave Shell credibility 
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in policy circles and meant that its views were considered in the development of 
the E.U. Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) that went into effect in 2005.  
 
Beyond its internal and external trading, Shell also became actively involved in 
early initiatives under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). Initial success here was also limited. The company faced problems both 
related to the CDM structure and of their own making. In one solar project, the 
company determined that the cost of going through the CDM process exceeded 
the benefits of the carbon offsets. In an energy efficiency project in Buenos Aires, 
the company has been in the CDM Executive Board process for over a year (as 
of January 2006), leading to some frustration with the process. In addition, Hone 
feels that the Group “wasted” effort on early (1999-2000) internal CDM 
workshops but couldn’t produce concrete results because of the slow start to the 
CDM market. Now, with the CDM market emerging and beginning to look like a 
success story, the company is working to reengage its businesses and capitalize 
on the opportunities that CDM offers. Early in 2006 Shell Trading was the 
recipient of the first physical forwarding of Certified Emission Reductions to an 
account on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Secretariat's Clean Development Mechanism Registry.  
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Internal Trading Shows Limited Success84
The Shell Tradable Emissions Permit System (STEPS), the company’s first attempt at 
GHG emissions trading, had decidedly mixed results. Begun in 2000, STEPS was an 
internal cap-and-trade scheme designed to last three years. Units within Shell joined 
STEPS voluntarily and were allocated tradable emissions permits based on their past 
history of emissions. These units accounted for 70 percent of Shell’s emissions in Kyoto 
Annex I countries. The goal was to reduce the emissions of these units to 2 percent 
below 1998 levels using declining caps on permit allocations under the trading system. 
 
STEPS offered some benefits to the company. It gave Shell’s units practical experience 
in both trading and calculating the cost curves for GHG abatement. The program also 
helped train Shell units for mandatory trading systems under the EU and Kyoto. While it 
provided these benefits, the program did not live up to expectations for several reasons:  
 
1) The voluntary nature of the program meant there were not enough participants and 
not enough liquidity in the permits market. Only units that could easily reduce their 
emissions tended to participate – making the market price for permits artificially low. 
 
2) Shell units in different countries could not monetize the internal GHG emissions 
trades because of the tax liability it would generate. 
 
3) Midway through the scheme, some units asked for – and received – extra permits 
from company headquarters. This “going back to the government” created 
uncertainty and softness in the already illiquid market. 
 
Beginning in 2005, the company found itself at a crucial crossroad as the carbon 
issue began to figure significantly in the Group’s forward-looking strategy. An 
internal “CO2 study” concluded that the Group must step up its efforts on GHGs. 
It must find ways to integrate its energy strategy and climate change strategy 
tracks into one cohesive strategy that helps them identify and capture new 
business opportunities as well as maintain its core fossil fuel business.  
 
In a January, 2006 Financial Times editorial,85 Shell CEO Jeroen van der Veer 
articulated Shell’s conclusion that future production of liquid fossil fuels would 
increasingly depend on unconventional sources, such as oil sands, gas-to-
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liquids, oil shale and coal gasification. The days of “easy oil” are over. The more 
difficult oil is “dirtier’ and the company will subsequently have to address their 
associated higher GHG output. Van der Veer stresses the importance of carbon 
sequestration – both underground and combined to make inert materials, as a 
technical solution. It has become clear that the energy portfolio will have a 
significant impact on its GHG profile. Conversely, the company’s climate change 
strategy has created the expectation of a company able to manage GHG 
emissions and government action has created carbon value in the market. These 
two tracks must now be intertwined. The Group’s future depends on it.  
 
One important acknowledgement of this increased importance is the creation of a 
new CO2 unit led by a senior executive. Graeme Sweeney, also head of 
Hydrogen and Renewables at Shell, has filled the post. His role will be to attend 
to the development of Shell’s CO2 strategy and the technologies that support it. 
The Group’s CO2 unit under Sweeney is viewed as a place to kick-start and 
foster GHG reduction technology until it is sufficiently integrated in the business 
units to stand on its own.  
 
External demand for lower-carbon energy has led the group to look toward key 
growth product lines. The first is continued attention to “developing LNG and 
natural gas businesses as a very easy way to help transition to a low carbon 
world” since natural gas has half the carbon footprint of coal in electricity 
production. As part of its broader energy portfolio, Shell has a strategy of having 
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many technological irons in the fire. “A lot of energy technologies have come and 
gone,” Hone says, “and it’s hard to predict what the next big hit will be.” The 
company has invested over $1 billion in new technologies such as wind, solar, 
bio-fuels and hydrogen, and is now stepping up investment in underground 
sequestration and IGCC/coal gasification.  
 
Within the last two years, there has been a growing realization that coal is going 
to be an integral part of the global energy mix, particularly in China and India. As 
gasification is a chemical conversion, an existing proficiency of the company, and 
has applications across a broad range of products and markets, the company 
sees a significant opportunity in this area. Shell’s experience with gasification 
dates back to the 1950’s when the first gasification unit was commissioned with 
oil as feedstock. There are now over 150 Shell Gasification Process (SGP) 
gasifiers licensed worldwide. The experience gained on oil gasification provided 
a firm theoretical and practical base for the start of the coal gasification 
development in 1972. In fact, the technology has been utilized in a coal 
gasification pilot plant in the Netherlands. The process can be used to make 
“syngas” which can be used to make everything from electricity to plastics and 
importantly liquid transport fuels or even hydrogen for transport. Further, the 
process could be altered (with further R&D) to accommodate feedstocks of wood 
chips, municipal waste or other materials that could be gasified into useable 
fuels.  
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The company’s solar operations are an outgrowth of solar research that started 
after the energy crises of the 1970’s and is now focused primarily on non-silicon 
based, copper indium diselenide (CIS) “thin-film” panels. Shell is also one of the 
ten largest wind farm owners in the world with capacity greater than 350 MW. Its 
wind portfolio is planned to grow at the market rate of expansion to 500MW by 
2007.  
 
However, as advances are made, the company finds that some renewables clash 
with the existing business model. For example, electricity generation is not part of 
Shell’s core business, yet wind power is fundamentally an electricity business. 
Similarly, Shell Solar has undergone both expansions and contractions, buying 
Siemens Solar in 2001 and then selling its silicon-based solar activities in 2006 to 
SolarWorld AG. The remaining thin-film business line has sought a partner in the 
form of Saint-Gobain, a company with “film-on-glass” technology expertise. And, 
as Hone puts it, “Can an oil company like Shell compete in a market where an 
electronics company like Sony or Sharp can bring a lot of R&D and 
manufacturing expertise to bear?” 
 
Hydrogen production is an area where Shell is developing critical expertise and is 
seeking to leverage that expertise in its investments. Shell already produces 
7,000 tons of hydrogen per day, mostly from natural gas, and mostly for use in 
refinery operations. Shell hopes to use this existing source of hydrogen in some 
of its early efforts to make hydrogen more widely used as a fuel. Right now, says 
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Hone, “98 percent of homes within the E.U. are within 100 kilometers of 
someone’s hydrogen production site.” Because the existing infrastructure is 
already there, all that is necessary for this opportunity to realize itself is an 
awakened demand and continued refinement in hydrogen handling and 
distribution technology. Before that happens, Shell recognizes that it needs to be 
up-and-running and prepared to meet the demand. So, for example, the Group 
now operates four hydrogen filling stations -- in Tokyo; Amsterdam; Washington 
DC; and Reykjavik – and is planning to build one in Shanghai in partnership with 
Tongji University. Further stations are also planned for the United States. 
 
Organizational Integration 
To help diffuse and incentivize climate change initiatives, Shell has incorporated 
climate change related goals into individual business scorecards. Scorecards use 
a number of criteria to evaluate performance of business units and individual 
managers, and focus on two or three principal metrics, such as financial 
performance. A particular climate change initiative (e.g. preparation for the EU-
ETS by EU refineries) might account for five percent of a given score in a 
particular year – an amount Hone describes as “modest”. But the measures are 
constantly changing, reflecting a particular year’s goals. The scorecards are used 
for calculating bonuses more so than promotions and are revised each year to 
reflect new concerns. 
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Beyond scorecards, three other devices foster information flow and innovation: 
the Annual Report, the Shell Sustainability Report and an internal Climate 
Change Newsletter.  
 
The Shell Sustainability Report, produced annually, serves three purposes: to be 
the company’s public face, reporting its activities to the outside world; to act as 
an internal coordinating mechanism, giving staff and the various business units a 
guiding vision; and to allow those units to communicate their concerns and ideas 
during the process of compiling the Report. To develop the report, which is 
published each year in April, cross-business workshops are organized the 
preceding October to identify key issues to discuss and report on. “The goal is 
not simply to record accomplishments or make people feel good,” says Hone. “It 
is meant to be self-challenging.” 
 
The Climate Change Newsletter is a purely internal e-mail document that 
reaches a community of 300+ employees each month. Employees with an 
interest in climate change issues can find out about the newsletter on the Shell 
internal climate change website and subscribe. The newsletter discusses specific 
technologies, developments within the company, and external climate change 
information. Anyone within the company can receive the newsletter, yet 
subscribers tend to come from four categories: corporate, including legislative 
affairs personnel; technology development (including CO2 sequestration and 
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energy efficiency); commercial units such as trading; and business areas with 
GHG-focused projects such as the Canadian oil sands units.  
 
External Outreach 
The full gains from Shell’s efforts at carbon management would not be realized 
without a concerted effort to engage with external groups. Shell directs its 
external relations regarding carbon management to four primary areas – trade 
associations; shareholders; NGOs and, most importantly, government.  
 
First, Shell works through its trade associations to further develop action on 
climate change. At times, trade associations have taken positions that are not 
aligned with Shell’s viewpoint. But Shell has typically chosen not to publicly break 
with such organizations (an exception being the Global Climate Coalition in 1998. 
The company instead focuses their efforts on practical measures on which there 
is consensus, like standardizing measures for reporting GHG emissions. Trade 
associations are not solely the domain of industry’s large players. Hone stresses 
that trade associations are important to smaller players who he believes must 
stay involved in the regulatory development process. 
 
Second, to allow itself the space to make forward-looking decisions about climate 
change, Shell believes it must convince shareholders of the merits of being 
environmentally responsible. The company does get climate change questions 
from investors and investor groups (such as the Carbon Disclosure Project) and 
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climate change appears to be a rising issue. In addition, by watching shareholder 
resolutions at competitors such as ExxonMobil or Chevron, the company knows it 
is an issue they cannot ignore. At the request of his own internal investor 
relations department, Hone has given presentations to investor groups on climate 
change and energy development. 
 
Third, Shell is working with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on climate 
change issues. “NGOs,” Hone says, “can expose the company to a range of 
views on how we are doing.” Shell’s work with Pew, for example, opens some 
doors for the company that wouldn’t otherwise be available. “Once you go 
through Pew,” Hone says, “it’s like you’ve gone through a filtering process – you 
have additional credibility. Shell provides Pew with credibility. And likewise, Shell 
gets the same. There is less suspicion than if Shell went it alone.”  
 
Shell Canada has set up a Climate Change Advisory Panel, made up of 
representatives of NGOs (including a First-Nation, Native American 
representative) to address concerns over GHG emissions at the Athabasca oil 
sands project. Shell sees this as part of the integration of its energy and climate 
change strategies, acknowledging that this new fuel source will impact its carbon 
footprint, its public credibility, its unofficial license to operate and ultimately its 
ability to expand operations. Hone says there has been tension on the Panel 
from time to time, but calls it “healthy”. For example, when the company was 
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considering its second hard target on GHG reductions, the Panel was a good 
sounding board for ideas they were considering. 
 
Policy 
Governments are the fourth, and most important, area at which Shell directs its 
external affairs activity. As governments act on climate change, Shell wants a 
seat at the table to discuss future regulation. “Particularly in emissions trading, 
these are the people you’re doing a major trade with through the allocation 
process,” Hone says of governments. “If you’re doing a deal with somebody and 
they’re setting the rules, then you want to have a say.” And because climate 
change cuts across many issues ranging from the location of new LNG facilities 
to energy prices, Shell’s government relations offices spend an increasing 
amount of their time on climate change/GHG issues with the most involvement in 
the U.K., strong involvement with the E.U. in Brussels and then moderate 
involvement in Washington. Overall, says Hone, “Our role is not to advocate that 
policy be enacted. We don’t set policy. But if a government decides that policy is 
necessary, we will help them understand the best mechanisms to reach their 
goals.” 
 
Shell (and other corporate representatives) worked with the U.K. government to 
help set up the U.K. Emissions Trading Group to develop rules on trading in the 
U.K. Further, Shell has worked with the Corporate Leaders Group in the U.K. 
who, in conjunction with the Prince of Wales Business and Environment program, 
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wrote a letter to the Prime Minister recommending more aggressive action on 
climate change. 
 
Shell doesn’t advocate voluntary reductions as a long-term strategy to reduce 
GHG emissions. “Government needs to get involved through a variety of 
mechanisms,” says Hone. A balanced approach of market incentives, tax 
incentives, and subsidies is needed to create strong encouragement.” Mandatory 
programs, such as the EU Emissions Trading System, will help ensure the 
playing field is level, define price and monetize the advances Shell makes in 
reducing its GHG emissions. Without the government pushing it, he says, the 
business case for GHG reductions is harder to make, “and action cannot take 
place without the business case.” By contrast, Hone says, a business case 
driven by higher energy prices may not lead to lower carbon emissions, as higher 
prices may merely push companies to exploit heavier ‘unconventional’ oil 
resources, dig for more coal or drill deeper oil and gas wells.  
 
Challenges Ahead 
In looking over its initiatives thus far on climate change, Hone sees the failure of 
the company’s internal trading system as one useful lesson. While its failure was 
a surprise, he feels the company should have seen its limitations beforehand. But 
rather than dismissing the entire venture as lost, he sees benefits in the way it 
helped the company develop the expertise to become a leader in emissions 
trading in Europe.  
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Reflecting on all his company has done, Hone ponders “When addressing 
climate change, the question is not just how will you manage your own GHGs, 
but how will you change the game? Ultimately, we’ll have to get out of fossil 
fuels, but that is almost certainly many decades away. Maybe hydrogen is the 
answer. But you have to make the right change at the right time and in the right 
way. People will not get rid of cars and people will always want more energy. The 
key is both influencing the rules of the game and timing your shift to a new 
carbon-constrained strategy. It’s knowing what the next technology for energy 
production is, and shifting when the market is ready to reward it. We’re not going 
to get out of the oil business in the near term.” But you have to ask, says Hone, 
“What is the iPod® for energy? Is it out there? You have to be on watch.” 
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Don’t Switch Tracks When the Train is Already Moving  
Whirlpool∗
At the ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol in 
2003, Whirlpool became the world’s first appliance manufacturer to announce a 
greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction 
strategy. But unlike many other 
companies that have made similar 
pledges, Whirlpool’s approach to 
climate change involves neither 
dramatic changes to its operations 
nor significant bottom line costs. Its 
strategy is laser focused on 
leveraging its current core 
competencies, and continuing down 
the same path it has been on for 
years: bringing the most energy efficient prod
reducing GHG emissions through its consume
going drive for energy efficiency, the words “c




















                                                 
∗ We would like to thank Tom Catania, Dick Conrad
Casey Tubman and Steve Willis for their contributions 
 
At the time of writing, Whirlpool was in the process o
because of Securities and Exchange Commission rule
approval. Maytag is also a member of The Pew Cen
Environmental Leadership Council, though they have n
 
  Whirlpool’s Footprint 
(2005) 
quarters:  Benton Harbor, MI 
nues:  $14.3 billion 
loyees: 65,682 
entage of Emissions 
oto Ratified Countries: 31 percent 
t CO2e  
sions: 0.8 MMtons 
ect CO2e  
sions*: 146.5 MMtons 
egate CO2e  
sions: 147.3 MMtons 
et:  Three percent below 1998  
levels by 2008 while 
 increasing sales 40 percent.  
 Target Set:  2003 
0.8 MMtons*
*: ucts to the market and, in so doing, 
rs. In fact, given the company’s on-
limate change” are not often stated 
. The mantra is “energy efficiency” 
on metric tons. 
asured as emissions from product use. 
, Mark Dahmer, JB Hoyt, Bob Karwowski, 
to this case study.  
f acquiring Maytag Corporation. However, 
s, the merger could not be discussed until 
ter on Global Climate Change’s Business 
ot set a definitive GHG reduction target. 
187 
DRAFT – Please do not cite, quote or distribute 
plain and simple. In the words of Mark Dahmer, Director of the Laundry 
Technology Division, “We’ve got a train moving on efficiency. We’d just start 
confusing things if we tried to throw more on the train or start a new train.”  
 
Company Profile 
Based in Benton Harbor, MI, Whirlpool is the world’s largest home appliance 
manufacturer. With annual sales of over $14 billion and nearly 50 manufacturing 
and research facilities worldwide, the company sells to consumers in more than 
150 countries. Among its 11 major brand names are Whirlpool®, KitchenAid®, 
Kenmore®, Brastemp®, Bauknecht®, and Consul®. The company’s broad vision is 
to have the company’s products in “every home, everywhere.”  
 
Two aspects of Whirlpool’s culture above all others drive the company’s attention 
to addressing climate change. The first is a continual search for ever increasing 
energy efficiencies. This is born out of the company’s historic focus on cost and 
quality in a low margin industry. The second is a close connection to its 
Midwestern roots, out of which emerges a strong belief in corporate citizenship. 
According to Dahmer, one of the core corporate principles is that there is “no 
right way to do a wrong thing.” The company’s Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) statement expresses it simply as an aim to operate in “ways that honor 
ethical values and respect people, communities and the natural environment. 
Equal to protecting the health and safety of our employees, we consider 
environmental stewardship among our most important business 
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responsibilities.”86 That aim is echoed in the statements of employees as the 
primary reason for addressing climate change. In the words of many, the 
company is just trying to “do the right thing.” According to Dahmer, “the company 
is about providing for the country and the customer.”  
 
Strategy Development 
In 2003, the company announced a plan to decrease total GHG emissions from 
global manufacturing, product use and end-of-life by three percent from a 1998 
baseline by 2008, while increasing sales by 40 percent over the same period. 
According to Whirlpool, these reductions were equivalent to the CO2 emissions of 
28 coal-fired plants or 10 million cars. On announcing the reductions, Tom 
Catania, Vice President of Government Relations, commented, “whatever 
political solution the global community agrees to as the best mechanism for 
collectively addressing climate change, our company will continue its efforts to do 
our part, while at the same time bring unique, innovative and energy-efficient 
products to our customers.”87  
 
And customers are the key to Whirlpool’s efforts to address climate change. 
Studies have shown that the majority of lifecycle GHG emissions from home 
appliances come from the use phase. Whirlpool’s internal studies conclude that 
of the nearly 30 metric tons of CO2e emitted over the life of an average washing 
machine, over 93 percent come from the use phase. Of the remaining amount, 
two percent come from manufacturing and five percent come from end-of-life 
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disposal. This is corroborated by a 1992 study by the United Kingdom-based PA 
consulting group which also shows that over 93 percent of washer emissions 
come from use.88  
 
The concentration of emissions in the use phase presents an opportunity for 
focused efforts toward reducing those emissions. While the company still seeks 
energy reductions throughout the supply chain, it has determined that further 
improvements in the manufacturing process would be hard to find. Bob Karowski, 
Director Environmental Health and Safety for North America, relates a story from 
the late 1990s when a group of Enron energy analysts came to evaluate 
Whirlpool’s opportunities for further efficiencies. None were found. 
 
Driven by mandatory (such as national energy efficiency standards) and 
voluntary (such as Energy StarTM) programs, as well as competitor pressures and 
consumer demand, Whirlpool has been engaged in a constant search for energy 
efficiencies with its appliances. The company (and the industry) has achieved 
dramatic energy savings over the past 30 years. Compared to models from 1970, 
today’s refrigerators use less than half as much energy and washing machines 
and dishwashers use approximately one-third as much. Since 1980, the overall 
percentage of the United States home energy use that is dedicated to appliances 
has dropped by two-thirds, to between 18 and 20 percent.  
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Yet these improvements have not always been easy. In the past, the company 
has felt that it was paddling upstream against consumer demand. For example, 
in 1993 the company was the winner of the Super Efficient Refrigerator Program 
(SERP) competition sponsored by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
the Department of Energy (DOE) and 27 national utilities. Though the company 
received the $30 million prize for winning the challenge and enjoyed the 
accolades that came with it, some in the company felt that the corporate 
investment far outweighed the reward. In the end, the prize money barely 
defrayed the development dollars and the company was forced to go to great 
lengths to elicit consumer interest in the product. This experience planted 
concerns within the company that you cannot get too far ahead of the market; 
efficiency gains must not exceed manufacturing costs or consumer demand. 
 
According to Mark Dahmer, Director of Laundry Platform Technology, American 
consumers believed that efficiency was tied to inferior performance. Like the 
falsehood that higher automobile fuel efficiency necessitates compromised 
performance, customers believed that an efficient machine would not clean as 
well. At one point, the situation was so disconcerting that the company engaged 
in an internal debate over the merits of featuring the Energy StarTM label so 
prominently on its products. In the end, they decided to keep the label to educate 
the consumer. While using less water and less energy could elicit concerns from 
some consumers, the company felt that it had merits as a proxy for quality and 
performance.  
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Just after this dampening experience with efficient refrigerators, the company 
faced a challenge from competitors on efficient washers that, in the end, had a 
positive effect. In the early 1990s, small European-style front loading, horizontal 
axis washers were sold in the United States in limited quantities. The sales 
volume was low, as these products lacked the size or features preferred by 
consumers. In the late 1990s, the introduction and early consumer acceptance of 
a new full-sized, front load washer led Whirlpool to rapidly leverage its European 
technology to introduce a American-style product of its own. This technology was 
available to Whirlpool through its 1989 acquisition of the Philips business in 
Europe. The Whirlpool Duet® is a front loading washing machine that uses the 
more efficient horizontal axis orientation to yield efficiencies of 68 percent less 
energy, 67 percent less water and 50 to 70 percent less detergent than traditional 
top loading machines. Most importantly, the machine has been extremely 
successful in the marketplace and served to counter internal resistance that had 
been generated by the earlier SERP experience. 
 
Over the past two years, Whirlpool executives sense a market shift as 
consumers have become increasingly interested in energy efficiency. This, they 
believe, is driven by both increasing awareness of climate change and 
environmental issues as well as increasing energy costs. According to Casey 
Tubman, Brand Manager of Fabric Care Products, “In the 1980s, energy 
efficiency was number ten, eleven or twelve in consumer priorities. In the last 
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four or five years, it has come up to number three behind cost and performance, 
and we believe these concerns will continue to grow.” But energy efficiency still 
requires education of the consumer. The most efficient washers can cost up to 
$500 more than traditional washers (absent any rebates). But, depending on 
utility rates, they can save between $75 and $100 per year, yielding a payback of 
five years. According to Catania, “We are getting better and better at making this 
visible to consumers. This is good for the environment, good for the consumer 
and good for Whirlpool.”  
 
Going forward, Whirlpool believes that the focus on efficiency will have other 
long-term benefits for the company in terms of market share. According to 
Tubman, energy efficiency is becoming a source of competitive advantage by 
building brand loyalty; “Once someone buys a high efficiency device, they never 
go back to buying a traditional machine.” Whirlpool’s market research supports 
this conclusion. According to Steve Willis, Director of Global Environment, Health 
and Safety, Whirlpool surveys have demonstrated that “there is a strong 
correlation between a company’s performance in appliance markets and their 
social response to issues such as energy efficiency and pollution.” While not 
uniform across products or regions, Whirlpool believes that environmental 
attributes (water and energy conservation) yield customer loyalty and repeat 
purchases.  
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As an added benefit, Whirlpool executives believe that the company’s focus on 
energy efficiency, like its other responsibility efforts, helps to draw and retain 
people who feel good about the company and perform better. In Tubman’s 
words, “The values stay here because the people stay here and the people stay 
here because the values stay here.”  
 
All of this leads to the conclusion that a focus on GHG reductions through energy 
efficiency is central to the company’s core strategy. The company states that it 
will continuously develop new energy efficiency technologies, and at times, 
license them to competitors. If necessary, the company will also aggressively 
guard those innovations. In the summer of 2003, Whirlpool sued Korea based LG 
Electronics for patent infringement, claiming that LG copied technology 
developed by Whirlpool that delivers sharply higher energy and water savings to 
customers. When commenting on the suit, David L. Swift, Whirlpool's executive 
VP for North America, remarked, “Whirlpool has invested heavily in developing 
innovative fabric care wash technology that delivers meaningful benefits to our 
customers … Whirlpool will tirelessly and aggressively work to protect our assets 
from competitors who choose to disregard U.S. patent law."89  
 
The motivation behind the lawsuit, according to Catania, is both to protect the 
company’s assets but also to maintain a level playing field where he thinks the 
company can win. Toward that end, Whirlpool has worked aggressively through 
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its trade association to develop rigorous techniques for measuring energy 
efficiency, keeping them up to date and uniformly applied.  
 
Organizational Integration 
Unlike other companies in this report, the impetus to address GHG emissions at 
Whirlpool did not come from the CEO’s office. Though JB Hoyt, Director of 
Regulatory and State Government Relations, admits that top down leadership 
would have been important to the company if it were starting from scratch, he 
says that the company had already been working on energy efficiency for years. 
There was no need to push a new mindset though the organization. In fact, some 
at the company believe that introducing the concept would do more harm than 
good, confusing what is already an on-going initiative.  
 
Whirlpool first began attending to climate change in the same way it addresses 
other environmental issues: through the company’s Environmental Council. 
Comprised of representatives from the six business units (North America, 
Europe, China, India and Brazil white goods and compressors), the group meets 
by phone, six to eight times per year to consider the environmental and 
employee safety concerns facing the corporation. These issues are brought 
before the Council through suggestions from the Council members based on 
their efforts to identify best practices, new challenges and emerging trends. In 
2003, the Council selected climate change as an issue that necessitated review, 
particularly in terms of developing better tracking and control of GHG emissions. 
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In addition, the company was motivated by their involvement with the Business 
Roundtable’s challenge to commit to the voluntary Climate RESOLVE initiative. 
Since Whirlpool’s commitment to energy efficient appliances was central to its 
long term strategy, the additional focus on GHG emissions was a natural step to 
take, and had the potential to help create a competitive advantage. 
 
To develop targets for GHG reductions, Willis went to each of the product groups 
(refrigeration, fabric care (washers/dryers), dishwashers, cooking, air 
conditioning, and portables) and compiled data on sales volume projections, 
consumer use, average age of each type of product when taken out of use, and 
introduction schedules for new, more energy efficient models. He then calculated 
total energy consumed by all the products over their average life and converted 
that energy consumption to GHG emissions using country specific conversion 
factors. The result was the determination that the total GHG emissions from 
product sold in 2008 would be three percent less than the total GHG emissions 
from the product actually sold in 1998.  
 
Willis admits that the three percent goal will not be a tremendous stretch for the 
company, but according to Hoyt, they may commit to a stretch goal “after we get 
a track record.” Nevertheless, Willis is extremely confident they will meet their 
target. Returning to the company’s mantra of producing efficiency improvements 
for its consumers, he comments, “We were going to do this stuff anyway. Energy 
efficiency is one of our priorities.”  
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And this leads to one final and important point about Whirlpool’s global appliance 
portfolio. Catania points out that “You’d be hard pressed to tell the difference 
between a Whirlpool appliance sold in a Kyoto ratified and a Kyoto non-ratified 
country. We’re trying to get as much global leverage on our factories as 
possible.” So, whether the United States ratifies Kyoto or not, the most efficient 
technologies the company produces (such as seals, the primary source of 
cooling loss in refrigerators) will migrate around the world. According to Catania, 
“When we build a factory, we want to milk it and use the technology throughout 
our product line.” 
 
External Outreach 
Whirlpool, like other companies in this study, places great emphasis on external 
outreach. But the direction of that outreach is critically focused on enhancing 
consumer awareness and demand. For example, to address consumer 
misconceptions about the efficacy of energy efficient appliances, the company 
has actively worked to educate retailers (such as Lowes and Sears) and 
consumers on their benefits, including their average five year payback period. 
Since the more efficient machines need high efficiency detergents to attain the 
best cleaning experience (at no additional cost per load, the company is quick to 
point out), Whirlpool worked closely with Proctor & Gamble to help educate 
consumers and assure availability of the detergents. Further, the company was 
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pivotal in convincing Consumer Reports magazine to include energy efficiency in 
the rankings of appliances. 
 
Like other companies in this report, the company has not shied away from 
stepping out in front of its industry on these issues. This has not always been 
welcome by its competitors. Early on, the company faced criticism by some who 
felt that Whirlpool was trying to use energy efficiency as a way to disadvantage 
the competition, particularly those with lower capital spending plans. This 
criticism played out with the American Home Appliance Manufacturers (AHAM), 
the industry lobbying organization in Washington, D.C. of which Whirlpool is the 
largest member. In 1993, Whirlpool introduced highly efficient refrigerators in the 
belief that this would spur federal mandates to require manufactures to meet its 
efficiency level. However, following the Gingrich revolution of 1994, other 
manufacturers convinced the AHAM to lobby against the new regulations. Since 
the organization had a policy of one vote per company regardless of market 
share, Whirlpool’s interests were overruled. The organization was successful in 
convincing the DOE to hold off on the new regulations and, in response, 
Whirlpool withdrew from the organization in March 1997. After months of 
negotiations, the company rejoined the AHAM following amendments to the 
organization’s bylaws that require 75 percent membership approval (by market 
share) of all public policy positions. Today, Catania points out that much of the 
industry shares Whirlpool’s concern for energy efficiency. 
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Finally, the company has also worked closely with some non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to develop and promote energy efficiency incentives. For 
example, the company worked closely with the Sierra Club, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, the Alliance to Save Energy and others to promote 
manufacturers tax credits within the recently passed Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
Unlike consumer tax incentives, these credits can offset substantial manufacturer 
development investments, allowing producers to provide a less expensive 
product to the end consumer. In the words of Tom Catania, the credits provide a 
“win-win for everyone. NGOs and the government get environmental gains while 
the consumer gets a better product.” 
 
Policy 
Whirlpool has a long history of working with the government. Since 1975, the 
company has played a leadership role in crafting every major appliance efficiency 
regulation, and has been an Energy StarTM Partner of the Year every year since 
1999.  
 
On the issue of climate change, the company’s primary focus on end-use 
emissions leads executives to feel strongly that any national policy aimed at 
addressing climate change must include credit for use-cycle reductions. “Who 
gets the use credits?” asks JB Hoyt. “Should the utility get it? The user? The 
Manufacturer? We’re feeling our way along on CSR and climate change. We 
want to provide a leadership voice.” Catania adds, “If the government wants to 
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motivate appliance manufacturers to participate in a meaningful cap-and-trade 
program, then it needs to provide credit for the power plant emissions reduced or 
avoided though the increased energy efficiency of our products.” Willis echoes 
this sentiment, “If the company is going to move forward on climate change, we 
need to get credits for indirect emissions.” This is the number one issue, even 
though the company has been working on emissions reductions for a long time. 
Says Hoyt, “We would love to get credit for the gains we’ve made 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, but the real line in the sand for us is the 
1998 baseline for our GHG reduction commitments.” 
 
When pressed, Catania adds that the company would be just as satisfied with 
manufacturer’s tax credits rather than carbon credits. In either case, the company 
will be rewarded for producing energy efficient products. The least attractive 
solution, in Catania’s view, would be consumer credits for efficient products. “The 
consumer credit does not have nearly the stimulative effect that the 
manufacturer’s credit.” Competitors could easily undercut the stimulus of a 
consumer rebate by cutting margins. 
 
One area where Catania has very strong feelings is the topic of state-level 
climate change regulations. “This would be a huge misdirection of resources and 
much less can be achieved if we are subjected to a Balkanized set of standards 
from fifty different sources.” In his view, 50 separate policies would benefit 
neither consumers nor businesses.  
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Challenges Ahead 
Whirlpool is still struggling with the growing pains of recent expansion and 
acquisitions. Coordination among the various divisions of the company is loose. 
While each plant has an “energy facilities engineer,” for example, there is 
presently no one person in the company who focuses on company-wide energy 
conservation. (The company is considering creating such a position.) Whirlpool 
has a highly decentralized culture and its units value and protect their autonomy. 
Technology sharing, when it does occur, is limited, and there is little technology 
transfer among plants domestically or globally. In the aggregate, these factors 
have cemented the belief within Whirlpool that the company has reached the 
limits on energy efficiency in manufacturing process.  
  
An additional challenge is Whirlpool’s current difficulty in analyzing emissions 
data. In order to analyze data collected in 2003 and 2004, the company solicited 
bids for a data management system to track emissions and conservation. When 
the proposals came back with costs between $75,000 and $225,000, the 
company decided to develop a system in-house. These efforts have so far been 
unsuccessful. According to Willis, a data management system and international 
GHG conversion factors are the company’s biggest current needs with regard to 
climate strategy.  
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The company is also alert to the balance it must strike between leading and not 
leading too much. Consumers care about energy efficiency but cannot be pushed 
too hard to purchase more efficient models. Requiring sacrifices or greater effort 
of the consumer so as to attain greater efficiency is out of the question. 
According to one customer survey conducted by Whirlpool, “Consumers expect a 
comfortable solution with a minimum of inconvenience. Whoever is the bearer of 
news to the contrary, is subject to consumer disdain and ridicule.”90  
 
Looking forward, a focus on energy efficiency gives Whirlpool a premium product 
well suited for a carbon-constrained future. Though there is relative technological 
parity between the product offerings of domestic and European manufacturers, 
the company is concerned that Asian-based manufacturers could overrun the 
domestic market with cheap, less energy efficient, machines. But increased 
home energy prices resulting from efforts to reduce GHG emissions could 
potentially be a windfall to Whirlpool as consumers place an even higher 
premium on energy efficiency. Banking on this future, Whirlpool has stayed the 
course and continued to do what it does best -- bringing energy efficiency into the 
home.  
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Glossary 
1605(b): Under the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 Section 1605(b) program 
companies are encouraged by the Department of Energy to voluntarily report 
activities undertaken to reduce GHG emissions or to sequester carbon. 
Companies may want to report these activities in order to achieve recognition of 
achievements (from both regulators and stakeholders), inform the public debate 
on climate change, or to participate in educational exchanges. 
Certified Emissions Reduction (CER): Reductions of greenhouse gases 
achieved by a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project. A CER can be 
sold or counted toward Annex I countries' emissions commitments. Reductions 
must be additional to any that would otherwise occur. 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs): are compounds consisting of chlorine, fluorine, 
and carbon. CFCs are very stable in the troposphere, however are broken down 
by strong ultraviolet light in the stratosphere to release chlorine atoms that 
deplete the ozone layer. CFCs are commonly used as refrigerants, solvents and 
foam blowing agents. International phase-out programs of these chemicals are in 
place, most importantly the 1987 Montreal Protocol and its subsequent 
amendments. CFCs are also considered to be greenhouse gases and are 
targeted for reduction under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): One of the three market mechanisms 
established by the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM is designed to promote sustainable 
development in developing countries and assist Annex I Parties in meeting their 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction commitments. It enables industrialized 
countries to invest in emission reduction projects in developing countries and to 
receive credits for reductions achieved. 
CO2 equivalents (CO2e): Carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) provide a universal 
standard of measurement against which the impacts of releasing (or avoiding the 
release of) different greenhouse gases can be evaluated. Every greenhouse gas 
has a Global Warming Potential (GWP), a measurement of the impact that 
particular gas has on “radiative forcing;” that is, the additional heat/energy which 
is retained in the Earth’s ecosystem through the addition of this gas to the 
atmosphere. The GWP of a given gas describes its effect on climate change 
relative to a similar amount of carbon dioxide and is divided into a three-part 
“time horizon” of twenty, one hundred, and five hundred years. As the base unit, 
carbon dioxide numeric is 1.0 across each time horizon. This allows the 
greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol to be converted to the 
common unit of CO2e. Global Warming potentials for the greenhouse gases 
regulated under the Kyoto Protocol under a 100 year timeframe are as follows: 
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Carbon dioxide has a GWP of 1; Methane has a GWP of 23; Nitrous oxide has a 
GWP of 296; Halocarbons (HFC) has a GWP of 120 to 12,000; Sulphur 
Hexafluoride has a GWP of 22,200.91
Direct emissions: Emissions from sources owned by the reporter. 
Emissions Trading: A market mechanism that allows emitters (countries, 
companies or facilities) to buy emissions (“permits” or “credits”) from or sell 
emissions to other emitters. Emissions trading is expected to bring down the 
costs of meeting emission targets by allowing those who can achieve reductions 
less expensively to sell excess reductions (e.g. reductions in excess of those 
required under some regulation) to those for whom achieving reductions is more 
costly. 
Geologic Sequestration: Injecting captured CO2, under pressure into stable 
geologic formations where it is expected to remain indefinitely.  
Global Warming Potential (GWP): The relative impact on climate over 100 
years of the emission of one kilogram of a compound compared to the emission 
of one kilogram of CO2. Each greenhouse gas differs in its atmospheric lifetime 
and ability to absorb heat in the atmosphere. CH  has a GWP of 21. GWP values 
for N O = 310; HFC = from 140 for HFC-152a to 11,700 for HFC-23; PFC = from 





Greenhouse Gases: There are six focal greenhouse gases. Greenhouse gases 
that are both naturally occurring and manmade include carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O). Greenhouse gases that are not 
naturally occurring include hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).  
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) HCFCs are synthetic industrial gases 
made up of hydrogen, chlorine, fluorine and carbon. They are being used as 
commercial substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) primarily for refrigeration 
but also as blowing agents for insulating plastic foams, fire extinguisants, and 
solvents. There are no natural sources of HCFCs. These compounds deplete 
stratospheric ozone, although much less than CFCs. Production and 
consumption of these gases are controlled under the Montreal Protocol. 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs): HFCs are used as a replacement for CFCs in a 
variety of industrial processes, including semiconductor manufacture (plasma 
etching and cleaning tool chambers), refrigeration and fire protection and have 
been used as a replacement for CFCs. The atmospheric lifetime of HFCs ranging 
from about 1.5 years for HFC-152a to over 250 years for HFC-23. HFCs are 
among the six greenhouse gases to be curbed under the Kyoto Protocol. 
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IGCC: Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle plants gasify coal, biomass, or 
petroleum waste products (typically from refining processes) without burning the 
feedstock. The gas is then combusted in a gas turbine, and waste heat is used to 
create steam to drive a steam turbine. Sulfur dioxide and other trace impurities 
are removed prior to combusting the gas. The process uses less water and 
produces approximately 50 percent less solid waste than conventional coal-fired 
plants (which combust pulverized coal to create steam) and produces a pure 
carbon dioxide stream that can be separated and captured with a lower energy 
penalty and at lower incremental costs than in the case of pulverized coal plants. 
Another benefit is the potential to remove mercury at lower costs than in 
conventional coat-fired plants. 
Indirect emissions: Indirect emissions are defined as emissions from sources 
other than that owned by the reporter, but caused by actions on the part of the 
reporter. The predominant source of indirect emissions is the purchase or sale of 
electricity. Another source of indirect emissions might include emissions caused 
by product use (i.e. the calculated emissions of the fleet of GM vehicles in 
operation in the United States or of the operation of Whirlpool washers and 
dryers in the United States. There are clear problems with these measures. For 
example, there is a real risk of double counting as both a utility and the entity that 
purchases the electricity each counts the emissions for the same kilowatt. The 
key question becomes, who “owns” the emissions arising from power generated 
on behalf of others.93
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement adopted in December 1997 in 
Kyoto, Japan. The Protocol sets binding emission targets for developed countries 
that would reduce their emissions on average 5.2 percent below 1990 levels.  
Make-Rate: A term to describe the weight ratio of HFC-23 byproduct to HCFC 
production expressed as a percentage. 
McCain-Leiberman Climate Stewardship Act is a bipartisan national plan for 
action to begin solving the problem of global warming. The Act gives power 
plants, oil companies and factories until 2010 to collectively reduce their 
greenhouse emissions to the levels they emitted in 2000. The Act calls for the 
creation of an emissions trading system to help companies meet these 
requirements. The Act also allows companies to meet a portion of their emissions 
goal by paying farmers to use conservation methods to increase the amount of 
carbon stored in their soil.  
Nitrous Oxide (N2O): N2O is among the six greenhouse gases to be curbed 
under the Kyoto Protocol. N2O is produced by natural processes, but there are 
also substantial emissions from human activities such as agriculture, industrial 
production of nitric acid and adipic acid and fossil fuel combustion. The 
atmospheric lifetime of N2O is over 100 years, and its GWP is 310. 
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Off-system reductions: GHG emission reductions that are achieved outside of 
the company’s operations, such as reforestations projects (biological 
sequestration) or energy conservation projects undertaken with customers. 
On-system reductions: GHG emission reductions that are achieved within the 
company’s operations, such as heat rate improvement projects at electricity 
generation stations, renewable energy demonstration projects or implementation 
of hybrid vehicles.  
Safety Valve: A price cap within the cap-and-trade program whereby participants 
can purchase allowances from the government at the safety valve price if market 
prices exceed the safety valve. This would lower the risks of economic shocks 
created by unexpectedly high allowance prices, while lowering the risks of such a 
program being rolled back if high prices emerged (such as happened in the 
California RECLAIM market, where NOX prices exceeded $40,000/ton, causing 
the program to be shut down). Such a program is often referred to as a “hybrid,” 
combining elements of a cap-and-trade program with those of an emissions tax. 
Sequestration: Opportunities to remove atmospheric CO2, either through 
biological processes (e.g. plants and trees), or geological processes through 
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